

# **THE POSSIBILITY OF ENTRANCE OF SWEDEN AND FINLAND TO NATO**

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## Preface

I chose this topic in the first place because I am interested in the geopolitical-economic world, but also because it had become increasingly relevant throughout the years. My study Business Engineering not only increased my analytical skills but taught me to reflect critically about my surroundings which is an important aspect in this dissertation.

This dissertation is relevant for my studies at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration as it discusses macro-economic cost-benefit analysis. It enhanced my skills to work independently on a large project.

I want to thank Prof. Dr. Herman Matthijs for giving me the opportunity to work on this master's dissertation and helping me to achieve the end result by offering numerous feedback sessions. I want to thank my parents for supporting me during the writing process.

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## List of standard abbreviations

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Definition</b>
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
A2AD	Anti-Access and Area Denial
AAM	Air-to-air missile
ACCS	Air Command and Control System
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AEV	Armoured engineering vehicle
AEW&C	Airborne early warning and control
AG	Miscellaneous auxiliary
AGF	Miscellaneous Command Ship
AGI	Auxiliary General Intelligence
AGM	Air-to-ground missile
AKL	Light Auxiliary Cargo
APC	Armoured personnel carrier
ARS	Rescue & salvage ship
ARTY	Artillery
ARV	Armoured recovery vehicle
AShM	Anti-ship missile
ASM	Air-to-surface missile
AUV	Autonomous underwater vehicles
AX	Training ship
AXS	Training ship, sail
BvS	Bandvagn Skyddad
C	Centre Party (Sweden)
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CV	Combat vehicle
DPPC	Defence Policy and Planning Committee
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council



EDA	European Defence Agency
EEA	European Economic Area
EFTA	European Free Trade Organisation
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMU	European Monetary Union
ENEA	European Nuclear Energy Agency
EOP	Enhanced Opportunity Partners
Epbv	Eldledningspansarbandvagn
EPF	European Peace Facility
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
FGA	Fighter ground attack
GBU	Guided Bomb Unit
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPS	Global Positioning System
HX	Hornet X (X = item that is candidate for replacement)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IFV	Infantry fighting vehicle
INS	Inertial Navigation System
ISR	Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance
KD	Christian Democrats (Sweden)/ Christian Democrats (Finland)
KESK	Centre Party (Finland)
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
KOK	National Coalition Party (Finland)
L	Liberals (Sweden)
LCAC	Landing Craft Air Cushion
LCM	Landing craft, mechanized
LCP	Landing craft, personnel
LCVP	Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel
LIIK	Movement Now (Finland)
Lvkv	Luftvärnskanonvagn

M	Moderate Party (Finland)
MANPATS	Man portable anti-tank system
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MBT	Main battle tanks
MC	Military Committee
ML	Minelayers
MOR	Mortar
MP	Green Party (Sweden) / Member of Parliament
MRH	Main rotor head
MRL	Multiple rocket launcher
MSI	Modalities for Strengthened Interaction
MSL	Missile
MW	Mine Warfare
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NDPP	NATO Defence Planning Process
NIB	Nordic Investment Bank
NLAW	Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapon
NORDEFECO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NRF	NATO Response Force
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PARP	Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process
PB	Patrol boat
PBF	Fast patrol boat
PBG	Patrol boat, guns
Pbv	Pansarbandvagn
PCC	Patrol craft, coastal
PCGM	Patrol coastal, guns, missile
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PKK	Kurdistan Worker's Party
PPV	Protected patrol vehicle

PS	Finns Party
PSO	Patrol ship, offshore
R&D	Research and Development
R&T	Research & Technology
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
RBS	Robotsystem
RCL	Recoilless rifle
RQ	Research question
RSQ	Research sub-question
S	Swedish Social Democratic Party
SAM	Surface-to-air missile
SD	Sweden Democrats
SDP	Social Democratic Party (Finland)
SEK	Swedish krona
SFP	Swedish People's Party (Finland)
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SP	Self-propelled
SSK	Single-shot kill
SU	Soviet Union
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TKR	Tanker
TPT	Transport
TRG	Training
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US(A)	United States (of America)
USD	US dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V	Left Party (Sweden)
VAS	Left Alliance (Finland)
VIHR	Green League (Finland)
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
VLB	Vehicle-launched bridge

WTO World Trade Organization  
YPG People's Defence Units

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Relevance

This master's dissertation researches the opportunity of entrance of Sweden and Finland into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for Sweden, Finland and NATO itself and was started in October, 2021. The topic was already relevant in a deteriorating Euro-Atlantic security environment, especially in Eastern Europe with the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the consequential fights in the Donbas region.

However, in the light of the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine starting from February 24th, 2022, geopolitical tensions have risen even further. It concerns military crimes in the Euro-Atlantic region on a scale not seen since World War II. The conflict has an enormous impact on countries in Russia's neighbourhood, like Sweden and Finland. They are affected by this war as they feel their national safety seriously threatened. That's why it is from the utmost importance to research the possibility of NATO membership for both Sweden and Finland.

This importance is even further highlighted by the fact that NATO can guarantee a security framework towards European nations that want to accede to the Alliance and that respect its policy and are able to meet its criteria. Both Sweden and Finland already collaborate very closely with NATO and they share the same ideological values. In addition, Sweden and Finland on the one hand as well as NATO on the other hand could possibly enforce each other's military capabilities and organization and thus benefit from an expansion of the Alliance. It seems only logical that there are benefits involved for both parties.

Also, this master's dissertation can bring an added value to academic literature as similar cost-benefit analyses are primarily conducted by national entities, in this case Sweden's and Finland's government, and not by independent sources.

This research includes global events until August 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022 as a cut-off point and is submitted on August 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022.



## 1.2 Research questions

The main research question stands central in this master's dissertation. It can be subdivided in multiple research sub-questions. The main research question and research sub-questions are introduced in this subsection.

### 1.2.1 Main research question

The main research question upon which this master's dissertation tries to give an answer can be stated as:

RQ: What is the opportunity of entrance of Sweden and Finland to NATO for Sweden, Finland and NATO itself?

### 1.2.2 Research subquestions

This main research question can be subdivided in multiple sub research questions. These research questions are all answered in the corresponding sections.

RSQ 1: How can Sweden and Finland benefit NATO regarding their geographics, demographics and internal state structure? (Section 2)

RSQ 2: How did Sweden and Finland develop themselves into neutral countries throughout history and how was this state of neutrality reversed in the last months? (Section 3)

RSQ 3: Into which political and economic organizations did Sweden and Finland already integrate themselves since the Second World War? (Section 4)

RSQ 4: How can NATO as an organization bring more stability to Sweden, Finland and their uncertain security environment? (Section 5)

RSQ 5: What are the geopolitical developments in Sweden's and Finland's immediate security environment in the last years and how do Sweden, Finland and NATO need to take these into account when they decide whether or not to become a NATO member? (Section 6)

RSQ 6: What are the perspectives of the different political parties in Sweden and Finland regarding NATO membership and how did they evolve the last years? (Section 7)

RSQ 7: Which military capabilities can Sweden and Finland add to NATO's military organization? (Section 8)

RSQ 8: How do Sweden's and Finland's defence expenditures over time, in the past, at present and in the coming years, align with NATO's defence expenditure requirements? (Section 9)

RSQ 9: What are the costs of NATO membership for Sweden and Finland and how does this compare to their current spendings regarding defence? (Section 10)

RSQ 10: How will the geopolitical situation in Sweden's and Finland's environment be affected if Türkiye does not support both countries' NATO membership? (Section 11)

### 1.3 Methodology

In this master's dissertation, it is researched what the costs and benefits are regarding possible NATO membership of Sweden and Finland by formulating and answering a main research question and research sub-questions.

Main sources that are used to conduct this research are two books explaining Sweden's and Finland's history, the websites of Sweden's and Finland's national governments and their Defence Ministries, the website of NATO, the websites of the national political parties in Sweden and Finland, the websites of the Swedish Armed Forces and the Finnish Defence Forces, the Military Balance 2022 for information about military capabilities and the European Defence Agency for information about defence expenditures. In addition, several other sources are used, involving governmental reports and news articles reporting recent events. Independent academic sources regarding this subject were often scarce as this research concerns recent events in the geopolitical world. Topicality related to this research was followed up intensively and has shed even more light on the subject. A complete list of sources is provided at the end of this dissertation.

In each section of the dissertation following on this introduction, one of the above defined research sub questions is answered. Section 2 provides an answer on research sub question 1, Section 3 provides an answer on research sub question 2, etc. To conclude, an answer on the main research question is given in the conclusion. Additional information is provided in the appendices, as well as a complete list of used abbreviations, tables and figures.

## 2 Sweden and Finland: a general outline

To begin with, it is necessary to procure some insight into what characterizes Sweden and Finland in terms of their geographic location, their internal geographics and demographics and their internal state structure to give a first impression of how they could fit into NATO.

This section provides an answer to sub research question 1. General information about both Sweden and Finland is given. First, Sweden is described, and Finland is discussed in the same way afterwards.

### 2.1 Sweden

In this subsection, some general information is given about Sweden's geographic location, their internal geographics and demographics and their internal political structure.

#### 2.1.1 Geographic location

Sweden is located in the north of Europe as geographic part of the Scandinavian peninsula. Its neighbouring countries are Norway to the north and west, Finland to the east and Denmark to the south-west. Sweden is separated from Norway by the longest uninterrupted border between two European countries. At the west of Sweden bordering Norway there are the Scandinavian mountains, the Scandes. Finland is separated from Sweden by a somewhat shorter border of 614 km at the north east, by the Baltic Sea at the east and south coast of Sweden and by the Gulf of Bothnia, an arm of the Baltic Sea, at the east coast. The Åland Sea at the east coast of Sweden forms the connection between the proper Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia on the one hand, and between the Åland Islands and the Swedish mainland on the other hand. Sweden is connected to Denmark in the south-west with the Öresund bridge, disrupting the natural border of the narrow Öresund strait in the south and the broader Kattegat border in the south-west. Both the Öresund strait and Kattegat are regarded as an extension of the Baltic Sea (Sweden, 2021b).

### 2.1.2 Internal geographics & demographics

Sweden has a population of roughly 10,5 million and a total area of 528.447 km<sup>2</sup>. Sweden's capital is Stockholm. Both in number of inhabitants and total area, it is the largest of Northern Europe and the fifth largest country of Europe in terms of territory. Sweden's inhabitants mostly reside in the central and southern half of the country. Sweden's largest cities in terms of municipality population are its capital Stockholm (978.770 inhabitants) at the Baltic Sea on the east coast, Göteborg (587.549 inhabitants) at Kattegat on the west coast and Malmö (351.749 inhabitants) on the Öresund strait at the south coast. Although Sweden has a high degree of urbanization, this proportion of the population only covers 3% of the entire territory. More in the north, Sweden has more nature, predominantly forests: 69% of Sweden's land area is covered by forests. A significant share of Sweden's land area lies above the Arctic circle. Sweden's two largest islands are Gotland and Öland, both located in the Baltic Sea to the east of the Swedish mainland (Sweden, 2021b). Figure 2.1 provides a geographical map of Sweden.

### 2.1.3 Internal state structure

Sweden has a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy. The current head of state is King Carl XVI Gustaf, although nowadays the monarch in Sweden has merely a ceremonial function. The Swedish Riksdag is the unicameral parliament and consists of 349 members who hold a legislative power and are elected every 4 years. The national government resides in the parliament and consists of the prime minister and other cabinet ministers. It is a one-party minority government consisting of only members of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, led by prime minister Magdalena Andersson. The Social Democrats have historically been the most important political party in Sweden. Before Sweden's intention to join NATO, it had been neutral and military non-aligned since 1814, thus for more than two centuries (Sweden, 2021b). Appendix 1 provides a political map of Sweden.



Figure 2.1: Geographical map of Sweden (*Academia Maps, s.d.c*)

## 2.2 Finland

In this subsection, some general information is given about Finland’s geographic location, their internal geographics and demographics and their internal political structure.

### 2.2.1 Geographic location

Finland is located in Northern Europe and is just like Sweden a part of the Scandinavian peninsula. Finland’s neighbouring countries are Sweden to the west, Norway to the north and Russia to the east. As described above, Finland is separated from Sweden by a land border, the Gulf of Bothnia in the west and the Baltic Sea in the south-west. The border with Norway

is a natural land border. The border between Finland and Russia is long, namely 1.340 km and economically very important for trade between those two countries. At the south coast of Finland between Estonia and Finland, the Gulf of Finland is located (Finland, 2021).

### 2.2.2 Internal geographics & demographics

Finland's population is about 5,5 million and its total comprised area is 338.462 km<sup>2</sup>. Finland's capital is Helsinki. In terms of territory, it is one of the largest European countries. Just like Sweden, Finland has a low population density with people for the largest part living in the southern area of the country. Helsinki is Finland's largest city, with 655.000 inhabitants. Most of Finland's industry and agricultural resources are located in the south as well. Further north, Finland is mainly constituted of nature, mostly forests and lakes. Finland lays for nearly one third of its area within the Arctic Circle. Its most northern county, Lapland, is located above the Arctic circle. The Åland Islands are a Finnish archipelago off the south west coast of Finland between the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia and are a demilitarized semi-autonomous dependency. Finland's mainland is separated from the Åland Islands by the Archipelago Sea, which in itself lies between the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Finland and the Sea of Åland (Finland, 2021). Figure 2.2 provides a geographical map of Finland.

### 2.2.3 Internal state structure

Finland has a unitary parliamentary republic with a representative democracy. The Finnish unicameral parliament is called Eduskunta and has the legislative power. 200 members are seated there, elected by the Finnish people every 4 year. In contrast with Sweden, the head of state is not a monarch but a president. Finland's president is Sauli Niinistö of the National Coalition Party. He is in charge of the foreign politics and the defence forces. However, the country's power also lies in the hands of the prime minister, Sanna Marin of the Social Democratic Party, as leader of the Finnish government. The government is a five-party coalition consisting of the Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party, the Green League, the Left Alliance and the Swedish People's Party and consists of the prime minister and other ministers. The Social Democratic and Centre parties together with the National Coalition Party have been historically dominating the Finnish parliament. Throughout the centuries, Russia and Sweden have had a large political influence on Finland. Finland became

independent of Russia only in 1917 and has been stated as politically neutral and military non-aligned ever since 1948, before it expressed its interest in joining NATO in 2022. An important remark is that Finland is bilingual: both Finnish and Swedish are official languages and Swedish is a compulsory school course. Swedish is the official language on Åland. It demonstrates the huge influence Sweden currently has and has had on Finland throughout the years (Finland, 2021). Appendix 2 provides a political map of Finland.



Figure 2.2: Geographical map of Finland (Academia Maps, s.d.a)

### 3 Evolution of Sweden's and Finland's status of neutrality throughout history

It is important to first look back at Sweden's and Finland's history and how they have developed themselves into neutral countries throughout time to better understand the background against which they make political decisions regarding NATO membership.

This section provides an answer to sub research question 2. First, the political history of Sweden before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is described. Then, the same is done for Finland. The last part of this section further explains the recent events of 2022 and how this led to the end of Sweden's and Finland's neutrality.

#### 3.1 Sweden's neutrality status before Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine

Throughout history, Sweden has been maintaining a neutral policy until very recently and has been at peace for more than two centuries, ever since 1814 when Sweden invaded Norway. During multiple wars, including World War I, World War II and the Cold War, Sweden successfully managed to officially retain this status. Sweden has joined multiple international organizations since the end of World War II, like the UN and the EU, but has traditionally always been unfavourable towards joining NATO. Despite their neutrality policy, Sweden has maintained good diplomatic relationships with almost all countries throughout the years. A more detailed overview of Sweden's international political history (1397-2022) in different political eras is provided in this subsection. First, Sweden as a part of the Kalmar Union is described (1397-1524). Then, it is explained how Sweden evolved into one of the most powerful countries in Europe and how this Swedish Empire came to an end (1524-1721). Next, an overview of Sweden's last wars before they became neutral and the loss of Finland as an integral part of Swedish territory is provided (1721-1814). To conclude, Sweden's era of neutrality is discussed (1814-2022).

##### 3.1.1 Sweden as a part of the Kalmar Union (1397-1524)

Before 1397, Sweden had survived a period of decline following the Black Death in the 1340s. However, The Kalmar Union was formed in 1397. It brought Sweden, Denmark and



Norway together under the crown of queen Margarete. At this point in time, Sweden possessed the eastern and southern part of Finland. Wars between Sweden and Denmark took place between 1451 and 1455 and between 1506 and 1509. In 1495, Russia attacked the Swedish settlements of Viborg and Nyslott. Internal conflicts in the Kalmar Union however led to the execution of about a hundred Swedish nobles in the “Stockholm bloodbath” in 1520. This was ordered by Kristian II, the king of Denmark, after he was crowned king of Sweden. In 1521, there was a rebellion and Gustav Vasa, a Swedish nobleman, took power and was crowned the Sweden’s first hereditary monarch in 1523 (Kent, 2008).

### 3.1.2 Rise and fall of the Swedish Empire (1524-1721)

During Vasa’s reign, there was the Protestant Reformation, which Vasa used to nationalize the church and to consolidate its absolute power. Sweden itself flourished economically under Vasa’s reign. Regarding foreign policy, Sweden aimed at reigning over the Baltic Sea. After Vasa’s death starting from 1560, a turbulent period started involving multiple wars in which Sweden gained territories in the eastern Baltic region at the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. This continued in the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, where Sweden gained Kexholm in northern Karelia and Ingria, where St-Petersburg is currently situated. Sweden, under the crown of king Gustav II Adolf, was considered as a superpower for the first time in its history and it was successful in the Thirty Years’ War after intervening in 1630. Sweden supported the protestant powers of northern Germany in this war. Sweden’s military operations in this war reached far south in Central Europe, with the help of its ally France. The end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 resulted in the annexation of Bremen-Verden, the town of Wismar and Swedish Pomerania in the Treaty of Westphalia. In the 1640s and 1650s in separate wars, Sweden fought Denmark and Russia and enlarged its territory even further. In 1658 after the Peace Treaty of Roskilde with Denmark, the Swedish Empire reached its largest extent. At this point in time, next to present-day Sweden, it comprised Finland, parts of the present-day Baltic States and Norway and northern German provinces. It was the third largest European country at that point in time after Russia and Spain. Sweden’s success in the 17<sup>th</sup> century was further illustrated by the establishment of its own colony, New Sweden, in 1637, in what is currently known as the state of Delaware in the USA, until it was conquered by the Dutch in 1655.

Sweden had become a strong powerhouse in Europe but did not really have the resources to hold onto this as they were still an agrarian economy. This led to significant losses in wars in the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The old alliance with France was on the wane. Denmark, Poland-Saxony and Russia all united their forces in a pact to battle Sweden under king Karl XII in the Great Northern War (1700-1721). Sweden sought an alliance with England and Holland. Sweden booked important victories against the Russians at the Battle of Narva in 1700 and conquered parts of amongst other Poland, but ultimately lost the war at the Battle of Poltava, which is in present Ukraine, against the Russians in June 1709. To worsen the situation even further, Sweden was struck by the plague in the period 1710-1712. After Karl XII's death in 1718 and the conclusion of the Great Northern War in 1721 by the Treaty of Nystad, in which Sweden had to concede Estonia, Livonia, Ingria, Karelia and Kexholm to Russia, it became clear that Sweden's era of superpower (1611-1721) was over, as it only comprised modern-day Sweden, Finland and some German provinces anymore (Kent, 2008).

### 3.1.3 Sweden's last wars and the loss of Finland (1721-1814)

After the defeat in the Great Northern War, the status of the monarchy suffered as the parliament put an end to the absolute power of the king in the "Age of Freedom", until royal absolutism was reintroduced in 1772 by Gustaf III. During this period, internal struggles between the Hats and the Caps broke out. The Russo-Swedish war broke out in 1741. Finland was ceded to Russia in 1742 but most of it was given back in 1743 after appointing a Russian ally from the House of Holstein-Gottorp as heir to the Swedish throne. Sweden lost South Karelia to Russia after the subsequent peace treaty in 1743. The Pomeranian War against Prussia in an attempt to regain lost German territories in 1757 resulted in a defeat and a territorial status quo ante in Germany by the peace treaty in Hamburg in 1762. A new war was waged against Russia (1788-1790) but resulted in a failure. Russia had become the dominant state in the Baltic Sea region. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Sweden blossomed culturally following the Enlightenment. Sweden got entangled in the Napoleonic wars (1803-1815) across Europe in 1805 after being pressured by both England and Russia and it lost Pomerania to the French in 1807 and the part of Finland under Swedish reign to Russia under Tsar Alexander I in 1809. The following peace treaty of Hamina on September 17<sup>th</sup>, 1809 confirmed the cession of Finland to Russia. This concerned an area of about one third of Sweden total territory. No single Swedish border has changed ever since 1809. Internally, royal absolutism was set aside after Gustaf's III's demise. The French Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, who was appointed

as new king Karl XIV Johan, allied himself against Napoleon by defeating the Danes in 1813. In the following treaty of Kiel in 1814, Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden, whereafter Sweden and Norway formed a joint union under Swedish crown. This treaty was further enforced after Sweden's invasion of Norway. However, Sweden lost its Northern German provinces as decided on the Congress of Vienna. The invasion of Norway was the last war Sweden ever had fought and marked the beginning of Sweden's era of neutrality (Kent, 2008).

#### 3.1.4 Sweden's era of neutrality (1814-2022)

During the middle years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a few decades after Sweden's neutrality had originated, a dramatic acceleration in industrialization in Sweden occurred. As demand for labour had lowered, waves of mass immigration towards North America started in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This all went paired with a major European military conflict, the Crimean War starting from 1853, in which Sweden's neutrality policy was successfully tested for the first time. Sweden's industrial development resulted in economic growth of the nation. Three major political parties originated: the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives, and popular movements, like the labour movement and women movement, arose. Sweden introduced mandatory military service in 1901. Norway declared its independence and stepped out of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905 after it had been striving for more autonomy in the union for decades.

In the next decade, World War I (1914-1918) started. It was a serious test for Sweden's neutrality policy. Although Sweden officially stayed neutral, they supported both sides in the conflict. Before World War I started, Sweden had strengthened its ties with Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Sweden enriched itself economically by providing material demands to both sides, for example timber for Great-Britain and Swedish horses for Germany in 1915. Under pressure from Germany, Sweden mined the Kogrund Channel, which is the Swedish side of the Öresund channel, in 1916, which enraged Britain by taking away its maritime access to the Baltic Sea and thus its trade possibilities in that region. This led to a British blockade of German exports and imports and subsequent food riots in Sweden and the fall of the Swedish government under Prime minister Hjalmar Hammarskjöld, an Independent Conservative. On the other hand, an accord was reached with the Entente in 1918 involving the import of large quantities of common goods like grain and

fodder and the reduction of iron ores to Germany. At the conclusion of the first World War, however seriously weakened economically, it could be said that Sweden had strengthened its political and economic position compared to Russia and Germany.

Regarding the Åland islands, a Swedish-speaking part of Finland, Sweden occupied them in February 1918 after hearing reports regarding Russian atrocities on the islands. The Åland islands were originally intended to be demilitarized after the peace treaty of Paris in 1856 concluding the Crimean War but Russia had started to re-fortify them during World War I. Sweden however ultimately decided to avoid a confrontation and started to evacuate its troops from the islands. A referendum in the Åland islands in 1919 concerning reintegration with Sweden resulted in 95% of the votes in favour. However, this result was rejected by the League of Nations. As a result, the islands stayed under Finnish sovereignty, had autonomy regarding internal matters and maintained Swedish as official language.

After the first World War, Sweden became a member of this newly established League of Nations in 1920, being pressured by Britain. Further reforms took place, like the introduction of universal suffrage for both men and women in 1921. An attempt to create a Nordic defence pact in anticipation of a newly looming world war failed.

At the start of World War II on September 1<sup>st</sup>, 1939, Sweden under Prime minister Per Albin Hansson of the Social Democrats again declared its neutrality. When the Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30<sup>th</sup> of that same year, however, Swedish volunteers were allowed to fight for Finland. The Swedish government covertly provided weapons and credit to Finland. Sweden enriched themselves economically by continuing to provide Germany supplies of iron ore to maintain Germany's military capabilities, despite failed attempts of the British to sabotage this export. In return, Germany also provided Sweden of coke and coal to maintain Sweden's energy supplies' level. Trade with the west over maritime channels was difficult for Sweden as the North Sea was turned into a battlefield. In addition, after Germany's occupation of Norway, German forces traveling to and from Norway were allowed to use Swedish railways. Germany's military forces were also allowed passage to travel to Finland in 1941. The Swedish government censored publications of Swedish right parties concerning torture of the Norwegian resistance fighters by the Nazis. On the other side, trade negotiations with Britain were made, just like in World War I, which caused both nations to benefit economically. Significant help was given to thousands of European Jews fleeing the Nazi holocaust throughout the war by giving them asylum in Sweden, despite

being pressured by Germany to stop this. Nevertheless, after the conclusion of World War II, it could be stated that Sweden again had succeeded to officially maintain its neutrality policy: they had avoided any invasions by the Allies or the Axis powers. In addition, they had enormously enriched themselves economically by playing both sides (Kent, 2008).

Regarding internal post-war developments, the economic gains from World War II, together with additional funding from the Marshall Plan programme in 1947, helped develop the Swedish welfare state further. Sweden had become one of the world's most advanced countries in many aspects. Being represented in each government from 1917 until 1976 and delivering the Prime minister in each government from 1936 to 1976, the Social Democrats had undisputedly developed themselves into the leading power in the Swedish parliament. With the support of other democratic parties, they introduced several important reforms. The Swedish parliament was made unicameral with 350 MPs in 1970. This was altered to 349 MPs in 1972. In 1976, Thorbjörn Fälldin of the Centre Party became prime minister, disrupting the Social Democrats' hegemony. This term, Social Democrats were not present in the national government coalition. Altogether, also in 1991 and 2006 they were left out in the government formation, when the Swedish government in both cases consisted of a coalition led by the Moderate Party. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a political shift to the right in Sweden (Sweden, 2021a).

Regarding international post-war developments, Sweden joined multiple organizations like the United Nations in 1946 and the OEEC in 1948. While global tensions were rising again during the Cold War, Sweden stressed its neutrality policy in 1948. However, more affiliations were made with the western block, namely the USA and NATO, to secure Sweden's defence in the case of a possible Soviet military threat. Tensions between Sweden and the Soviet Union remained high as two unarmed Swedish reconnaissance planes flying over international waters were shot down in 1952 and when a Soviet submarine U 137 retrieved itself in Karlskrona, a Swedish naval zone, in 1981. After the fall of the Soviet Union, further political and economical integration in western institutions followed (Kent, 2008). Sweden joined the European Union in 1995 after a referendum in November 1994, but the proposal to implement the Euro as national currency was rejected by a majority of the population in another national referendum in 2003 (Sweden, 2021a). Starting from the late 1960's Sweden began to play a role in international peace efforts in Congo, Cyprus, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Chad. Sweden joined the NATO Partnership for Peace in 1994 together with Finland. In this partnership, Sweden

collaborated with NATO, although not being a member of the Alliance, to ensure peacekeeping internationally and aid in international missions, like in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, while still keeping its sovereignty. Further integration in the NATO framework was provided by its status of Enhanced Opportunity Partner in 2014. After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden felt endangered and started to express stronger sentiments towards joining NATO (NATO, 2022m).

### 3.2 Finland's neutrality status before Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine

Finland officially abides by the principle of neutrality since 1948. They have been at peace ever since 1947 after the Paris treaty was signed. Similar to Sweden, they have good relationships with almost every country and have become part of multiple international organizations like the UN and the EU. An important difference with Sweden is that Finland did implement the Euro as a national currency in 2002. Finland is currently not a member of NATO. A more detailed overview of Finland's international political history (1249-2022) in different political eras is provided in this section. First, a long era of Finland under Swedish reign is described (1249-1809). Then, the more autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland under Russian authority is explained (1809-1917). Next, an overview of the Republic of Finland as an independent country is provided (1917-1948). To conclude, Finland's era of neutrality is discussed.

#### 3.2.1 Finland under Swedish reign (1249-1809)

Finnish history in this period is largely overlapping with Swedish history as Finland was geographically seen largely a part of Sweden. For events regarding Sweden which also apply to Finland, section 3.1 can be consulted.

Finland had no significant political entity until the middle of the 12<sup>th</sup> century. However, it was always in the interest of neighbours Sweden and Novgorod, which is present-day Russia. Finland was subjected to Swedish authority after the second Swedish crusade around 1249 (this could also be a decade earlier as the exact date of event is not known). The peace treaty of Oreshek between Sweden and Novgorod in 1323 divided current Finland between the two countries: Novgorod received the eastern part of Finland, namely Karelia, which is currently a part of Russia, while Sweden received the majority of Finland by obtaining the western and

southern parts. The exact line of the division however is open to debate for historians (Finland, 2017).

Throughout the next centuries, Finland took over the legal and social frameworks of Sweden. There was a growing catholic sphere of influence in Finland. Finnish territory under Swedish reign became part of the Kalmar Union in 1397. As present-day Finland was divided under Sweden and Russia, it became subject to a war fought between both countries between 1495 and 1497. 1524 marked the end of the Kalmar Union. Vasa started to reign over Sweden and thus over Finland. Similar to Sweden, the protestant Reformation started in Finland in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Vasa founded Helsinki, which was then called Helsingfors, in 1550. By the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century during its expansion period in the Baltic region, the Swedish Empire had pushed Finland's eastern border with Russia as far east and north as where the present-day border is situated.

The Finnish armies took part in the Thirty Years' War under Swedish reign and Finland became part of one of the mightiest countries of Europe at the end of this war in 1648 and further after the peace treaty of Roskilde in 1658. However, Sweden suffered losses at the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and was further weakened in the Great Northern War (1700-1721), especially at the battle of Poltava in 1709. The mighty Swedish Empire had ceased to exist. The border between Finland and Russia was back at the level from after World War II after Russia had annexed the south-eastern part of Finland. Finland served as battleground in the Great Northern War and this resulted in famine and a decline in the Finnish population. Finland became victim of the war between Russia and Sweden (1741-1743) and became occupied by Russia for the second time in a generation. A new war fought by Sweden under Gustav III and Russia (1788-1790) further disturbed economic life in Finland. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Finland had been a playball of both Russia and Sweden. Finnish territories conquered by Russia in 1721 and 1743, "Old Finland", were to be reunited with the rest of Finland only in 1809. Very often, and especially in the Great Northern War, Finland became a victim of wars fought by both powers, beyond its control. However, outside of this last war, the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century had been very prosperous for Finland under the Enlightenment. In February 1809, the Russians under Alexander I invaded Finland during the Finnish war (1808-1809) between Sweden and Russia. Southern Finland had been overrun within 3 months and Finland got separated from Sweden. In June, Finland declared united with the Russian Empire by imperial edict. In March 1809, Finland pledged alliance to the Russian empire in Porvoo. This marked the end of Finland under Swedish reign (Kirby, 2006).

### 3.2.2 Grand Duchy of Finland (1809-1917)

Finland became officially the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland after the defeated Sweden signed the treaty of Fredrikshamn on September 17, 1809. In addition, Sweden had lost Åland after the war and it became a part of the Grand Duchy of Finland. Alexander I, the Russian emperor, became the Grand Duke of Finland. The Governor General was its representative in Finland. Karelia, one of the areas conquered by Russia in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and part of “Old Finland”, was reunited with the Grand Duchy of Finland. Finnish matters were handled directly by the Russian Emperor after being presented by the Finnish senate. Finland was given extensive autonomy by Grand Duke Alexander I. Helsinki became Finland’s capital in 1812. The Crimean war (1853-1856) between Russia on the one hand and an alliance of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France on the other hand resulted in bombings on the Finnish coast by the French and British. Multiple Finnish areas like Helsinki, the Åland islands and port towns in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland were attacked. The Finnish commonly refer to this war as the Åland war. After the peace negotiations, it was decided that Åland would become demilitarized. Outside of these events, the territory of present-day Finland entered a relatively peaceful era where many reforms took place. The Grand Duchy had become an important source for Russia for food, labour, industrial products and raw materials, and especially for the Russian capital Saint-Petersburg (then Petrograd). Finnish became an official language in Finland in 1863 in addition to Swedish. Finnish conscription was allowed by Russia in 1878 and resulted in a Finnish army. Finnish nationalism started to rise in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century under Russian reign with the growth of the strong national Fennoman movement and the development of Finland’s own currency in 1860.

Under Nicholas II however, a period of Russification started, also known as the first era of oppression (1899-1905). He published his February Manifesto in 1899 to curb Finnish autonomy. This manifesto stated that the Russian Empire could rule Finland without agreement of local legislative bodies. Nicolas II wanted the Russian Empire to have a closer grasp on Finland. That same year, the Labour Party, the later Social Democratic Party, originated. In 1900, measures were taken to implement Russian as the official administrative language in Finland. In 1901, conscription in the Russian Empire was installed and this ended the Finnish armed forces as an independent force structure. The outbreak of the Russian Revolution in October-November 1905 and the consequent patriotic national strike in Finland resulted in the reform into a unicameral parliament in 1906. The Finnish parliament or Eduskunta as it is known today thus originated. This went paired with the adoption of



universal suffrage in Finland. It was the first European country where women were allowed to vote. Similar to Sweden, emigration waves to the USA originated in Finland in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Russification continued in the second era of oppression (1908-1917). Tsar Nicholas II dissolved the parliament in 1908. He installed his own government in Finland without reference to the parliament to increase his control over Finland during this second period of Russification. This caused a lot of internal resistance within Finland and souring relationships between the autonomous Finland and Russia were emerging.

In the meantime, the rising German Empire had been taking an interest in Russia and Eastern Europe as a source of resources and tried to cause division in Russia by supporting revolutionary groups with financial means, like the Finnish national activist movement. Access to Finnish territories would give Germany the opportunity to enter Petrograd and Kola, rich in mining resources. Different Finnish groups increasingly began to unite. Pro-Swedish nationalists in Finland, known as Svecomans, volunteered to be trained as soldiers in Germany and formed a Jägerbattalion in 1915. After the outbreak of the February Revolution in Russia in February-March 1917, the firm grasp of Nicholas II on the Eduskunta ended. In July 1917, the Social Democrats in the Finnish parliament tried to press through the Power act, an attempt to transform Finland into a parliamentary democracy rather than a bid to become an independent country. It would diminish Russian influence. As a reaction to this, the dissolution of the parliament was forced as a reaction on this. New elections followed and the Social Democrats lost their absolute majority in the parliament to right-wing bourgeoisie. After the October Revolution in 1917 in Russia and the grasp of power of the Bolsheviks, politics got reversed. The non-socialist bourgeoisie in the parliament strived for total independence. On December 6, 1917, independence was finally voted by the Parliament. This was later approved by the newly installed Soviet government under Lenin. An end had come to Finland under Russian authority and Finland would soon call itself a republic (Kirby, 2006).

### 3.2.3 Republic of Finland (1917-1948)

After the Declaration of Independence was signed end 1917, the political spectrum in Finland was seriously divided. One the one hand, there was the Swedish-speaking middle- and upper-class rural right-wing, the Whites, which voted conservatively and was against socialism. They were supported by imperial Germany and their Jägerbatallions and by Swedish

volunteers. On the other hand, the left-wing Socialist-Communist Reds represented the low-class urban workers and was against capitalism. They were supported by the Soviets as they wanted to create a Finnish Socialist Worker's Republic according to the Soviet model. In January 1918, one month after the Declaration of Independence was signed, the Finnish government had to flee as a coup was organized by the left-wing Reds. The Civil War following this coup ended in May of the same year as the Reds were defeated by government troops of the Whites and German troops. The battle in Tampere in April where the Whites had emerged victorious appeared to be decisive. The parliament, which was now controlled by Whites, planned to install a monarchy under German influence in Finland. This failed after Germany's defeat in the First World War in November 1918. Instead, Finland became a republic. K.J. Ståhlberg, a liberal nationalist, was elected the first Finnish president of the republic of Finland in 1919. In 1920, Finland and the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty but tensions between the two countries remained high. In this treaty, it was stated that Finland gained Petsamo but lost its claims on East Karelia. Finland rapidly developed itself into a capitalist democracy in the next two decades after its independence under the political leadership of the Whites. Finland became a member of the League of Nations in 1920. In addition, Finland strengthened its ties with western nations like France and Sweden. Internal resistance was of the left-wing Social Worker's Party however remained and their activities were further repressed. A failed coup attempt of the anti-communist Lapua Movement in 1932 resulted in imprisonment of its leaders (Kirby, 2006).

The Åland Islands caused a dispute in Finland after its independence as they wished to reunite with Sweden. They were a pro-Swedish group of islands in Finland but sought to be an integral part of Sweden again. Finland rejected their demands and they offered in 1920 that the Åland Islands could become an autonomous region within Finland. However, Åland refused this offer. The League of Nations decided in 1921 that Finland would be sovereign over Åland, as long as they would respect their Swedish culture, language, values and self-government. Åland's demilitarization as decided after the Crimean War in 1856 was again confirmed. In addition, Åland was declared neutral under international convention. Ever since, Åland's 1920 Autonomy Act has been reviewed two times (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, s.d.).

In the 1930s, tensions between the Soviet Union and Finland started to rise again. In the nonaggression pact signed between the Soviet Union and Germany in August 1939, Finland was secretly assigned to the Soviet Union as a part for its sphere of influence. In October

1939, the Soviet Union requested Finland to install military bases on Finnish territory. After Finland's refusal, Finland was attacked by the Soviet Red Army on November 30, 1939. This event started the Winter War (1939-1940). This was the first of three large-scale armed conflicts involving Finland during World War II. It was the Soviet-Union's goal to annex Finland. However, after multiple defeats for the Soviet Union in sub-zero temperatures, Stalin recognized Finland's sovereignty. Still, Soviet troops were able to reach Vyborg in March. The war ended by means of the Moscow peace treaty on March 13<sup>th</sup>, 1940. This treaty assigned the Karelian isthmus as a territory of the Soviet Union in addition to a part of the Salla area, the Finnish part of the Rybachi peninsula, islands in the Gulf of Finland and finally the leasing of the Hanko Peninsula as a naval base to the Soviet Union. Karelia as Finland's industrial heart was an enormous loss. Despite many materiel and human losses for both parties, the Soviet Union had emerged victorious. An exhausted Finland started to cooperate with Nazi Germany in August 1940, in a pact with mutual gains: Finland helped Germany as they allowed passage of German troops on Finnish ground to occupied Norway. In exchange, the Finnish Army received weapons from Nazi Germany. In December 1940, Germany was making plans for its operation Barbarossa: the invasion of the Soviet Union. Finnish officers were drip-fed information about this, assuming they would have a role to play in this conflict. This was the beginning of military co-operation between both countries without any political agreement. Finland would never sign the Tripartite Pact between Axis powers. Germany launched its invasion against the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the Soviet Union attacked Finland 3 days later via air. Finland claimed its conflict with the Soviet Union to be a separate war from World War II: it was the beginning of the Continuation War (1941-1944). Finnish troops were able to occupy East Karelia by the end of 1941. They virtually regained all areas lost to the Soviet Union after the Winter War. In December 1941, war was declared on Finland by Britain. After Germany's defeat in Stalingrad in early 1943, Finland wanted to disengage itself from the war. Germany however did not allow that, and American attempts in 1943 to mediate peace between Finland and the Soviet Union failed. Peace talks were resumed again in Stockholm in 1944. The Moscow Armistice reached on September 19<sup>th</sup>, 1944 between the Soviet Union and Finland marked the end of the Continuation War and had serious negative implications for Finland, although Finland had never been occupied. The 1940 border was implemented. In addition, Petsamo, the modern-day Petsjenga at the Arctic Ocean, was annexed by the Soviet Union and Finland's naval base in Porkkala were to be leased to them. War reparations also needed to be made and German troops were prohibited on Finnish ground. This last requirement led to the Lapland War between Finland and

Germany from September to November 1944, where Germans were forced out by Finland into Norway, under pressure by the Soviet Union. This war included some minor battles and led to destruction in Lapland by the retreating Germans. Reconstruction of infrastructure in Lapland would last for years. Overall, Finland had suffered enormous losses during World War II. The Paris peace treaty concluded the Second World War in 1947, where Finland decided to reject Marshall aid to be able to develop good relations with the Soviet Union. In April 1948, both countries sign the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Co-operation between both countries would form the basis of the good Soviet-Finnish relationships during the Cold War. It also initiated Finland's policy of neutrality in 1948 as the treaty stated that it would not join a military alliance against the Soviet Union neither would it become dependent on the Soviet Union (Kirby, 2006).

#### 3.2.4 Finland's era of neutrality (1948-2022)

Finland subsequently joined multiple international organizations in its era of neutrality, including the UN in 1955, the Nordic Council in the same year and the European Free Trade Organization (EFTA) in 1961. This neutrality policy was further conducted in the decades after, although further integration with western institutions followed. Trade with the Western countries started to increase which led to the development of the Finnish welfare state, just like its neighbour Sweden. Trade with the Soviet Union continued after the war reparations were paid off. Finnish leaders realized that a good relationship with the Soviet Union would imply Finland's long-term survival as an independent state. The Soviet Union stayed their most important trade partner until the USSR's fall in 1991. After the fall of the Soviet Union, good trade relations were established between Finland and Russia in 1992 to replace the 1948 mutual assistance treaty. Finland became a member of the European Union in 1995 after it was approved by a national referendum in October 1994 and a consequent Parliament vote. While Finland adapted the Euro as national currency, Sweden did not (Finland, 2017). Similar to Sweden, Finland joined the NATO Partnership for Peace in 1994 to ensure peacekeeping internationally and aid in international missions together with NATO while still keeping their sovereignty. In addition, Finland became an Enhanced Opportunity Partner in 2015 together with Sweden (NATO, 2022n).

### 3.3 The end of neutrality for Sweden and Finland (2022)

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine starting on February 24th, 2022, Finland and Sweden both officially ended their political status of neutrality by submitting their letters of application to join NATO on May 18<sup>th</sup>, 2022, which started their accession process (Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022b). An overview of recent events following this invasion is provided in this subsection.

Following the invasion, the EU including Sweden and Finland imposed multiple sanctions upon Russian and Belarusian persons and entities and broader financial sanction packages upon the Russian and Belarusian state. The sanctions against Russian and Belarusian persons and entities included freezing of funds and travel restrictions. The general financial sanctions included export, import and investment restrictions (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Gradually phasing out Russian energy sources like crude oil was one of the most important sanctions the EU was willing to undertake to harm the Russian economy (Government Communications Department, 2022a).

Regarding material and humanitarian aid and additional equipment, Sweden decided in February to support Ukraine by providing 5000 anti-tank weapons, 5000 body shields, 5000 helmets, 135000 field rations, mine clearance equipment, medical supplies and other equipment to rebuild Ukrainian infrastructure. In the Budget Act, it was decided to enable transferring surplus equipment to Ukraine which is not of primary concern to the Swedish government (Sweden's Ministry of Defence, 2022b). Later, additional anti-tank weapons, mine clearance equipment, RBS-17 anti-ship missile systems and infantry support weapons were provided. Financially, they have provided Ukraine with SEK 500 million and an additional SEK 577 million to the fundraising account of the National Bank of Ukraine. SEK 110 million was sent to NATO's Support Fund for Ukraine's armed forces and SEK 100 million to support Ukraine through the EU and UN. Additional funding for humanitarian support was provided as well (Sweden's Ministry of Defence, 2022a).

Finland has also provided Ukraine with defence materiel, humanitarian support and other equipment. In February, it was decided by the President upon 2500 assault rifles, 150000 cartridges, 70000 combat ration packages, 1500 single-shot anti-tank weapons and other military aid (Finland's Ministry of Defence, 2022c). The following months, further defence materiel was later provided to Ukraine. However, the exact content of this military aid was not made publicly available by the Defence Ministry (Finland's Ministry of Defence, 2022b).

Financially, a total amounting of EUR 21 million of financial support was foreseen for humanitarian assistance as well as development cooperation. The total planned budget for Ukraine for the period 2014-2022 amounts to EUR 91 million (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2022a).

On April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2022, a report concerning the changes in Finland's security environment was passed through by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2022b) to the Finnish Parliament where a NATO membership was considered as a primary option after performing a security analysis, however no direct recommendation was made. That same month, it was decided by the Swedish Riksdag that the scale-up of Sweden's defence as stated in the Total Defence Bill would be accelerated in 2022 to reach 2% of GDP allocated to national defence as soon as practically possible. This means that Swedish national defence expenditures will have gone up by 85 percent between 2014 and 2025 (Sweden's Prime Minister's Office, Sweden's Ministry of Defence, & Sweden's Ministry of Finance, 2022).

On May, 21<sup>th</sup>, Russia stopped the transfer of natural gas to Finland as Finland no longer agreed to pay in Russian rubles for their gas supplies (Finland's Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, 2022).

A Host Nation Support Technical Arrangement was signed between NATO and Finland on May 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022. This enables Finland to support NATO forces in any security situation when they are stationed on Finnish territory and vice versa enables Finnish troops to receive NATO support when taking part in international exercises. Sweden already has this arrangement in place since 2014 (Finland's Ministry of Defence, 2022a).

Sweden's admission to NATO was initiated when Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2022a) published a report on May 13<sup>th</sup>, 2022, regarding the deterioration of the security environment and its implications for Sweden. A clear analysis was given of the security environment at that time. Sweden's Prime Minister's Office (2022a) announced on May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022 that Sweden would apply for NATO membership after this was debated in the Riksdag. 6 out of 8 parties in the Riksdag were in favour, only the Green Party and the Left Party were against admission. The political landscape of Sweden is further discussed in section 7.

Regarding Finland, a national report on Finland's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by the Finnish Government (2022c) was discussed in the Finnish parliament on May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2022. The President together with the government agreed upon NATO application. On May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2022, the Finnish parliament voted in favour: 188 in favour and 8 against

(Reuters, 2022a). Most of the votes against originated from Left Alliance MPs. However, more parliament members of the Left Alliance voted in favour than against NATO membership. The Left Alliance announced that they would stay in the Finnish government, independent of the outcome of the vote (Vanttinen, 2022). No further complications are thus expected for the well-functioning of the Finnish government.

On May 18<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Sweden and Finland both transmitted their application letters to join NATO (Finnish Government, 2022b; Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022b). However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan openly opposed entrance of Finland and Sweden to NATO. He accused both countries of supporting terrorist organizations (Milne & Pitel, 2022c). On the first day of the NATO Summit in Madrid which took place on June 28<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup>, an agreement was reached with Türkiye to support Sweden's and Finland's NATO membership, in the form of a trilateral memorandum between the three countries (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2022c). The complications regarding Türkiye's support of Sweden's and Finland's NATO bid are further discussed in section 11. After Türkiye lifted its veto, all 30 NATO member countries had given their permission to start accession talks between NATO, Sweden and Finland.

NATO talks between NATO on the one side and respectively Sweden and Finland on the other side took place on July 4<sup>th</sup> and were led by official delegations of both parties. Sweden and Finland both handed in their letter of intent regarding NATO membership and their obligations towards NATO that same day (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2022d). The Accession Protocol for both countries was signed by all NATO countries on July 5<sup>th</sup>, which officially made both Sweden and Finland NATO invitee. Being an invitee gives a country an observer status and thus the right to be present at NATO meetings. It does however not yet guarantee the security of NATO's collective defence mechanism (Finnish Government, 2022a).

The Accession Protocols are currently in the state of being ratified by each member country individually under national legislation. The Government of the United States of America serves as depository of the Washington Treaty and receives notifications of all members' accepted Accession Protocols (NATO, 2022b). The ratification process is expected to take some months. Most recently, the United States were the 23rd country to accept Sweden's and Finland's membership as the Accession Protocol passed the US Senate on August 3<sup>th</sup> (Schwartz, Milne, & Pitel, 2022).

After the ratification process is completed, NATO's Secretary-General will then invite both countries to become NATO member. Subsequently, the respective national parliaments of Sweden and Finland need to approve admission. After this is fulfilled, Sweden and Finland will officially be a member of NATO. Regarding Finland, Aland will remain its neutral position under international law (Finnish Government, 2022b).



## 4 Timeline of Sweden's and Finland's membership of international organizations

Sweden and Finland have become an integral member of several international political and economic organizations since the Second World War despite their official policy of neutrality before submitting their application letter to join NATO on May 18<sup>th</sup>, 2022.

This section provides an answer to sub research question 3. An overview is provided of the most important international organizations Sweden and Finland joined from 1946 until present day. Because they share membership of most organizations, no further subdivision in respectively Sweden and Finland is made in this section, in contrast to most other sections.

Throughout time, Sweden and Finland often joined or co-founded organisations simultaneously, or sometimes Finland followed Sweden a few years later. In addition, Finland was never the predecessor of Sweden for any organization<sup>1</sup> which indicates the leading role of Sweden in their bilateral relationship. It is noteworthy to mention that Sweden's and Finland's list of international organisations of which they have become a member throughout time is almost identical. The only organization Finland acceded to and Sweden did not, is the European Monetary Union. A timeline for both countries accurately depicts their year of entrance to several organizations in figure 4.1 and figure 4.2.

Sweden joined the United Nations (s.d.) in 1946, one year after its establishment. Finland joined 9 years later, in 1955. Sweden was one of the founder states of the Council of Europe (s.d.) on May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1949 and Finland only joined in the year 1989. The Nordic Council (2022) had Finland and Sweden both join as one of the founders in 1952. It is an organisation put in place in 1952 to improve interparliamentary coordination between the Nordic states Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark as well as the autonomous areas Åland islands, Faroe Islands and Greenland. Sweden subsequently joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (2022) in 1957 and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) (2022), having the same purposes as the IAEA but with fewer members, in 1958. Finland joined these organisations respectively in 1958 and 1976. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (s.d.) was joined by Sweden in 1961 as one of its founding members and by Finland only in 1969. Sweden and Finland co-founded the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in

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<sup>1</sup> Except for when Finland joined the Eurozone, as Sweden has never until present day adapted the Euro as a national currency

Europe (OSCE) (s.d.) in 1973. The Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) (s.d.) was founded by Sweden, Finland and the other 3 Nordic States in 1975 as an international financial institute. The European Free Trade Organisation (EFTA) (s.d.b) was established by Sweden and 6 other European states in the year 1960. Finland joined the association in 1986. They both left the organisation together end of 1994 with other countries to join the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Union (EU), both subsequently in 1994 and 1995 (EFTA, s.d.a). Finland and Sweden became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 to stimulate dialogue and co-operation between NATO and non-NATO members especially in Eastern and Central Europe after the Cold War (NATO, 2017). This organisation was later followed up by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) (2020) in 1997 which both countries joined that year. A couple years before in 1992, Sweden and Finland co-founded the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) (s.d.) which united the governments around the Baltic Sea to work together on the safety issues. Finland and Sweden both became a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994 (NATO, 2020b). This program was constructed to promote co-ordination between NATO states and other states in Europe regarding military operations, disaster planning and aiming to create trust. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) (s.d.) was created in 1995 and Sweden and Finland got seated in the organisation that year as well. Sweden and Finland both co-founded the Arctic Council (s.d.) in 1996, which concerned issues of the countries around the Arctic region. One organisation Finland has acceded and Sweden did not until today is the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 (European Central Bank, s.d.). Finland implemented the euro as a currency in 2002 while Sweden abstained and kept the Swedish Crown as national currency. The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEF) (s.d.) was a cooperation structure founded in 2009 by Sweden and Finland and the three other Northern European nations to increase the countries' national defence. Both countries however became Enhanced Opportunity Partners (EOP) of NATO in 2014 as the threat level in Eastern Europe and in the Baltic Sea increased. Deeper co-ordination with NATO was possible, for example regarding crisis management in case of future conflicts (NATO, 2022i).





Figure 4.1: Timeline for Sweden joining international organizations (1946-2014)






Figure 4.1: Timeline for Finland joining international organizations (1952-2014)

## 5 NATO: a general outline

It is important to consider how the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) can bring stability to both Sweden and Finland as they are situated in an uncertain security environment. That is why more information about NATO and its purpose needs to be procured.

This section provides an answer to sub research question 4. First, an introduction of NATO's origin and its members is provided. Secondly, NATO's main principle is explained. Then, it is explained how NATO functions as an organization and which international partnerships NATO has. Then, the accession process for new members is described. Fifth, NATO's look at the future as decided upon at the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid is revealed. To conclude, NATO's funding structure is analysed.

### 5.1 The origin of NATO and its members

NATO was established in 1949 by the North-Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty. It is a political and military alliance in the Euro-Atlantic area between countries from Europe and North America. NATO wants to safeguard the freedom and security of its members, both in a political and a military way.

In a political regard, NATO wants to promote democratic values. If problems related to defence or security arise, they want to give the opportunity to members to solve these issues by consulting and cooperating with each other. This way, they are more likely to trust each other and to avoid conflicts in the long term.

In a military regard, NATO wants to bring a peaceful solution to conflicts. However, NATO can call upon its military capabilities to undertake an active role in a broad range of multinational crisis-management operations and missions, including civil emergency operations, if diplomacy does not succeed. NATO does not have troops of its own: NATO members attribute national troops to the Alliance (NATO, s.d.b).

The political context for the origin of The Washington Treaty can be found in the increasing hostilities between the western powers and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The Soviet Union's sphere of influence was spread throughout Eastern Europe and at the same time, demobilisation of western forces was happening. Tensions rose with the Berlin blockade

in April 1948 and the coup in Czechoslovakia in June 1948. Western powers quickly realised that a military alliance was needed to avoid a new World War. The United States agreed to back this alliance military after the Western Union was created with the signing of the Brussels Treaty in March 1948. This Brussels Treaty became the basis for The Washington Treaty (NATO, 2022c).

The Washington Treaty was then signed in Washington D.C. on April 4<sup>th</sup>, 1949 by 12 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Following this, Greece and Türkiye joined in 1952, Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020. Sweden and Finland jointly submitted their application for NATO on May 18<sup>th</sup>, 2022. In total, NATO now counts 30 members (NATO, 2020a, s.d.a). In figure 5.1, a map involving all NATO members excluding Northern Macedonia is provided<sup>2</sup>. In table 0.1 in appendix 3, an overview of all current NATO members ranked by their date of accession can be found.




Figure 5.1: Political map of all NATO members excluding Northern Macedonia (NATO HQ Geospatial Section, 2019)

<sup>2</sup> A more recent map involving all NATO members was not yet available on NATO’s website.

## 5.2 NATO's main principle

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's founding treaty, constitutes NATO's main principle, namely the principle of collective defence. It states that an attack against one or several NATO members is considered as an attack against all. Military operations can be undertaken by NATO upon activation of Article 5 or under a mandate of the United Nations, alone or by collaborating with other nations or international organisations. Only once has this article been activated, namely after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001. Together with the possession of nuclear weapons, this policy of collective defence increases NATO's deterrence towards hostilities. To further illustrate NATO's collective thinking, it is important to mention that each NATO decision regarding any matter can only be supported if all 30 member states are unanimously in favour. Decisions are taken regarding security on multiple levels and thus require a consensus within NATO (NATO, 2022a).

## 5.3 NATO's organizational structure and partnerships

NATO's organizational structure is as follows: each member has its own NATO delegation and its military representatives. The delegations are permanently stationed in NATO's headquarters in Brussels. The delegation's head is an ambassador who represents the member's government in the decision-making process of NATO. The delegations form the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group. The North Atlantic Council is the political decision-making body of NATO. It is headed by the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who leads NATO since 2014. Each country has a representative in this council and they meet once a week or more if necessary. The Nuclear Planning Group is similar to the North Atlantic Council, but they decide on nuclear policy matters. Lower on the hierarchical ladder, a network of subordinate committees exists that deals with a broad range of problems, political as well as technical. In these committees, representatives and experts of all members are seated. The military representatives translate the political decisions into military actions. The Military Committee (MC) consists of the Chiefs of Defence of the member countries and the International Military Staff, which is the Military Committee's executive body. NATO's integrated military command structure is then composed of the Allied Command Operations (ACO), which is responsible for NATO's operations' planning and execution, and the Allied

Command Transformation (ACT), which identifies challenges and opportunities to be able to innovate and stipulates NATO's future (NATO, 2022h, s.d.b). In appendix 4, a schematic overview of NATO's internal structure is provided.

In order to be able to quickly react to military threats, NATO developed its NATO Response Force (NRF), which is a force of air, land, maritime and special operations force units. In addition, the NRF can be used for exercises or training activities. Member states bring in rotational units for a period of 12 months. In 2014, this Force was extended with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as a "spearhead force" and as a part of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to be able to be even more responsive to the deteriorating security environment. NATO currently has multiple international operations and exercises where members cooperate to test systems and tactics in NATO's integrated command structure, improve interoperability and prepare for real conflicts. After the 2022 Russian invasion in Ukraine, NATO extended its exercise programme (NATO, 2022g).

Outside of its members, NATO partners with other countries and international organizations. NATO has partnerships with 40 countries who are not a member of the Alliance on problems regarding politics and security. Dialogue and cooperation between NATO and these countries are main elements of the partnership. Although they do not have the decision-making power NATO members have, they can collaborate in other practical ways, for example by supporting and participating in the military missions, operations and exercises led by NATO, together with member countries. Partnerships with countries include the Partnership for Peace (the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) consists of all NATO member countries and the Partnership for Peace countries), NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and other global partners on a national level. Partnerships with international organizations include for example the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (NATO, 2020c).

#### 5.4 The accession process of new members into NATO

NATO has a long, multi-step accession process. Currently, NATO has an open-door policy for European countries, as stated in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which means that NATO membership is open to any European country that respects NATO's policy, as long as this is under consensus of all NATO members. Respecting NATO's policy also means that aspiring NATO members cannot sign new treaties or maintain treaties which are opposed to



the North Atlantic Treaty. In addition, it is required that they can meet the proposed criteria on an economic, political and military level and that they can bring added value in increasing stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. When a country has announced its interest to join NATO and has submitted its letter of application, they are invited to a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in which NATO gives effective advice regarding key requirements of membership. Additionally, they are invited by NATO to enrol in dialogue regarding their aspirations and necessary reforms. Those accession talks between a team of NATO experts and representatives of the aspirant country take place in the NATO Headquarters and are the first step in the accession process. Issues regarding political, legal and military obligations are discussed and the aspirant's willingness to contribute. A second step is that the country sends letters of intent to NATO regarding acceptance of their commitments and obligations towards NATO, together with timetables regarding reforms. The third step is that Accession Protocols are signed by NATO countries for the invitee. Those protocols are then ratified by each NATO country individually in a fourth step as the procedures are different on a national level. Fifth, the Secretary General invites the aspiring country to accede to NATO. The invitee then accedes to the Treaty according to their own national procedures. Lastly, they ultimately become a NATO member after depositing their instruments of accession with the US State Department. However, it is important to stress that all steps in the admission process where NATO's decision-making is involved need to be unanimously approved by all member states (NATO, 2022b). This is discussed further in Section 10, where it is illustrated that this principle can be problematic in some cases. A schematic overview of the admission process can be found in appendix 5.

## 5.5 NATO's look into the future

On the most recent NATO Summit, taking place from June 28<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup>, 2022 in Madrid, NATO members decided upon the direction of NATO's future policy to transform and further strengthen itself. Sweden and Finland were also invited as observing parties. In this summit, NATO strongly condemned the military actions Russia is undertaking against Ukraine, a stable, sovereign and independent democratic partner country with whom the cooperation has intensified over time. NATO's response to these recent events is further described in section 6. The most important points formulated on the NATO Summit were the increase of common funding and higher investment in NATO by member states, an expansion in the amount of high readiness forces to over 300.000, stronger forward defences, improved battlegroups in

the east of NATO territory and a Comprehensive Assistance Package to support Ukraine in the long term. In addition, the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept was formed (NATO, 2022o).

NATO's Strategic Concept is a blueprint in which NATO's values, tasks and principles as well as its purpose and priorities for the next decade in the changing security environment are defined. The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept is the most recent version, following the 2010 Strategic Concept obtained at the Lisbon Summit. It was adopted end June 2022 at the NATO Summit in Madrid. NATO's three core tasks as stipulated in this Strategic Concept are deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. The deteriorating security environment with Russia as most significant threat is underlined. Next to this, China is for the first time addressed as a challenge towards the security of NATO, and climate changes continue to obtain a prominent role (NATO, 2022k). Updating the strategic concept is one of the 9 pillars of the NATO 2030 agenda (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2021).

In this NATO 2030 agenda, NATO (2021) reveals its ambitious plans for the future. It is proposed by the Secretary General how to make NATO stronger and ready for the changing security environment in the coming years, based on consultation with members and an independent expert group. On the NATO Summit in Brussels on June 14<sup>th</sup>, 2021, the NATO 2030 agenda was decided upon by the member countries' leaders. The 9 main pillars are Deeper Political Consultation and Coordination, Strengthened Deterrence and Defence, Improved Resilience, Preserving Technological Edge, Upholding the Rules-Based International Order, Boost Training and Capacity Building, Combat and Adapt to Climate Change, the Next Strategic Concept and Investing in NATO.

## 5.6 The funding structure of NATO

NATO's well-functioning of the entire organization is made possible by its funding. NATO's funding structure consists of both direct and indirect contributions of its members. NATO organs that take part in the funding process are The Resource Policy and Planning Board, the Budget Committee, the Investment Committee and the North Atlantic Council itself.

### 5.6.1 Direct funding

NATO's direct funding is paid by the member states by common funding and joint funding. Direct funding for NATO amounts to EUR 2.5 billion in total and only make 0.3% of all defence expenditures of all member states. This way, the NATO budgets and programmes are financed, such as its permanent military command structure, its military infrastructure including satellite communications, its air defence programs... They are to the interest of all member states. The common funding principle is applied as follows: the NATO budget for each year is decided upon by the Allies, and they then need to attribute to this budget according to their Gross National Income. Every member thus pays an equal small percentage of their Gross National Income to finance NATO's direct cost structure. This can be seen in table 5.1.

<b>Nation</b>	<b>Cost share</b>	<b>Nation</b>	<b>Cost share</b>
Albania	0.0908	Lithuania	0.2566
Belgium	2.1043	Luxembourg	0.1693
Bulgaria	0.3656	Montenegro	0.0291
Canada	6.8789	Netherlands	3.4506
Croatia	0.2995	North Macedonia	0.0778
Czech Republic	1.0558	Norway	1.7771
Denmark	1.3116	Poland	2.9861
Estonia	0.1248	Portugal	1.0491
France	10.4913	Romania	1.2279
Germany	16.3444	Slovakia	0.516
Greece	1.0573	Slovenia	0.2276
Hungary	0.7595	Spain	5.9908
Iceland	0.0642	Türkiye	4.7266
Italy	8.7812	United Kingdom	11.2823
Latvia	0.1595	United States	16.3444
		<b>TOTAL NATO</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 5.1: Adjusted cost share in % of NATO members in NATO's common-funded budget (applicable from January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2022 to December, 31th, 2024) (*NATO, 2022d*)

In practice, NATO's common-funded budget consists of three main parts: the civil budget, the military budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme. The civil budget involves the costs related to the working of NATO's headquarters and amounts to EUR 289.1 million in 2022. The military budget involves the costs of the integrated Command Structure and amounts to EUR 1.56 billion in 2022. The NATO Security Investment Programme involves costs related to NATO's capabilities and military infrastructure and amounts to EUR 790 million in 2022. For 2023 until 2030, additional funding will be provided by the Allies (NATO, 2022d).

Sweden's and Finland's expected contribution to the common-funded budget, if they were to join NATO, is discussed in section 9.

### 5.6.2 Indirect funding

Indirect costs are larger and correspond to national contributions. In practice, it involves the costs a member pays for providing capabilities and troops to a NATO operation or mission. Members are not obligated to contribute unless it is a NATO operation as a consequence of an Article 5 invocation. These contributions can vary widely regarding the amount and form of procurement of troops, weapons and other military infrastructure or equipment. Each member takes some of its own national collective defence to cede it to NATO's collective defence framework. The 2% guidelines established on the Wales summit in 2014 as mentioned above relate to these costs.

As a reaction on Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 which caused growing instability in the Euro-Atlantic region, NATO decided at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales to reinforce its deterrence and defence posture by increasing its indirect funding. NATO members committed to spend at least 2% of their GDP on military spendings. More concretely, it was decided that Allies who already spend 2% of their GDP on military defence, would continue to do so, and Allies who did not meet this criterion yet would urge themselves to do so within the coming decade. In addition, it was decided that by 2024, at least 20% of defence spendings had to be invested in new major equipment for each Ally. These guidelines will apply to Finland and Sweden as well if they decide to become a member of NATO (NATO, 2022d). 2014 only counted 3 NATO members that reached the 2% threshold, including new members Montenegro and North Macedonia. Based on the yearly report regarding defence expenditures of NATO members, it was estimated that there were 9 out of

29<sup>3</sup> countries meeting this criterium in 2022. Based on the same report, it was estimated that 24 members succeeded in the 20% defence expenditures for investment agreement in 2021, while only 7 members reached this threshold in 2014, including Montenegro and North Macedonia. There has been a rise in total NATO defence expenditures from 2017 until 2022, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022). NATO’s increasing aggregated defence expenditures from 2014-2022 in USD millions can be verified in figure 4. Estimates are provided for 2021 and 2022.




Figure 2: Total defence expenditures of NATO members in million USD (2014-2022) in 2015 constant prices and exchange rates (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022)

<sup>3</sup> Finland does not have armed forces. That is why only 29 members are considered.

## 6 Geopolitical consequences regarding NATO membership of Sweden and Finland

Many different actors in the Euro-Atlantic region have conflicting interests and ambitions. This can make tensions rise between countries in this region. Especially in the case of Sweden and Finland and their increasingly uncertain neighbourhood in the last decades and years next to Russia, it is important to be aware of these geopolitical developments. A possible NATO membership of Sweden and Finland will undoubtedly impact the geopolitical situation in their environment.

This section provides an answer to sub research question 5. First, it describes Russia's military capabilities, and recent geopolitical events in Sweden's and Finland's joint neighbourhood. Secondly, it mentions what the geopolitical consequences of NATO membership could be in these regions. Sweden's and Finland's security environment can be considered as fairly identical as they are neighbouring countries. That is why, in contrast to most other sections, no further subdivision between Sweden and Finland is made in this section.

### 6.1 Geopolitical developments in Sweden's and Finland's environment

This subsection starts with explaining the Russian military threat and the Baltic states' peculiar position between Russia on the one side and Sweden and Finland on the other side. Then Russia's military operations are discussed before its invasion of Ukraine. Then, the Arctic region is discussed. Finally, the military actions of Russia since its invasion of Ukraine are described and the reaction of the West.

#### 6.1.1 Russia's military capabilities

Russia can be considered as the major geopolitical threat in the Baltic Sea region and Arctic Ocean region. Regarding Russia's Navy, the fleets of concern for Sweden and Finland are the Baltic Sea fleet and the Northern fleet. The Nordic fleet is located in Severomorsk in the Murmansk region on the coast of the Arctic Ocean and has submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Because of its nuclear power, Murmansk is of geostrategic importance to Finland as

it is less than 200 km away from the Finnish border. It has an important status because Russia has its missile launch centre in Plesetsk and its shipyard in Arkhangelsk stationed there. Nuclear deterrence is an important part of Russia's strategy as it has the largest, most diversified and most modern nuclear arsenal in the world. The major city to defend is Saint-Petersburg, the "Northern Capital". Saint-Petersburg is less than 200 km away from the Finnish border. As the second largest Russian economic centre, it is the closest major Russian city to NATO borders at a distance of merely 60 km. A strong A2/AD denial capability has been set up in Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave at the south east coast of the Baltic Sea, to compensate for the loss of the Baltic states as a strategic position after the Cold War. A2/AD is also deployed in Crimea. The reach of this denial capability goes as far as south in the Norwegian Sea. This A2/AD capability forms a threat for the whole Baltic and Black Sea region, and in particular for mainland Sweden and Gotland, which is located only 330 km away from Kaliningrad.

Multiple areas where Russia has increased its military presences the last couple of years are of concern for Sweden and Finland. Russia has strengthened its military capability in both countries' neighbourhood. More concretely, Russia has reinforced itself in the Arctic and along its western border. Furthermore, Russia has increased its military presence in Belarus as well as its military cooperation with them. This has resulted in a higher military threat for Poland and the Baltic States. Russia has further modernized its armed forces. Its operating procedures have been improved after having gained experience from recent combat operations. Russia has placed some of its most advanced technological weapons systems close to Finland in the last years. The last couple of years, Russia has been investing in its nuclear capabilities to maintain its status as nuclear superpower. In 2020, Russia even published a policy document in which the use of nuclear weapons was authorized by its own policy if the very existence of the state was in jeopardy. Furthermore, Russia and China have been developing their bilateral relationships the last couple of years, with their common ambition to weaken the position of the West, and a no-limit partnership was signed on February 4<sup>th</sup>, 2022.

### 6.1.2 The Baltic States' peculiar position

NATO shares a direct land border with Russia in the Baltic Sea region by means of the Baltic States. The Baltic States are located between Russia on its east border and Finland close to its west border, on the west coast of the Baltic Sea. Concerning this strategic geographical

position next to the Russian border, it is important that the Baltic States remain free and secure the coming years as they have become an important economic and strategic partner of Finland, Sweden and NATO as a whole. NATO can currently reinforce its Baltic Allies over land through the Suwalki corridor in Poland between Belarus and Kaliningrad on NATO ground. However, it is then not possible to circumvent the A2AD positioned in Kaliningrad. The Baltics can also be reinforced via Sweden and Finland over land, or via Gotland over sea, although this is no NATO territory and thus not the most practical solution in case of a heightened threat level.

### 6.1.3 Russia's military operations before its invasion of Ukraine and the reaction of the West

The past few years, Russia has created multiple international conflict situations to reach its long-term goals. Examples of this are its military activities in Georgia in 2008, its military intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2015, its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the consequential war in the Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine. Military jets from Russian origin, like SU-24 bomber planes in 2014, have been regularly entering the Swedish airspace unaccompanied and without permission in the last years. Foreign submarines have been spotted sailing off the archipelago near Stockholm in 2014. In March 2015, a Russian military exercise with 30.000 soldiers took place with the objective to simulate an attack on Gotland and some Danish and Norwegian islands. In the spring of 2021, Russia deployed a large number of military troops in Crimea on the border with Ukraine. Chemical weapons have already been used in the past by Russia in illegal ways, for example in the assassination attempt on Alexei Navalny. Russia has also undertaken other types of operations to reach its goals. It has been targeting cyber operations at Ukraine, like releasing spyware. All these actions have led to an increasingly undermined security situation and higher uncertainty in the Euro-Atlantic region for Sweden and Finland in the Baltic Sea region.

Consequential actions have been undertaken by Finland and Sweden separately and by NATO as a reaction on the increasing Russian military threat. Following the signalisation of Russian warships close to Gotland, Sweden deployed troops to Gotland in 2020. NATO has increased its presence and training activities in the Baltic countries and in Poland to improve stability. NATO has improved its deterrence policy and its collective defence, for example by organising more military exercises and by further developing its defence planning. They pay more attention to cyber domains and sea lines of communication in the Northern Atlantic



Ocean. They look closer at the geopolitical developments in the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe. It is of vital importance to Sweden and Finland that NATO maintains its strong security position in Europe, as it raises the threshold for a military attack by Russia.

#### 6.1.4 The threat in the Arctic region

The Arctic region is strategically very important for Finland. The Finnish province of Lapland is situated in the Arctic Region. The last 10 years, the Arctic environment has changed a lot. Sweden and Finland strive to maintain a stable Arctic environment, but global powers' growing military activity and presence to obtain additional natural resources in the Arctic because of climate change make this increasingly challenging. Russia as largest Arctic country sees the Arctic as increasingly important for its economic activities and has therefore increased its military presence in the Arctic region. This has enhanced Russian control over the Northern Sea route. In addition, China's presence as non-Arctic country for economic and strategic reasons has made tensions in the Arctic region rise even further. Canada, the USA and other NATO countries have increased their military presence as a reaction to this which raises the global strategic importance of the Arctic.

#### 6.1.5 Russia's military operations since its invasion of Ukraine and the reaction of the West

It can be stated that the Russian large-scale military aggression against Ukraine starting from February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022 is on a level not experienced in Europe since World War II. There was no single legitimate reason to invade Ukraine and to breach its territorial integrity. War crimes have been committed and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, like military targeting of civilians. Ethically, Russia's actions do not comply with the United Nations Charter, the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE Charter of Paris and the Budapest Document.

A strong, united answer on Russia's invasion of Ukraine was given by the EU as it has politically openly expressed itself against Russia. The EU has inflicted economical sanctions against both Russia and Belarus, consistent with the sanctions inflicted by the USA, the UK, Canada and other western-oriented countries like Japan and South Korea. In addition, the EU is scaling back dependency on Russian commodity products like oil and gas supplies. The EU made the transfer of military equipment of member states to Ukraine financially possible by providing billions of euros under the European Peace Facility (EPF). Next to political,

economic and military support, humanitarian aid was given to Ukraine. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have each applied for EU membership which could make the strategic position of the EU in Russia's neighbourhood even stronger.

NATO has not directly sent troops to the Ukrainian front as this would eventually result in a new World War. However, for the first time, elements of the NATO Response Force were activated. NATO sent reinforcements to the four existing multinational battle groups in eastern Europe, namely in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and created four additional multinational battle groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. NATO's eastern flank now has troops reaching from the Baltic Sea region in the north to the Black Sea region in the south. Military support in the form of weapons and other military infrastructure has been sent to Ukraine by individual NATO countries and by Sweden and Finland. This decision ended Sweden's and Finland's military non-alignment. NATO maritime cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia has increased. NATO cooperation with Sweden and Finland has intensified by means of the Modalities for Strengthened Interaction (MSI). This concerns increased information exchange, strategic communications and coordination of activities between both Sweden and Finland on the one hand and NATO on the other hand.

Military cooperation between countries of NORDEFSCO has further developed to enhance stability and security in the Baltic Sea region, the Arctic region and in Northern Europe. The bilateral defence cooperation between Sweden and Finland themselves has also improved since the invasion, including joint military exercises on Gotland, in the central Baltic Sea and in Stockholm's southern archipelago. Furthermore, possible joint peacetime operations such as territorial surveillance are looked upon to be improved. The Arctic Council has stopped its coordination as Russia is a member of that council. Other international organisations, like the Council of Europe, the UN Human Rights Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Northern Dimension have each suspended Russia as a member. Although the no-limit partnership with China was signed in February, 2022, China has not chosen to directly assist Russia in the Russian-Ukraine conflict, which isolates Russia even further.

## 6.2 Geopolitical considerations regarding possible NATO membership of Sweden and Finland

This section first describes the geopolitical consequences in Sweden's and Finland's immediate neighbourhood, on the one side if they were to stay out of the Alliance and on the other side if they were to become a NATO member.

### 6.2.1 Sweden and Finland do not become a member of NATO

Sweden and Finland could abstain from NATO membership. They are already internationally engaged as they are part of several international organizations, as discussed in section 4. However, as long as they are not a part of NATO, it cannot be guaranteed that they will receive military aid if they would fall under Russian military threat. This can be clearly seen in the case of Ukraine. Article 5 is further explained in section 5. In addition, Russia has only launched military attacks on neighbouring non-NATO countries in the past and has never attacked a NATO Ally. Following all this reasoning, Sweden and Finland would possibly require an even greater military capability on their own to safeguard their territorial integrity if they were not to join NATO and this would result in even more defence spendings than 2% of their GDP.

Regarding support from the European Union, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states in Article 42(7) that EU member states are obligated to aid and assist each other in the case of an armed aggression and if this article is invoked, but this is not a collective defence mechanism as opposed to NATO Article 5. As EU members, Finland and Sweden can thus (probably) count on aid by other European Union states in case of military threat but this is clearly a less binding defence pact than the collective pact provided by NATO members. Consequently, collective defence within the European Union is lacking. Bilateral or multilateral mutual defence pacts, for example a Swedish-Finnish defence alliance, are neither comparable to a possible NATO membership. Also, if Sweden and Finland would apply for NATO membership, they still run the risk of Russian retaliation during the transition period following the country's letter of intent to join NATO from time of submission of that letter to becoming a worthy member. Since Article 5 cannot be invoked yet, for example an attack on the island of Gotland in the case of retaliation against Sweden is possible. To cope with this, multiple measures could be taken to improve readiness of defence, for example by establishing bilateral defence frameworks with NATO members individually, like already

done with the UK in May 2022, or by moving NATO troops onto Swedish or Finnish territories.

### 6.2.2 Sweden and Finland do become a member of NATO

If Sweden and Finland would join NATO, this would imply that both countries would become a part of NATO's collective defence framework. An attack mounted by Russia on Finnish or Swedish soil would result in a retaliation by the NATO forces if they were unanimously in favour as defined by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. On the other hand, Sweden and Finland would be expected to assist fellow NATO members military if needed and would further enhance the nature of deterrence of NATO towards opposing countries like Russia and Belarus, especially because of their strategic location. Their defence would be integrated in the defence of the NATO in a way that would be determined after negotiations.

Geographically spoken, NATO membership of both Sweden and Finland would almost completely secure the Baltic Sea region. It would be the largest NATO territory enlargement since 1952 when Türkiye and Greece joined NATO. The land border length between NATO and Russia would increase by a factor of 2. NATO would be able to enhance their strategic position in the currently more unstable Northern Europe. Swedish and Finnish Defence troops could be allocated to aid other NATO countries and NATO troops from other NATO countries could be employed on Swedish or Finnish territory. NATO would be closer to strategic Russian areas like St. Petersburg and Kola. NATO could enormously benefit from the strong Finnish air defence that would be integrated in its force structure. Alternatively, an eventual Russian attack on one of the Baltic States could be prevailed more easily because of possible immediate presence without restrictions of NATO troops on Finnish (or Swedish) soil. However, it is important to note that Sweden and Finland are not obligated to permit NATO's troops, bases or nuclear weapons onto their territories. In the late nineties, when NATO admitted a number of new states, it was not deemed appropriate to station troops, bases or nuclear weapons on new NATO member's territories. Similar to Norway and its self-imposed restrictions regarding foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Norwegian ground, Sweden and Finland could opt for only domestic military on their territories. Anyway, an entrance of Sweden and/or Finland in NATO would be considered a political defeat for Russia and a threat to Russian national security.

Vladimir Putin, Russia's current head of state, recently adopted a less hostile position towards NATO entrance of Sweden and Finland. He stated on May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022 that he had no problem with Finland and Sweden joining NATO, as long as no NATO military infrastructure would be stationed there. However, there are multiple reasons to take Russia's frustration towards the West seriously. Before Russia's invasion on Ukraine, Putin had been warning Sweden and Finland multiple times about NATO entrance and possible Russian retaliatory measures. Russia sees NATO as its major geopolitical competitor. This further highlights the importance of NATO's security guarantees. It still needs to be taken into account that Russia could react heavily on a possible NATO accession of Sweden and/or Finland, being threatened by the growth of NATO's influence sphere directly next to its borders. An increased Russian military presence close to the borders with the Baltic states is also a probability. During the accession process, Russia could also engage in major influence activities. They could try to divide Finland politically by influencing the ethnic Russians living in Finland or try to influence the public debate in Sweden and Finland by posing threatening statements on their state-owned media channels towards Sweden's and Finland's decision makers. Although currently occupied with and in the future weakened by its act of aggression against Ukraine, there are several other course of actions Russia could undertake. These include denial-of-service attacks, breaches, malware attacks and more serious cyber activities. Even worse, they could bruise Sweden's or Finland's territorial integrity by moving into its air space or territorial sea, do nuclear testing or other aggressive acts in Sweden's and Finland's neighbourhood like the movement of troops and weapon systems. In the past, when Russia was confronted with an enlargement of NATO territory close to its borders, they almost always reacted with the following steps: first they exerted political and economic pressure, then there was some tacit acquiescence and finally a return to the status quo before the enlargement took place. This was the case for Türkiye (1952), Germany (1955 and 1990), Poland (1999) and the Baltic States (2004), although Ukraine and Georgia and their possible NATO admission have triggered Russia in a different way.

Next to the strengthening of NATO in Northern Europe if Sweden and Finland were to join, the working of other international cooperation frameworks within NATO, like the trilateral relationship between Sweden, Finland and Norway, the bilateral military cooperation between Sweden and Finland itself, the Nordic-Baltic cooperation and NORDEFECO would be deepened even further. This could apply to the aspects of territorial surveillance, air surveillance information exchange, the assertion of territorial integrity, logistics solutions,

capability development...Sweden and Finland would, as a member, become part of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) within NATO. They could use this decision-making power to their benefit as in shifting NATO's interests more towards security in Northern Europe and the Baltic region. would be a more deepened participation in NATO exercises as well as participation in peacetime defence missions. They would take further part in NATO's civil preparedness cooperation. Intelligence cooperation would be elaborated as well as the strategic overview on air and maritime situations. Sweden and Finland would become a part of under more the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence, the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) which is a part of the NATO Response Force and (probably) the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The Nuclear Planning Group gives information to NATO members about its nuclear doctrine without obligating them to also participate in nuclear missions. However, Sweden emphasizes that it will continue to promote its national peace policy, independently of NATO membership and military budgetary expansion.

Concerning the autonomous province of Åland, NATO entrance of Finland would not have an impact on its neutral status as it is recognised under international law. Finland wants to safeguard the Åland Islands' demilitarisation, in particular by surveillance of the Border Guard. The status of the Åland Islands will thus not have an influence on NATO membership or vice versa.

### 6.2.3 Either Sweden or Finland joins NATO

Of course, it would also be possible that only one of both countries would join NATO.

If Finland joined NATO but Sweden would not follow, this would imply that the only NATO border Finland would share with other NATO countries would be with Norway in the scarcely populated North. It would be more difficult for Allied forces to assist Finland if needed without access to Swedish territories and Russian presence of naval troops in the Gulf of Finland would make it difficult to lay contact with NATO troops in the neighbouring Estonia. Additional NATO presence in the Baltics or a rotational NATO presence in Finland could also improve security for Finland as a NATO member.

In the other scenario where only Sweden would join the NATO, Finland would find itself on a stronger than before tension field between the western Allies and its trade partner Russia. It would however be possible to move troops over Swedish grounds to the aid of the Baltics.

In both scenarios, the country which would not be joining NATO would be of strategic interest to Russia if a military conflict arose. It would then be the only non-NATO member in the Baltic or Nordic region. Moving additional troops to the Baltics in case of a military threat would be facilitated if Sweden and Finland both joined NATO. In addition, to move additional NATO troops to Finland as a NATO member if necessary would be more practical if also Sweden was a member of NATO. It is clear that because of strategical purposes, a joint entrance by both Finland and Sweden to enhance total security for both countries is preferred above either one of those two joining.

## 7 Political perspectives regarding NATO membership in Sweden and Finland

As the decision of Sweden and Finland to accede to NATO still remains a political decision on a national level, it is important to take the perspectives of the different political parties in Sweden and Finland regarding NATO membership into account. The Russian invasion on Ukraine in February 2022 was an important turning point in this, as it caused some political parties' to shift their opinion towards wanting to accede to NATO.

This section provides an answer to sub research question 6. First, political standpoints regarding NATO membership in Sweden are first examined. Then, the political standpoints in Finland regarding NATO membership are looked upon.

### 7.1 Sweden's political landscape

The political landscape in Sweden is as follows: from left wing to right wing, there are the Left party, the Swedish Social Democratic party, the Green Party, the Liberals, the Centre Party, the Moderate Party, the Christen Democratic Party and the Swedish Democrats (Sveriges Riksdag, s.d.). Sweden's head of state is the monarch, currently Karl XVI Gustaf, but most political power lies in the hands of the prime minister and the government (Finland, 2021).

As described in Section 3, Sweden's political landscape in the past 100 years has been dominated by the Social Democratic Party. Ever since 1917, Social Democrats have always been present in the government except for the terms of 1976, 1991 and 2006. They have delivered the prime minister every time in the period 1936-1976, with famous figures like Per Albin Hansson and Tage Erlander. The last time the government was not led by Social Democrats was from 2006 until 2014, when Fredrik Reinfeldt from the Moderate Party was prime minister in two consequent terms. He was then succeeded by Social Democrat Stefan Löfven in 2014 (Kent, 2008).

In this subsection, Sweden's difficult government formation after the 2018 elections is discussed to obtain a better grasp of Swedish politics. Then, it is described which stance each political party traditionally has taken about NATO membership throughout the years. Last,



more recent political perspectives regarding NATO membership from all political parties and from the modal Swede are discussed.

### 7.1.1 Sweden's national governments after the 2018 national elections

On January 21st, 2019, 131 days after the elections on September 9th, 2018 and after the longest government negotiations in Swedish history, a minority government was formed with Stefan Löfven as prime minister in its second term (Anderson, 2019). This government unified the Swedish Social Democratic Party (S) with 100 seats (-13 compared to the previous elections in 2014) and the Green Party (MP) with 16 seats (-9 seats) (Deloy, 2014; Sveriges Riksdag, s.d.). The cabinet was thus formed only of Greens and Social Democrats. This was exactly the same composition as with the government formation after the elections of 2014, however now with 22 seats less. The initial proposed coalition of the Democratic Party, the Green Party and the Left Party obtained only 144 seats, but still one more seat than the opposing coalition, the centre-right Alliance, consisting of four parties: the Liberals (20 seats, +1), the Centre Party (31 seats, +9), the Moderate Party (70 seats, -14) and the Christ Democrats (22 seats, +6). This initial opposition coalition was led by the Moderate Party under Ulf Kristersson. The right-wing populist party of Sweden Democrats with 62 seats, 13 more than the previous elections and the best result in their history, came third. The Left Party (28 seats, +7) was left out of both the minority government and the centre-right Alliance. The Left Party and the Sweden Democrats noticed the largest increase in seats in absolute amount (Statistics Sweden, 2022). A minority government is possible in Sweden due to the fact that the Swedish constitution has the principle of negative parliamentarism. This means that when a government needs to be formed, it does not need to have a support vote of the majority of parliament members but only a majority of the parliament members not against them (Savage, 2021). The result of the vote was that Swedish Democrats, Christen Democrats, Moderates and 1 Centre MP voted against, except for 1 absent MP for both Swedish Democrats and the Moderate Party. Lefts, Centres and Liberals abstained from the vote against Löfven, except for 1 Centre MP that voted against and 1 Left MP that was noted absent. It is important to remark here that the Centre Party and the Liberal Party, who were initially opposed, now only abstained as no Lefts were proposed to be involved in the new government. Social Democrats and Greens voted in favour of the new government, except for 1 absent Social Democratic MP. In total, 153 MPs voted against, which is short of a majority in the parliament. Further,

77 MPs abstained and only 115 MPs voted in favour (Widfeldt, 2019). In table 7.1, the political parties are ranked according to the number of MPs after the 2018 elections.

	Name	Leader	Seats 2018	Seats 2014
S	Swedish Social Democratic Party Socialdemokraterna	Magdalena Andersson	100 (-13)	113
M	Moderate Party Moderaterna	Ulf Kristersson	70 (-14)	84
SD	Sweden Democrats Sverigedemokraterna	Jimmie Akesson	62 (+13)	49
C	Centre Party Centerpartiet	Annie Lööf	31 (+9)	22
V	Left Party Vänsterpartiet	Nooshi Dadgostar	28 (+7)	21
KD	Christian Democrats Kristdemokraterna	Ebba Bush	22 (+6)	16
L	Liberals Liberalerna	Nyamko Sabuni	20 (+1)	19
MP	Green Party Miljöpartiet	Märta Stenevi	16 (-9)	25

Table 7.1: Overview of political parties in Sweden and their 2018 election results, ranked by number of parliament seats

However, given that incumbent minority government, ideological differences (and a seat-wise strong opposition), problems were on the horizon. This was the case on June 17th, 2021. A vote of no-confidence was called by the Sweden Democrats as the Lefts withdrew their support for the Red-Green government over the abolition of rent control of newly built residential developments. On June 21th, the vote was taken in the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, and as a result, Löfven was ousted by the Lefts, Sweden Democrats, Christen Democrats and Moderates who obtained a majority in the parliament. As a consequence, a government crisis started. It had never occurred before that the prime minister of Sweden was ousted by a no-confidence vote. Löfven chose to resign on June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2021, rather than

declaring snap elections. It is noteworthy that shortly after the national elections in 2014 however, the Löfven I Cabinet already retrieved itself once in another government crisis after the rejection of their government budget proposal in the Riksdag. On July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2021 however, Löfven was reinstalled as Prime Minister by the Riksdag. No less than 173 members voted against his re-election, although 2 votes short to reach the necessary 175 votes against Löfven's re-election. Compared to the vote regarding the instalment of Löfven II, the Liberal Party voted against instead of being abstained. The other parties voted similar compared to before, thus resulting in 173 votes against, 60 MPs abstained, and 116 in favour (Statistics Sweden, 2022). On July 9<sup>th</sup>, the new government Löfven III was installed, consisting out of Greens and Social Democrats. The cabinet consisted of the same ministers as the Löfven II government except from the abolition of the post of Minister for Rural Affairs (Savage, 2021).

Following these events, Löfven decided in August to retire as the Social Democrats' leader and as Prime Minister. The newly elected Social Democrat leader Magdalena Andersson became the first female Prime Minister on November 24<sup>th</sup> in a minority government of Social Democrats and Greens. 174 MPs voted against the new government, similar to the vote regarding the formation of the Löfven III government. However, Andersson already had to resign a couple of hours later because of the vote against the government's new budget proposal. A budget proposal of a coalition of opposing parties, consisting of the Moderate Party, Sweden Democrats and the Christian Democrats, received more votes. The Green party assured that they did not want to be part of a government compromising with a right-wing proposal and stepped out of the government. However, Andersson was reinstalled as Prime Minister of a one-party minority government (only the Social Democrats) as there was no majority in the Parliament that voted against. There were 173 votes against, which is similar to the vote regarding her appointment as prime minister a couple of days earlier. It is of course difficult to pass on new bills having only 100 of the 349 MPs in the Riksdag. In addition, the one-party government will only stand for only 9 months as the next elections are in September, 2022. It is difficult to foresee what those elections will bring (Statistics Sweden, 2022).

### 7.1.2 Historical political landscape in Sweden regarding NATO membership

If a closer look is taken at the standpoints of the political parties themselves before Russia's invasion of Ukraine starting on February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, it is clear that NATO entrance was not

open for discussion before the end of the Cold War, just like in Finland. Military non-alignment in peace and neutrality in war was the foreign policy focus. However, ever since the Cold War ended, opinions in some political parties changed. Before the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Liberal Party and the Moderate Party were already in favour of NATO membership. After the annexation, also the Christen Democrats and the Centre Party wanted Sweden to enter the Alliance. On December 15<sup>th</sup>, 2020, a motion to adopt a NATO option was voted in the Riksdag. The result was 204 MPs in favour of this option, a majority, including support of parties of the traditional centre-right alliance, namely the Liberal, Centre, Moderate and Christen Democratic Party, but also rather unconventionally the support of the Sweden Democrats. While the former four parties had been traditionally favourable towards NATO membership, the Sweden Democrats made a U-turn regarding their opinion on the matter. However, they stressed that they only preferred this option to have a certain guarantee of safety but that they were not aspiring to become a NATO member. The other parties in the parliament voted against this NATO option. The option did not mean an immediate entrance to NATO but only the freedom to do so if needed, in the case of a serious security threat in Sweden's surroundings. For example, Finland has had a similar option since 1995. It is only regarded as a move in the direction of membership. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Social Democrats were the only political party to shift their opinion to become in favour of NATO entrance. The Sweden Democrats confirmed their positive stance towards NATO entrance. More detailed standpoints of all political parties in Sweden regarding NATO membership are further described below and table 7.2 provides an overview of the Swedish political parties' opinion both before and after the Russian invasion in 2022.

### 7.1.3 Political opinion of the Social Democrats

Before the Russian invasion on Ukraine in February 2022, the Social Democrats have traditionally been against Swedish NATO membership. In contrast with the other two parties that were against NATO entrance before the invasion, the Left Party and the Green Party, the Social Democrats did eventually change their opinion. As the current Swedish minority government only consists of the Social Democratic Party under prime minister Magdalena Andersson, this turn of events was from the utmost importance for Sweden's security policy.

In December 2020, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ann Linde of The Social Democrats stressed in an interview with TT News Agency, the Swedish national news agency, that the NATO-option "undermines the credibility of Swedish security policy". She further stated in the same

interview that “the government remains convinced that the nation is best served by independence from alliances and that this contributes to security in Northern Europe” (Reuters, 2020). The Social Democrats say in addition that Sweden has already benefited from its neutrality and freedom from alliances in the past and that NATO membership could anger Russia. They argued that this could further worsen the already unstable Eastern European security environment. Social Democrat and Swedish Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist wrote in an editorial in August 2020 that the Social Democrats “don’t want to go down a road of security policy experiments or adventurism” (Duxbury, 2020). He wanted to emphasize the importance of Sweden’s policy of neutrality despite having an important role in organizing joint military training exercises with NATO. A few days before Russia’s invasion on Ukraine, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ann Linde mentioned in her Statement of Foreign Policy published on February 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022 that “the Government does not intend to apply for NATO membership” and that “Sweden would not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack”, and that Sweden “expects these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is affected” (Linde, 2022). On the other side, she wanted to extend the partnership with NATO and the defence cooperation Sweden’s Nordic neighbours and especially Finland, with the United States and within the EU (Linde, 2022).

After the Russian invasion, the Social Democrats became in favour of NATO membership. They currently state on their website that partnership with NATO is important for Sweden’s defence policy and that Sweden should indeed apply for membership. They say that Russia has completely changed the geopolitical situation in Europe. A NATO membership has become relevant, while it was not before. They mention that although the military freedom of alliance has served Sweden well throughout the decades, Europe has arrived in a new reality when Russia decided to invade an independent state. They want to reach 2% of GDP allocated to defence as soon as practically feasible.

#### 7.1.4 Political opinion of the Green Party

The Green Party (s.d.), being part of the former minority government (2018-2021), stressed their standpoint of non-alignment and thus opposed NATO entrance in their 2018 Party Program for the national elections. In their opinion, Sweden should instead focus on international disarmament, demilitarization and non-violence treaties. Sweden should also phase out weapons export and should stop leasing Swedish territory for military exercises performed by NATO. Nuclear weapons should be abolished. Still, Sweden should strengthen

its national defence capabilities. In a statement of opinion, Elisabeth Falkhaven of the Green Party says that the best way to maintain peace and democracy is not to join NATO in order for Sweden to be able to choose its own military partners. She says that it is much more difficult to strive for nuclear disarmament when joining a nuclear alliance and that fundamental values regarding human rights are more difficult to continue to pursue as Sweden is no longer military non-aligned. She also mentions that more democratic support should be required during an election campaign before taking such an important decision (Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022a, p. 51).

#### 7.1.5 Political opinion of the Left Party

The Left Party has always been completely opposed to NATO membership as well. The Swedish Left Party (2022b) stated in their party program that they value Sweden's military freedom of alliance. It would undermine Sweden's independent foreign policy credibility if they abandoned this tradition of neutrality. They do want to avoid Sweden being unnecessarily dragged into several wars and conflicts. They regard NATO as a nuclear weapon alliance. More strongly, they do not support the host country agreement which states that NATO troops can perform military exercises on Swedish soil and that they can be placed across Sweden to defend the country in case of threat. Internationally, they even want to work towards the dissolution of NATO. They further state that they want to promote international peace instead and end weapon export and install general conscription for both men and women. In a statement of opinion, Håkan Svenneling of the Left Party mentions that joining a military alliance which already fights its own conflicts and wars is "counterproductive" and "will lead to increased risks" for Sweden. He states that it is irresponsible to join NATO in a hurry without extensive public debate and popular support by a referendum. According to him, it is difficult to pursue Sweden's nuclear disarmament policy when joining an organisation "whose very pillars are based on the possibility of using nuclear weapons" (Sweden's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2022a, p. 43).

#### 7.1.6 Political opinion of the Moderate Party

The leader of the Moderate party, Ulf Kristersson, believed before the Russian invasion on Ukraine that "Sweden would be a member of NATO before the decade is out" (Duxbury, 2020). The Moderate party have been in favour of NATO membership for a long time, just

like the Liberals. They specify that only an integral NATO membership of Sweden would guarantee a full commitment of NATO members to protect Sweden against possible international conflicts. Further, they state that defence planning would be improved and that there also is a growing popular support in Sweden for NATO membership. They state that Sweden's security environment has worsened since the annexation of Crimea by the Russians. Sweden has to be open for entrance to reinforce security in every way possible. This is possible by joining an organization it shares many democratic values with. Pål Jonson, defence policy spokesperson for the Moderate Party, states that "strengthening the national defence together with keeping the road open to Swedish NATO membership is the best way to strengthen Sweden's security" (Swedish Moderate Party, 2022).

#### 7.1.7 Political opinion of the Liberal Party

The Liberals state that they were the first Swedish party to be in favour of NATO membership and that they have been so for decades. They say that Sweden can create security in alliances and not in standing aside, certainly in an increasingly unsafe outside world since the 2008 Georgian war and 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea. Sweden cannot isolate itself. Although already performing joint exercises with NATO and having a host country arrangement, Sweden cannot have the absolute guarantee of mutual defence and has no influence on NATO because they are no member (Swedish Liberal Party, s.d.b). Allan Widman, the party's spokesman of defence policy, had already expressed his worry about the dangerous position of Sweden "in no-man's land" by not being a NATO member and not having security guarantees (Duxbury, 2020). On May 16<sup>th</sup>, in his speech in the Swedish Riksdag, he repeated this and also mentioned that Sweden's non-alignment was not regarded as being credible by Russia. He also stressed that Sweden would "maintain its opposition to nuclear weapons" but that Sweden also might need "an umbrella to stand under" (Widman, 2022) referring to Putin's nuclear threats. The Liberals want to increase national defence to the 2% of GDP level as early as 2024 at the latest as required by NATO (Swedish Liberal Party, s.d.b).

#### 7.1.8 Political opinion of the Centre Party

The Centre Party aspire to accede to NATO since 2015. They want to improve national defence and they recognize that performing joint exercises with NATO without being a member is not enough. They believe 2% of GDP must be allocated to Sweden's defence by

2025 at the latest. They want Sweden as a whole to be able to be defended in a more than ever uncertain environment where it risks being dragged into an international conflict. Not only with Nordic countries, but also with the EU and NATO, defence cooperation should be increased. As additional reason, they state that they want to take their responsibility in making their security environment more secure (Swedish Centre Party, s.d.a). In a speech regarding NATO membership in the Riksdag on May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022, Annie Lööf expressed its necessity by declaring that “a Swedish NATO membership would raise the threshold for military conflicts and thus provide a conflict-detering effect in northern Europe” and that “there are no other realistic options”. She also mentioned that no nuclear weapons or permanent foreign troops in peacetime would be welcome on Swedish soil (Lööf, 2022).

#### 7.1.9 Political opinion of the Christen Democratic Party

The Christen Democrats mention in their party program that they want to join NATO. They became in favour of NATO membership after the annexation of Crimea. Sweden cannot defend themselves on their own in the case of a military attack. NATO can bring peace and security to their immediate environment, although only membership gives the necessary security guarantees. They want to gradually increase the defence budget to 2% of the GDP (Swedish Christen Democratic Party, 2022a). Christen Democrat party leader Ebba Busch declared in a speech in the Riksdag on May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022 that it is “Sweden’s primary responsibility to ensure the safety of their own people” and that becoming member of NATO is the best way to contribute to important values like democracy and freedom. She also mentioned that NATO membership would “act as a direct deterrent to Russian aggression in the Baltic Sea area” and that it is in Sweden’s strategic interests in the case of a Russian attack on the Baltics (Busch, 2022).

#### 7.1.10 Political opinion of the Sweden Democratic Party

The right-wing populist Sweden Democrats have made a U-turn in the last years towards NATO accession by declaring its usefulness. Traditionally, they always have been against NATO membership. However, it is noteworthy to mention that when the NATO option was voted in 2020, the Sweden Democrats suddenly wanted to have the right to have the possibility to join NATO provided by the NATO option when deemed necessary. Currently, they argue that Sweden and Finland should join NATO simultaneously for strategic reasons



and because the global security situation is worsening. They stress the importance of Sweden’s and Finland’s defence collaboration and want to strengthen national defence. In addition, they would want to increase Sweden’s defence budget to 2% of the GDP by 2025 and have this 2% level written down in the constitution. Eventually, they want to reach 2.5% of GDP allocated to defence (Sweden Democrats, s.d.c).

7.1.11 Political opinion of the Modal Swede

Next to changes in political opinions, it is important to look at how the modal Swede thinks about NATO membership, as he supports the political parties. A shift towards interest in joining NATO can be verified. An opinion poll by Demoskop, a Swedish data agency, in June 2022 showed that only 14% of Swedes were against NATO accession. 68% were in favour, especially elderly people and men. Before that, a clear alternating pattern between in favour of membership and against membership can be verified between 2016 and 2019, with both opinions obtaining around 40% in that period, and about 20% undecided. Since 2020, more people started to be in favour of NATO membership and a majority in favour was only reached in February 2022, namely 51%. Ever since, the votes in favour of NATO entrance have thus been increasing steadily every month. The strongest reason that Swedish people give for membership is presumably that Sweden is no longer able to defend itself on its own (Demoskop, 2022).

	Before February 2022		After February 2022	
	In favour	Against	In favour	Against
Social Democratic Party		X	X	
Green Party		X		X
Left Party		X		X
Moderate Party	X		X	
Liberal Party	X		X	
Centre Party	X		X	
Christen Democratic Party	X		X	

Sweden Democratic Party	X <sup>4</sup>		X	
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Table 7.2: Political opinion regarding NATO membership in Sweden

## 7.2 Finland's political landscape

Finland's most important political parties, ranked from left-wing to right-wing, are the Left Alliance, the Social Democratic Party, the Green League, the Centre Party, the Swedish people Party, the Christian Democrats, the National Coalition Party and the Finns Party. The Åland Coalition and Movement Now are special cases, as the former is a regional party from an autonomous region and the latter is a non-traditional party in the Eduskunta. Finland's official head of state is the president, although the most powerful person in the parliamentary republic is the prime minister.

Since 1946, the president has always been a member of the Centre Party or the Social Democratic Party, until the election of the current president Sauli Niinistö who is a member of the National Coalition Party. Starting from 1977, the prime minister has always been a member of the Social Democrats, the Centre Party or the National Coalition Party. In 2015, the last elections before the year 2019, Sipilä's cabinet was a government that existed of the National Coalition Party, the Centre Party and Blue Reform. Blue Reform is a conservative split-off from the Finns party and had lost all its parliamentary seats in 2019.

In this subsection, Finland's national governments since the 2019 elections is first discussed. Then, it is described which stance each political party in Finland traditionally has taken about NATO membership throughout the years. Åland Coalition and Movement Now are left out of this distinction as they are respectively governing over a neutral territory and not important enough in number of seats. Last, more recent political perspectives regarding NATO membership from all political parties in Finland and from the modal Fin are discussed.

### 7.2.1 Finland's national governments after the 2019 national elections

The 2019 government, Rinne's cabinet, was formed in June 2019 out of a coalition of the Social Democrats (SDP) with 40 seats (6 more than the previous elections in 2015), the Centre Party (KESK) with 31 seats (-18 seats), the Green Party (VIHR) with 20 seats (+5), the

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<sup>4</sup>In contrast to the other Swedish political parties who were in favour of NATO membership, the Sweden Democrats only wanted the right to have the possibility to join NATO provided by the "NATO-option" when deemed necessary but did not want to work actively towards membership yet.

Left Alliance (VAS) with 16 seats (+4) and the Swedish People Party (SFP) with 9 seats (status quo) and was led by prime minister Rinne of the Social Democrats. However, in December 2019, Rinne stepped down and Marin became the new prime minister of a new government that resembles the previous 2019 government a lot. The National Coalition party, the president's party, with 38 seats (+1) is thus not included in the government. Together with the right-wing Finn's party with 39 seats (+1), respectively the third and second largest party regarding parliament seats are not represented in the government. The Christen Democrats are in the opposition as well with only 5 seats (status quo). Movement Now (LIIK) is a new party, obtaining one seat. The Åland Coalition is a political alliance of the main political parties in Åland, having one seat for its representative. The government, formed after the elections in 2019, has a majority of 116 of the 200 seats in the Eduskunta, the Finnish parliament. As the government consists of no less than 5 political parties, obtaining a consensus is often a difficult task. In table 7.3, an overview of political parties in Finland is given.

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Leader</b>	<b>Seats 2018</b>	<b>Seats 2014</b>
SDP	Social Democratic Party Suomen sosialidemokraattinen puolue	Sanna Marin	40 (+6)	34
PS	Finns Party Perussuomalaiset	Riikka Purra	39 (+1)	38
KOK	National Coalition Party Kansallinen Kokoomus	Petteri Orpo	38 (+1)	37
KESK	Centre Party Suomen Keskusta	Annika Saarikko	31 (-18)	49
VIHR	Green League Vihreä liitto	Maria Ohisalo	20 (+5)	15
VAS	Left Alliance Vasemmistoliitto	Li Andersson	16 (+4)	12
SFP	Swedish People's Party + representative Åland Coalition Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue	Anna-Maja Henriksson	10 (+0)	10
KD	Christian Democrats Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit	Sari Essayah	5 (+0)	5

LIIK	Movement Now Liike Nyt	Harry Harkimo	1 (New)	/
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Table 7.3: Overview of political parties in Finland

### 7.2.2 Historical political landscape in Finland regarding NATO membership

In Finland, the political standpoints are different. The NATO-option has been voted for in favour in 1995. During the 2006 Finnish presidential elections, there was a heated debate over possible NATO entrance, with the National Coalition Party and Swedish People’s Party supporting membership (Cronberg, 2014). In the years after 2007, there was a general tendency in political parties expressing less interest to join the NATO. It is therefore that political standpoints are not as pronounced as in Sweden and less relevant information could be found, especially from before 2022. After the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Social Democratic Party and Centre Party were rather reserved and did not want to pursue membership. The Green Party, Left Alliance and Finn’s Party were even stronger against joining NATO. Only the National Coalition Party has always expressed their interest (Cronberg, 2014). After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, all political parties became in favour of NATO membership, although the Left Party is still largely divided. More detailed opinions of all political parties are provided below and a summary of their stance towards membership both before and after the 2022 Russian invasion is given in table 7.4.

### 7.2.3 Political opinion of the Left Alliance

The Left Alliance states on their website that they are against NATO membership, as they traditionally always have been. They argue that it would make Finland’s position in its immediate neighbourhood more unstable. Instead, they want to strive for military non-alignment. It is mentioned that they want to leave the host nation agreement. Instead of participating in NATO-led missions, they want to participate more in UN-led missions (Finnish Left Alliance, s.d.). However, they remained divided during the parliamentary vote regarding NATO entrance. More parliamentary members voted in favour than against. During their party meeting in June 2022, it was vaguely stated that “NATO membership is a massive change in the foreign policy line of Finland” and that it “increases political and military tensions” (Teivainen, 2022). This did not really give away a clear opinion and brought the

internal debate to a rest. It was also mentioned that no nuclear weapons, permanent NATO bases or NATO troops could be installed on Finnish ground (Teivainen, 2022).

#### 7.2.4 Political opinion of the National Coalition Party

The liberal-conservative National Coalition Party has been favourable towards joining NATO for more than 15 years. Petteri Orpo, the party's chairman, stated in 2021 that it would make Finland's neighbourhood more predictable and that it would make Finland more secure. He argued that security guarantees are not automatically offered if Finland is not a member of NATO. He further stated that Finland should be represented in an international organ where security issues affecting Finland itself are discussed. As mentioned above, intentions to enter NATO were primarily pushed on by Jyri Häkämies, the former Minister of Defence of the National Coalition Party. In 2016, on a party conference of the National Coalition Party, it was decided that Finland should join NATO in one of the coming years. The current president, Sauli Niinistö, is also supporting NATO membership.

#### 7.2.5 Political opinion of the Swedish People's Party of Finland

The liberal Swedish People's Party of Finland, who expresses the interests of the minority of Finnish inhabitants who speak Swedish, envisions Finland being a NATO member in the year 2025.

#### 7.2.6 Political opinion of the Social Democrat Party

The Social Democrat Party (s.d.) argued before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in their party program regarding relations with NATO that they should be limited to the Partnership for Peace program. They only supported the possibility of requiring NATO membership if it were decided with a majority of citizens being in favour of entrance. They also stated that Finland should be responsible for its own defence instead of relying on an international organisation.

#### 7.2.7 Political opinion of the Finns Party

The Finns Party is in favour of NATO membership. On their website, they mention that Russia already regards Finland as being military allied and that it is a necessary step in times of war. Team leader Ville Tavio argued in March 2022 that it would give Finland a security

guarantee and that “it would raise the threshold for using military force against Finland” (Nord News, 2022). Jussi Halla-aho, former party chairman, mentioned in his blog that “the risks associated with it are lower than the risks of the other alternatives” (Nord News, 2022).

#### 7.2.8 Political opinion of the Centre Party

Before the Russian invasion on Ukraine, the Centre Party used to be opposed to NATO membership. Matti Vanhanen, former chairman of the Centre Party, stated in 2020 that there was no reason to change Finland’s policy of military non-alignment. Finland as a small country should embrace continuity and not opt for a major change in strategy (Vanhanen, 2020).

However, they argue that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed Finland’s security environment. In a speech on May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022 by Keskustan Pylväs of the Centre Party, it was said that Finland now needs security guarantees of NATO membership next to improving its own national defence to improve stability and safety in the long term in Finland and its environment. He also mentions that NATO can provide “the greatest possible deterrent effect” (Pylväs, 2022).

#### 7.2.9 Political opinion of the Green League

The Green League does support NATO membership of Finland. They argue on their website that being a member of NATO will help bring more peace and stability globally (Finnish Green Party, 2022).

#### 7.2.10 Political opinion of the Christian Democrats

The Christian Democrats are in favour of NATO membership. On their website, they write that NATO’s capabilities will increase if Finland becomes NATO member. Further, they mention that the strategic geopolitical position of Finland as a NATO member would give Finland the opportunity to exert influence in its Northern European environment and that this would also benefit Finland’s own capabilities (Finnish Christian Democrats, 2022). Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrat MP speeched in May that this was necessary to obtaining Finland’s main goal: to prevent a war. It would also create a “unified Nordic defense area” (Räsänen, 2022). Peter Östman, also a MP of the Christian Democrats, argued that “the value

of partnerships is especially the creation of a military deterrent effect” and that Finland’s defence would be increased throughout closer partnerships (Östman, 2022).

7.2.11 Political opinion of the Modal Fin

According to a poll from YLE, the Finnish national broadcasting company, a shift towards favouring NATO membership can be verified amongst the Finnish public. Support has risen from 53% in favour of NATO membership in February towards 76% in favour and 12% against NATO membership in May. The Russian invasion on Ukraine was really a turning point as a majority of Finns historically have been opposing NATO membership. Ever since February 2022, Finnish popular support has been steadily rising. Especially voters of the Centre and Swedish People’s Party are in favour (Yle News, 2022).

	Before February 2022		After February 2022	
	In favour	Against	In favour	Against
Social Democratic Party		X	X	
Finns Party		X	X	
National Coalition Party	X		X	
Centre Party		X	X	
Green League		X	X	
Left Alliance		X	X <sup>5</sup>	
Swedish People’s Party	X	X	X	
Christian Democrats		X	X	

Table 7.4: Political opinion regarding NATO membership in Finland

<sup>5</sup> The Left Alliance is actually divided but most of its Left Alliance Members of Parliament voted in favour when the Eduskunta voted if Finland were to apply for NATO membership.

## 8 Military capabilities of Sweden and Finland

It should be looked upon which military capabilities Sweden and Finland can add to NATO's military infrastructure. NATO should have knowledge about this if they were to admit both countries to the alliance. Sweden and Finland could use the added value they would bring to NATO in terms of military means as an argument during accession talks.

This section provides an answer to sub research question 7. In this chapter, Sweden's and Finland's current military capacity is discussed. First, this is indicated for Sweden. Afterwards, the same is done for Finland.

### 8.1 The Swedish Armed Forces

Sweden's current military capabilities are discussed in this subsection.

#### 8.1.1 The organizational structure of the Swedish Armed Forces

The Swedish Armed Forces is the government agency that is tasked with Sweden's defence to safeguard its freedom and in a broader regard with aiding in international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. (Swedish Armed Forces, 2021a).

The Swedish Armed Forces consists of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Home Guard (Swedish Armed Forces, 2021a). Sweden's Home Guard almost makes up half of the Swedish Armed Forces, counting 21.000 units. The Army, Navy and Air Force together have a work force of 24.650 units. In these three branches, there are 14.650 active forces, from which 6.850 Army, 2.100 Navy, 2.700 Air and approximately 3.000 conscripts at once, divided over the three branches. At the moment, yearly 5.000 conscripts are trained which serve 4 to 11 months depending on the branch they retrieve themselves in. Furthermore, a reserve strength of 10.000 units is available. The units are categorised below corresponding to their branch (Army, Navy, Air Force and Home Guard) and evaluated on strength in numbers (Chapter Four: Europe, 2022, pp. 64-163). The composition is illustrated in table 8.1.



Total Swedish Armed Forces (Active + Home Guard + Reserves): 45.650				
Active Forces: 14.650			Home Guard: 21.000	Reserves: 10.000
Army:	Navy:	Air:		
6.850	2.100	2.700		
Conscripts: 3.000				

Table 8.1 Composition of the Swedish Armed Forces

Until the end of the Cold War, almost every male that come of age of military service was conscripted to the army. Starting from 2010, there was an all-volunteer recruitment which replaced routine conscription. In 2014, there was a refreshment training for the conscripted reservists. In 2018, basic conscription regardless of gender was reintroduced (Swedish Armed Forces, 2021c).

### 8.1.2 Swedish Army

The Army is responsible for organising and training ground units and air defence units. Joint operations are performed, both nationally and internationally, in collaboration with maritime and air forces. Coordination, staffing, preparedness and operations is all supervised by the Army Staff, established in Enköping.

The Swedish Army has a man force of 6850 personnel units and consists of mechanised units, cavalry units, artillery units, air defence units, command and control units, engineering units, support units and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) units.

It is the task of the Army's military units to be capable to oppose ground forces of similar size and equipment and to safeguard Sweden's defence this way. Military operations on an international level are conducted with Swedish materiel and personnel as well, and a part of the Swedish Army units is assigned to these military international peacekeeping missions (Swedish Armed Forces, 2020e).

The different Army regiments are the following:

- Army staff, located in Enköping
- Life guards, located in Kungsängen
- Dalarna Regiment, located in Falun

- Norrbotten Regiment, located in Boden
- Västernorrland Regiment, located in Sollefteå
- Life Regiment Hussars, located in Karlsborg
- Norrland Dragoon Regiment, located in Arvidsjaur
- Skaraborg Regiment, located in Skövde
- South Skåne Regiment, located in Revingehed
- Artillery Regiment, located in Boden
- Air Defence Regiment, located in Halmstad
- Göta Engineer Regiment, located in Eksjö
- Land Warfare Centre, located in Skövde
- Gotland Regiment, located in Visby
- Swedish Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Demining Centre (SWEDEC), located in Eksjö
- National CBRN Defence Centre, located in Umeå
- Logistic Regiment, located in Skövde (Swedish Armed Forces, s.d.)

An overview of all types of Swedish Army forces is provided in table 8.2 (and the number of each type, if the data is available, otherwise it is stated as n.a., not available):

<b>Armoured fighting vehicles</b>		<b>1595+</b>
Main battle tanks (MBT)	Leopard 2A5	120
Infantry fighting vehicle (IFV)	Combat vehicle (CV) 9040	369
	Eldledningspansarbandvagn (Epbv) 90	42
Armoured personnel carrier (APC)	APC (tracked)	389
	• Pansarbandvagn (Pbv) 302	239
	• Bandvagn Skyddad-10 (BvS-10) MkII	150
	APC (wheeled)	315+
	• Bastion APC	n.a.
	• XA-180 Sisu	34
	• XA-202 Sisu	20
• XA-203 Sisu	148	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patria AMV</li> </ul>	113
	Protected patrol vehicle (PPV)	360
<b>Engineering &amp; maintenance vehicles</b>		<b>82+</b>
Armoured engineering vehicle (AEV)	Pionierpanzer-3 Kodiak	6
Armoured recovery vehicle (ARV)	Bärgningsbandvagn 120	14
	Bärgningsbandvagn 90	26
Vehicle-launched bridge (VLB)	Brobandvagn 120	3
Mine Warfare (MW)	Aardvark Mk2	n.a.
	Area Clearing System	33
<b>Anti-tanks/Anti-infrastructure</b>		<b>n.a.</b>
Missile (MSL)/ Man portable anti-tank system (MANPATS)	Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapon (NLAW)	n.a.
	Robotsystem-55 (RBS-55)	n.a.
Recoilless rifle (RCL) 84mm	Carl Gustaf	n.a.
<b>Artillery</b>		<b>357</b>
Self-propelled (SP) 155mm	Archer	35
Mortar (MOR)	81mm M/86	201
	120mm 81 M/41D	81
	Self-propelled 120mm 40 CV90	40
	Mjolnir	
<b>Air Defence</b>		<b>41+</b>
Surface-to-air missile (SAM)	Long-range M903 Patriot PAC-3 MSE	3
	Medium-range MIM-23B Hawk	n.a.
	Short-range	8
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IRIS-T SLS,</li> </ul>	8
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Robotsystem-23 BAMSE</li> </ul>	n.a.
	Point-defence Robotsystem-70	n.a.
Guns Self-propelled (SP) 40mm	Luftvärnskanonvagn (Lvkv) 90	30

Table 8.2: Overview of the military infrastructure in the Swedish Army (*Chapter Four: Europe, 2022*)

Regarding the Army, the Defence Bill states it to be crucial to retain the two existing and to start organising a third mechanised brigade and a reduced motorised brigade in the Stockholm

area, the Brigade of the Life Guards. On Gotland, units will be enhanced. A divisional level will be worked out for staff, headquarters and artillery units. Regiments that should be re-established are the Norrland Dragoon Regiment in Arvidsjaur, the Bergslagen Artillery Regiment in Boden, the Västernorrland Regiment in Sollefteå and the Dalarna Regiment in Falun (Sweden's Ministry of Defence, 2020b).

### 8.1.3 Swedish Navy

The Navy is responsible for organising and training naval units who operate below, above and on the surface both on sea as in coastal areas. Advanced vessels and units enable Sweden to detect deviations at sea which might form a territorial threat to national interests. Joint operations are performed, both nationally and internationally in collaboration with other nations. Naval units must be operational both in times of war and peace. In case of international missions, the navy will engage personnel and equipment. Multiple international force registers can count on the contribution of several naval units. Especially the submarines have outstanding capabilities in a global view of comparison and are worldwide. The Swedish Navy has a man force of 2100 personnel units and consists of naval warfare flotillas, submarine flotillas, amphibious battalions, naval bases and command and control units (Swedish Armed Forces, 2020f).

The different Naval regiments are the following:

- Naval Staff, located in Muskö
- 1st Submarine Flotilla, located in Karlskrona
- 3rd Naval Warfare Flotilla, located in Karlskrona
- 4th Naval Warfare Flotilla, located in Berga
- 1st Marine Regiment, located in Berga
- 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment, located in Gothenburg
- Naval Base, located in Karlskrona
- Naval Warfare Centre, located in Karlskrona (Swedish Armed Forces, s.d.)

An overview of all types of Swedish Naval forces is provided in table 8.3 (and the number of units, if the data is available, otherwise it is stated as n.a., not available):

<b>Submarine</b>		<b>5</b>
Single-shot kill (SSK)	Gotland	1
	Gotland modified (mod)	2
	Södermanland	2
<b>Patrol and coastal combatants</b>		<b>150</b>
Corvettes FSG	Visby	5
PCGT	Göteborg	2
	Stockholm	2
Fast patrol boat (PBF)	Combat Boat 90H	100+
	Combat Boat HS	27
	Combat Boat 90HSM	6
<b>Mine warfare/ Mine countermeasures</b>		<b>7</b>
MCC	Koster	5
MCD	Spåro	2
<b>Amphibious/landing craft</b>		<b>11</b>
Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP)	Trossbat	8
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)	Griffon 8100TD	3
<b>Logistics and support</b>		<b>15</b>
Miscellaneous Auxiliary (AG)	Carlskrona	1
	Trosso	1
Miscellaneous Command Ship (AGF)	Ledningsbåt 2000	2
Auxiliary General Intelligence (AGI)	Orion	1
Light Auxiliary Cargo (AKL)	Loke	1
Rescue & salvage ship (ARS)	Belos III	1
	Furusund	1
Training ship (AX)	Altair	5
Training ship, sail (AXS)	Falken	1
	Gladan	1
<b>Amphibious</b>		<b>850</b>
Artillery	MOR 81mm M/86	12
Coastal Defence	AShM RBS-17 Hellfire	8
	AShM RBS-15	n.a.

Table 8.3: Overview of the military infrastructure in the Swedish Navy (*Chapter Four: Europe, 2022*)

Regarding the 2021-2025 Defence Bill, the submarine division needs to be further developed through the commission of 2 new Blekinge submarines. The corvette divisions will be enhanced by the modification of the Visby-class. 2 new surface combat vessels will be delivered during 2026-2030. An additional amphibious battalion will come in Gothenburg. Furthermore, the government wants to install two naval base battalions. Last but not least, the Älvsborg Amphibious Regiment in Gothenburg will be reviewed (Sweden's Ministry of Defence, 2020b).

#### 8.1.4 Swedish Air Force

Similar to the Swedish Army and the Swedish Navy, it is the Air Force's duty to protect Sweden's interests, both nationally and internationally, in collaboration with the land and maritime forces. The Air Staff, responsible for giving operational orders and organizing training activities, is located in Uppsala where coordination, staffing, preparedness and operations are regulated.

The Swedish Air Force has a man force of 2.100 personnel units and consists of fighter aircraft, transport aircraft, signals reconnaissance units, radar surveillance units, helicopter units, base units and command and control units (Swedish Armed Forces, 2020d).

The different Air Force regiments are the following:

- Air Staff, located in Uppsala
- Skaraborg Wing, located in Såtenäs
- Blekinge Wing, located in Ronneby
- Norrbotten Wing, located in Luleå
- Uppland Wing, located in Uppsala
- Armed Forces Helicopter Wing, located in Linköping
- Warfare Centre, located in Uppsala (Swedish Armed Forces, s.d.)

An overview of all Swedish Air Force units is provided in table 8.4 (and the number of units, if the data is available, otherwise it is stated as n.a., not available):

<b>Aircraft</b>		<b>177</b>
Fighter ground attack (FGA)	JAS 39 C/D Gripen	96
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)	Gulfstream IV SRA-4	2
Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C)	S-100B Argus	1
	S-100D Argus	2
Tanker/ transport (TKR/TPT)	KC-130H Hercules	1
Transport (TPT)	Medium C-130H Hercules	5
	Light Saab 340	2
	PAX Gulfstream 550	1
Training (TRG)	Sk-60W	67
<b>Uninhabited aerial vehicles</b>		<b>8</b>
Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR)	Medium RQ-7 Shadow	8
<b>Air-Launched missiles</b>		<b>n.a.</b>
Air-to-surface missile (ASM)	Air-to-ground missile-65 (AGM-65) Maverick	n.a.
Anti-ship missile (AShM)	Robotsystem-15F (RB-15F)	n.a.
Air-to-air missile (AAM)	IR AIM-9L Sidewinder	n.a.
	IIR IRIS-T	n.a.
	ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM	n.a.
	Meteor	n.a.
<b>Bombs</b>		<b>n.a.</b>
Laser-Guided	Guided Bomb Unit-12 (GBU-12)	n.a.
	Paveway II	
Inertial Navigation System (INS)/ GPS guided	Guided Bomb Unit-39 Small Diameter Bomb	n.a.
<b>Helicopters</b>		<b>53</b>
Transport (TPT)	TPT Medium	33
	• UH-60M Black Hawk	15
	• NH90 TTH	18
	TPT Light	20

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AW109</li> </ul>	12
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AW109M</li> </ul>	8

Table 8.4: Overview of the military infrastructure in the Swedish Air Force (*Chapter Four: Europe, 2022*)

Expansion of the Air Force as stated by the Defence Bill 2021-2025 will be foreseen in the form of additional air-to-air missiles and associated mission equipment. Electronic warfare capabilities should be enhanced. A new air launched anti-ship missile will be added to the Air Force. Long range air-to-surface capability should be brought to the Air Force during the 2026-2030 period. The JAS 39 E combat aircraft system will be introduced, while the core of the fighter squadrons still will consist of JAS 39 C/D Gripens. The Uppsala Uppland Air Wing (F16) will be revised (Sweden's Ministry of Defence, 2020b).

#### 8.1.5 The Swedish Home Guard

The Swedish Home Guard is an important part of the Swedish Armed Forces as nearly half of the Swedish Armed Forces personnel consist of Home Guard units (Swedish Armed Forces, 2022). There are approximately 21.000 men and women in the Home Guard (Chapter Four: Europe, 2022). According to the Defence Bill 2021-2025, the Home Guard will receive additional equipment, like night combat equipment, sensors and vehicles (Sweden's Ministry of Defence, 2020b).

## 8.2 The Finnish Defence Forces

Finland's current military capabilities are discussed in this subsection.

### 8.2.1 The organizational structure of the Finnish Defence Forces

The Finnish Defence Forces looks after the basic rights and the livelihood of Finland's inhabitants, its territorial integrity and the freedom of action of the government. They also take part in international missions. The Defence Forces need to have an appropriate military answer on air, land or sea if an external threat, or even an armed attack. Similar to the Swedish Army, the Finnish army consists of an Army, a Navy and an Air Force. The Finnish Border Guard becomes a fourth part in times of war. The Supreme Commander of the



Defence Forces, which is the President of the Republic, is currently Sauli Niinistö (The Finnish Defence Forces, s.d.a).

Finland’s Defence Forces have a strength of 22.300 active employees: 13.400 Army units, 3.150 Navy units, 3.050 Air units and 2.700 Border Guard units. Each branch consists of main units and conscripts, as listed in table 8.5 below. There is a mobilisation strength of 238.000 reserves: 185.000 Army units, 24.000 Navy units, 29.000 Air units and 12.000 Border Guard units. Those are men who have completed conscription in the past. Border Guard exists of 4 border guard districts and 2 coast guard districts. They co-operate with the Finnish Defence Forces and can be mobilized as a part of the Finnish Defence Forces. Each year, approximately 22.000 conscripts annually (165, 255 or 347 days depending of the degree of training advancedness) receive military training and 18.000 reservists a year conduct refresher training: a total time of 80 days refresher time is obligated (150 days for NCOs and 200 days for officers) for reservists between conscript service and age 50 (for NCOs and officers, this period continues until the age of 60) (Chapter Four: Europe, 2022).

Active Finnish Defence Forces: 22.300						
Army: 13.400		Navy: 3.150		Air Force: 3.050		Border Guard: 2.700
Main: 4.400	Conscripts: 9.000	Main: 1.400	Conscripts: 1.750	Main: 2.050	Conscripts: 1.000	Main: 2.700

Table 8.5: Active Finnish Defence Forces

Reserve Forces: 238.000			
Army: 185.000	Navy: 24.000	Air Force: 29.000	Border Guard: 12.000

Table 8.6: Finnish Reserve Forces

There is a general conscription. All male Finnish people who turn 18 years have to serve in armed or unarmed military service. The large conscription base creates a sizeable reserve force which should be able to withstand a long-lasting military conflict. International Finnish troops serve voluntary after their conscription stage in missions of UN, NATO or EU to maintain international peacekeeping. Women are allowed to join the army as well (The Finnish Defence Forces, s.d.e).

As stated by Finland's Ministry of Finance (2022a) in the General government fiscal plan for 2023-2026, Finland's defence capability will be extended. The budget allocated to operating costs of the Finnish Defence Forces will rise with EUR 130-200 million yearly for 2023-2026. This additional budget will be deployed for several goals. The number of reservists for refresher training will be raised by 10.000 reservists annually starting from the current 19.300 reservists annually. Next, readiness will be improved and the level of materiel maintenance will be increased. Regarding the purchase of defence materiel, a total of EUR 1.5 billion over the planning period will be procured for anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, anti-ship missiles, air defence missiles, field maintenance materiel, artillery ammunition, combatant gear and other weaponry. New surveillance aircraft for the Border Guard will come at a cost of EUR 163 million and their operational expenditures will increase. Annual funding to improve cyber security will be EUR 40-56 million higher. Funds outside of Finland's spending limits will cover for the necessary increases in military expenditures regarding national defence, cyber security and border security. Spending limits level will be lowered with EUR 42 million regarding the administrative branches of the Ministry of Defence. EUR 5.7 billion will be allocated to the appropriation level of the Ministry of Defence's administrative branch in 2023 and this will evolve to EUR 5.2 billion in 2026. Long term defence strengthening as well as medium- and short term resource purchases are crucial in the changing Finnish security environment after the invasion of Russia in Ukraine. The spending limits for the HX Project amount to EUR 4.8 billion in 2023-2026 and EUR 468 million for the Squadron 2020 project in total.

### 8.2.2 Finnish Army

It is the task of the Finnish Army to defend the state's entire land area. They provide assistance to other authorities and they lead most of the military crisis management operations of the Defence Forces. They mostly consist of reserves resulting from the general conscription. 18000 conscripts annually (2 half yearly cycles of 9000 conscripts) are trained in the Army and 18000 reservists are subjected to refresher training every year. The Army is the branch of the Finnish Defence Forces where most of conscripts and reserves receive their (refreshment) training. The Army is led by Commander Pasi Välimäki (The Finnish Defence Forces, s.d.c).

Finland's Army consists of 13400 units, from which 9000 conscripts (one cycle) and 4400 regular units. 185000 reserves are available. Well-equipped operational units deployable for

battle missions in the entire country, regional units with task-specific equipment suitable for controlling specific areas and local units with light equipment protecting targets are three different units in the Army (Chapter Four: Europe, 2022).

Next to the Army Command which serves as the Army's headquarters in Karkialampi, there are 8 brigades in the Finnish Army:

- Jaeger Brigade, located in Sodankylä and Rovaniemi
- Guard Jaeger Regiment, located in Santahamina
- Kainuu Brigade, located in Kajaani
- Karelia Brigade, located in Vekaranjärvi
- Army Academy, located in Lappeenranta
- Armoured Brigade, located in Parolannummi
- Pori Brigade, located in Säkyä and Niinisalo
- Utti Jaeger Regiment, located in Utti (The Finnish Defence Forces, s.d.c)

An overview of all Finnish Army forces is provided in table 8.7 (and the number of units, if the data is available, otherwise it is stated as n.a., not available):

<b>Armoured fighting vehicles</b>		<b>1644</b>
Main battle tanks (MBT)	Leopard 2A6	100
	Leopard 2A4	100
Infantry fighting vehicle (IFV)	BMP-2/-2MD	110
	CV 9030FIN	102
Armoured personnel carrier (APC)	APC (tracked)	142
	• MT-LBu	40
	• MT-LBV	102
	APC (wheeled)	471
	• XA-180/185 Sisu	260
	• XA-202 Sisu	101
	• XA-203 Sisu	48
	• AMV XA-360	62
Autonomous underwater vehicles		

	(AUV)	6
<b>Engineering &amp; maintenance vehicles</b>		<b>74+</b>
Armoured engineering vehicle (AEV)	Dachs	5
Armoured recovery vehicle (ARV)	BPz-2	9
	MTP-LB	15
	VT-55A	12
Vehicle-launched bridge (VLB)	BLG-60M2	12
	Leopard 2S	6
	SISU Leguan	9
Mine Warfare (MW)	Aardvark Mk 2	n.a.
	KMT T-55	n.a.
	Leopard 2R CEV	6
	RA-140 DS	n.a.
<b>Anti-tanks/Anti-infrastructure</b>		<b>n.a.</b>
Missile/ Man-portable anti-tank system (MSL/ MANPATS)	Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapon (NLAW)	n.a.
	Spike-MR	n.a.
	Spike-LR	n.a.
		n.a.
<b>Artillery</b>		<b>672+</b>
Self-propelled (SP) 122mm	K9 Thunder	13
	2S1 Gvozdika	36
TOWED	122 mm D-30	234
	155mm K 83/ GH-52	54
Multiple rocket launcher (MRL)	122mm RM-70	34
	227mm M270 MLRS	22
Mortar (MOR)	81mm Krh/71	n.a.
	120mm Krh/92	261
	SP 120mm XA-361 AMOS	18
<b>Helicopters</b>		<b>27</b>
Main rotor head (MRH)	Hughes 500D	5
	Hughes 500E	2
Transport (TPT)	Medium NH90 TTH	20
<b>Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles</b>		<b>11</b>

Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR)	Medium ADS-95 Ranger	11
<b>Air Defence</b>		<b>467+</b>
Surface-to-air missile (SAM)	Short-range	44
	• Crotale NG	20
	• NASAMS II FIN	24
	Point-defence	16+
	• ASRAD	16
	• FIM-92 Stinger	n.a.
	• Robotssystem 70 (RBS 70)	n.a.
Guns	23mm ItK 95/ZU-23-2	Total
	35 mm GDF-005	guns:
	SP 35mm Leopard 2 ITK Marksman	407+

Table 8.7: Overview of the military infrastructure in the Finnish Army (*Chapter Four: Europe, 2022*)

Regarding the Army, capabilities in the coming years will be improved. Local defence and mobile operations will be developed and regional forces will be discarded from the force structure starting from 2025. New armoured personnel carriers will be provided. The CV-9030 infantry fighting vehicles will be upgraded. Additional anti-tank weapons will be purchased. Light UAV's and new night vision equipment will be foreseen to improve the Army's surveillance capabilities. Older artillery will be replaced by artillery with more firepower. CBRN defence, camouflage systems and individual soldier equipment will be provided. Preparations are being made to enhance the use of unmanned aerial and ground vehicles. The Army's command and control systems are further improved to make mobile command possible. The Army will procure new ordnance to improve the current range of the heavy multiple rocket launchers. Many of the Army's infrastructure is coming at the end of their life cycle and this need to be recapitalized (Finland's Ministry of Finance, 2022a).

### 8.2.3 Finnish Navy

The Finnish Navy has as responsibility the safeguarding the waters around Finnish territories, the repelling of violations of Finnish territory and defend sea lines of communication. Like

the Army, they need to be able to perform tasks related to performing statutory tasks, supporting other authorities and participating in international missions. The Commander of the Finnish Navy is Jori Harju (The Finnish Defence Forces, s.d.f).

The Navy has a total of approximately 1,400 regular employees. A total of approximately 3,500 conscripts (2 yearly cycles of 1750 units), both men and women carrying out military service complete their training in the Navy each year. In total, the Navy consists of 3.150 active units and 24.000 reserve units (Chapter Four: Europe, 2022).

The Finnish Navy is made up of the Navy Command Finland, located in Turku, and four other units on a brigade level:

- Coastal Fleet, located in Turku and Upinniemi
- Coastal Brigade, located in Turku and Upinniemi
- Nyland Brigade, located in Dragsvik
- Naval Academy, located in Helsinki and Turku (The Finnish Defence Forces, s.d.g)

An overview of all Finnish Navy forces is provided in table 8.8 (and the number of units, if the data is available, otherwise it is stated as n.a., not available):

<b>Patrol and coastal combatants</b>		<b>20</b>
Patrol coastal, guns, missile (PCGM)	Hamina	4
Patrol boat, guns (PBG)	Rauma	4
Fast patrol boat (PBF)	Jehu	12
<b>Mine warfare</b>		<b>8</b>
Mine countermeasures	MCC Katanpää	3
Minelayers (ML)	Hameenma	2
	Pansio	3
<b>Amphibious/landing craft</b>		<b>51</b>
Landing craft, mechanized (LCM)	Kampela	1
Landing craft, personnel (LCP)		50
<b>Logistics and support</b>		<b>7</b>
Miscellaneous auxiliary (AG)	Louhi	1
	Hylje	2
Training ship (AX)	Fabian Wrede	3

	Lokki	1
<b>Coastal Defence</b>		<b>34</b>
Anti-ship missile (AShM)	Robotsystem15K (RBS15K)	4
Artillery (ARTY) 130mm	K-53tk	30
<b>Anti-Tank/ Anti-Infrastructure</b>		<b>n.a.</b>
Missile/ Man-portable anti-tank system (MSL/MANPATS)	Spike	n.a.

Table 8.8: Overview of the military infrastructure in the Finnish Navy (*Chapter Four: Europe, 2022*)

The Navy will increase its capabilities in the coming years. Mobile C2-systems will be built to enhance command and control capabilities. 4 new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes (Finland's first corvettes) will be delivered in the period 2022-2027 by the Squadron 2020 project and will fill multiple roles, including surveillance, naval mine laying and air defence. They will replace 7 vessels. Anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare capability will be increased by the introduction of torpedoes for regional sea control. These torpedoes will be provided on the Hamina-class and Pohjanmaa-class vessels. Further, modernized mines and a new anti-ship missile system, which is multifunctional as it can also serve as surface-to-surface missile against ground targets, will be procured. The anti-ship missile system will be integrated on the Hamina- and Pohjanmaa-class vessels as well as on anti-ship missile batteries. The Hamina-class combat boat will receive a new combat management system. Furthermore, the modernisation of the sub-surface surveillance system is starting and examines the possibilities of unmanned systems in territorial surveillance. Landing crafts will be modernized and minesweeping capabilities as well by replacing the Kuha and Kiiski minesweepers (Finland's Ministry of Finance, 2022a).

#### 8.2.4 Finnish Air Force

It's the responsibility of the Finnish Air Force to secure Finland's air defence. Just like the Finnish Army and Navy, they are tasked with participation in (international) crisis management and with supporting other authorities. Unidentified aircrafts entering or approaching Finnish airspace may be turned away if deemed necessary. The Air Force's commander is Pasi Jokinen (The Finnish Defence Forces, s.d.b).

The Air Force has 2050 regular units and 1000 conscripts, for a total of 3050 units. 29000 reserve units can be called upon (Chapter Four: Europe, 2022). A complete overview of all units is provided below, with the amount of each unit expressed in numbers, if data was available.

The Air Force's headquarters are located at Tikkakoski, where the Air Force Command is. Next to the Air Force Command, there are different branches within the Air Force:

- Air Force Academy, located in Tikkakoski
- Karelia Air Command, located in Rissala
- Lapland Air Command, located in Rovaniemi
- Satakunta Air Command, located in Pirkkala (The Finnish Defence Forces, s.d.b)

An overview of all Finnish Air forces is provided in table 8.9 (and the number of units, if the data is available, otherwise it is stated as n.a., not available):

<b>Aircraft</b>		<b>173</b>
Fighter ground attack (FGA)	F/A-18C Hornet	55
	F/A-18D Hornet	7
Electronic intelligence (ELINT)	C295M	1
Transport (TPT)	Light	11
	• C295M	2
	• Learjet 35A	3
	• PC-12NG	6
Training (TRG)	G-115EA	28
	Hawk Mk50/51A	29
	Hawk Mk66	16
	L-70 Vinka	26
<b>Air-Launched missiles</b>		<b>n.a.</b>
Air-to-surface missile (ASM)	Air-to-ground missile-65 (AGM-65)	n.a.
	Maverick	
Anti-ship missile (AShM)	Robotsystem-15F (RB-15F)	n.a.



Air-to-air missile (AAM)	IR AIM-9 Sidewinder	n.a.
	IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder	n.a.
	ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM	n.a.
	LACM Conventional AGM-158	n.a.
	JASSM	
<b>Bombs</b>		<b>n.a.</b>
Inertial Navigation System (INS) /GPS guided	Guided Bomb Unit-31 (GBU-31)	n.a.
	JDAM	
	Air-to-ground missile-154C (AGM-154C) JSOW	n.a.

Table 8.9: Overview of the military infrastructure in the Finnish Air Force (*Chapter Four: Europe, 2022*)

The Air Defence's capabilities will be further extended. 64 new multi-role Lockheed Martin F-35's will replace the current Hornet fighters and will be put into use starting from 2025 as a part of the ambitious HX Fighter Program of the Finnish government. A surface-to-air missile system will be added to the Air Defence to improve ground-based air defence. Ground-based air defence will improve its targeting capability. Counter-drone capabilities of the Defence Forces will be enhanced. The integrated intelligence, surveillance and command and control system will be improved (Finland's Ministry of Finance, 2022a).

#### 8.2.5 Border Guard

In addition, there is the Border Guard, which consists of 2700 Border Guard units (namely 4 Border Guard districts and 4 Coast Guard districts) and 12000 reservists (*Chapter Four: Europe, 2022*). Numbers are summarized in table 8.10 below.

<b>Patrol and coastal combatants</b>		<b>43</b>
Patrol ship, offshore (PSO)	Turva	1
Patrol craft, coastal (PCC)	Tursas	2
Patrol boat (PB)		40
<b>Amphibious/ Landing craft</b>		<b>6</b>

UCAC		6
<b>Aircraft</b>		<b>2</b>
Transport (TPT)	Light Do-228	2
<b>Helicopters</b>		<b>12</b>
Main rotor head (MRH)	Bell 412 Twin Huey	1
	Bell 412EP Twin Huey	2
Transport (TPT)	Medium AS332 Super Puma	5
	Light AW119KE Koala	4

Table 8.10: Overview of the military infrastructure in the Finnish Border Guard (*Chapter Four: Europe, 2022*)

## 9 Defence expenditures of Sweden and Finland

Next to Sweden's and Finland's current military capacity, it is important to analyse how both countries comply with NATO's defence expenditure requirements as established on the 2014 NATO summit in Wales.

This section provides an answer to sub research question 8. First, Sweden's military budget throughout the years is described making use of EDA and SIPRI data. For Sweden, EDA data is used for the period 2005-2020 and SIPRI data is used for the period 1960-2004 and 2021 as no EDA data was available for those years. A projection for government defence spendings for the near future is also made according to budget proposals. For Finland, EDA data is also used for 2005-2020 and SIPRI data was consulted for the years 1958-2004 and the year 2021 for the same reasons. Also for Finland, a budget projection for the coming years is given. The EDA report with defence expenditure data for 2021 for Sweden and Finland is expected in December 2022.

### 9.1.1 Military budget of Sweden

Sweden's defence expenditures can be quantified by different measures. It can be expressed as a fraction of GDP, as a fraction of government spendings, in absolute amounts and in amount per capita. Figure 9.1. shows defence expenditure data from the European Defence Agency (2021) during the period 2005-2020, using different measures, as does table 9.1. Extended defence expenditure data is provided in appendix 8.

It is useful to compare the evolution of Sweden's military expenditures throughout the years. On figure 9.1, it can be verified that the relative importance of Sweden's defence budget has been steadily decreasing over the years since 2005 until an absolute minimum was reached in 2017. That year, only 0,97% of Sweden's GDP was spent on defence. It is important to note that the Russian invasion on the Crim did not initiate an increased military spending. In 2018, spendings were also only 0,97% of GDP. In 2019, they again amounted to 1,05% and they rose further to 1,21% in 2020 (European Defence Agency, 2021). In anticipation of the EDA report, the 2021 data has not been included in the graph. In appendix 7, EDA data together with additional defence expenditure data consulted from SIPRI from the period 1958-2004

and 2021 can be consulted expressed as percentage of GDP: in 2021, defence expenditures further rose to 1,28% according to SIPRI (2022) data.




Figure 9.1: Evolution of Sweden's yearly defence expenditure expressed in absolute numbers, as % of GDP and as % of government spendings (2005-2020) (European Defence Agency, 2021)

According to defence spendings expressed as a percentage of government spendings, there has been an even steeper decrease starting from 2005 until 2018, when an absolute minimum of 1,95% was reached. Similar to the spendings as a % of GDP measure, there was an increase to 2,13% and 2,28% in 2019 and 2020 (European Defence Agency, 2021).

In absolute terms, defence expenditures declined from 2005 to 2009 in euros (in 2009 this was presumably due to the recession caused by the global economical crisis) and resumed relatively stable the years after the global recession. It is important to note that the Swedish economy had a clear growth in this period, but this didn't translate in a large absolute amount of defence expenses. Starting from 2019, also in absolute terms a clear growth can be verified:

EUR 4.982 million in 2019 and EUR 5.700 million in 2020 (European Defence Agency, 2021). For 2021, the costs incurred by the Swedish government for defence was about SEK 71 billion, as verified by Sweden's Ministry of Finance (2022a). The total defence expenditure per capita for 2005-2020 is also mentioned in table 9.1 and follows a similar trend as the absolute spendings (European Defence Agency, 2021).

<b>Year</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,42%	1,28%	1,27%	1,14%	1,13%	1,16%
Defence Expenditure as % of Government Spending	2,70%	2,51%	2,57%	2,28%	2,15%	2,27%
Total Defence Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 4.433	€ 4.295	€ 4.528	€ 4.026	€ 3.510	€ 4.265
Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 491	€ 473	€ 495	€ 437	€ 377	€ 455

<b>Year</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,07%	1,09%	1,07%	1,09%	1,03%	1,01%
Defence Expenditure as % of Government Spending	2,13%	2,13%	2,06%	2,13%	2,08%	2,04%
Total Defence Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 4.331	€ 4.632	€ 4.673	€ 4.711	€ 4.632	€ 4.683
Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 458	€ 487	€ 487	€ 486	€ 473	€ 471

<b>Year</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>
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Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	0,97%	0,97%	1,05%	1,21%
Defence Expenditure as % of Government Spending	1,96%	1,95%	2,13%	2,28%
Total Defence Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 4.639	€ 4.573	€ 4.982	€ 5.700
Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 461	€ 449	€ 485	€ 551

Tabel 9.1: Defence expenditure data for Sweden according to European Defence Agency (2021) data (2005-2020)

As presented in the 2022 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, published by the Sweden's Ministry of Finance (2022b) in April, defence expenditures for the coming years until at least 2025 are expected to increase. An allocation of 2% of GDP to defence needs to be reached as soon as practically feasible as stipulated by the NATO threshold, and Sweden has committed to reach this threshold in the coming years. In practice, the government forecasts a budget of SEK 80 billion for 2022 for defence expenditures, and this is calculated to increase to SEK 90 billion in 2023, SEK 102 billion in 2024 and SEK 110 billion in 2025 (Sweden's Ministry of Finance, 2022b). This is a rather large acceleration compared to the Total Defence Bill 2021-2025 proposed end 2020, which proposed an investment plan of SEK 71 billion in 2022, SEK 76 billion in 2023, SEK 83 billion in 2024 and ultimately SEK 89 billion in 2025 (Sweden's Ministry of Defence, 2020b). This can be verified in table 9.2.

<b>Year</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2025</b>
(Expected) defence expenditures according to Spring Fiscal Policy Bill, in billion SEK	71	80	90	102	110
(Expected) defence expenditures according to Total Defence Bill, in billion SEK	71	71	76	83	89

Tabel 9.2: Acceleration of defence expenditures (Sweden's Ministry of Defence, 2020b; Sweden's Ministry of Finance, 2022b)

It can be concluded that Swedish defence expenditures have been decreasing since 2005, according to fraction of GDP, fraction of government spendings and in absolute amounts, and have only started to increase again around 2018. 2014 is regarded as an important benchmark as it is the year in which Russia invaded Crimea and tensions in the Baltic region started to rise. However, these events did not immediately lead to a rise in defence expenditures. Sweden has to reach 2% of GDP in the near future and as soon as practically feasible and is working towards that goal with an increase in defence budget for the coming years (European Defence Agency, 2021).

### 9.1.2 Military budget of Finland

The same measures as for Sweden are applied to quantify the defence measures of Finland: as a fraction of GDP, as a fraction of government spendings, in absolute amounts and in amount per capita. Defence expenditure data from the European Defence Agency (2021) for Finland is shown in figure 9.2. during the period 2005-2020, using different measures, as does table 9.3. Extended defence expenditure data is provided in appendix 10.

A first useful tool is the expenditures for defence as a percentage of Finland's GDP as NATO wants all member states to reach the 2% threshold. It can be verified on figure 9.2 that Finland's defence budget has stayed relatively stable around 1,5% of GDP in the period 2005-2020, with respectively 1,4%, 1,4%, 1,5% and 1,5% of GDP allocated in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020. Contrary to Sweden, there has not been a large decline in defence expenditure as % of GDP between 2005 and 2014. The Russian invasion on Crimea only caused a very slight increase in government spendings for defence as a % of GDP (European Defence Agency, 2021). According to SIPRI (2022) data, expenditures have gone up to 2,03% in 2021. In anticipation of the EDA report, the 2021 data has not been included in the graph. Appendix 10 gives a more extended review of defence expenditures relative to GDP for Finland, with EDA data used for 2005-2020 and SIPRI data used for 1958-2004 and for 2021.



Figure 9.2: Evolution of Finland's yearly defence expenditure expressed in absolute numbers, as % of GDP and as % of government spendings (2005-2020) according to European Defence Agency (2021) data

According to spendings expressed as % of government spendings, a slightly different trend is verifiable: relative government spendings on defence have been decreasing in the period 2005-2014, with an absolute minimum of 2,27% in 2014, the year in which Russia annexed Crimea. After 2014, governmental expenditures rose again to 2,87% in 2019, after which there was a slight decrease to 2,60% in 2020.

In absolute euros spent per year on defence expenditures, there is a slightly different interpretation than for the previous two measures. Throughout 2005-2020, it can clearly be seen that government expenditures for defence have risen consistently from EUR 2.210 million in 2005 to EUR 3.518 million in 2020, with an acceleration in increase after 2014 and an absolute peak in 2019 of EUR 3.673 million. This consistent growth can partly be explained by an increase in GDP in 2005-2020. The increase in defence expenditure after 2014 is also due to actions the Finnish government took after the invasion of Crimea by Russia to further secure Finland against a possible Russian military threat. The budget for 2021 for defence was EUR 4.346 million, as found on the website of the state budget proposals online service of the Finnish government. The total defence expenditure per capita



for 2005-2020 is also mentioned in table 9.3 and follows a similar trend as the absolute spendings. Internationally seen, Finland has a very high defence expenditure per capita (European Defence Agency, 2021).

<b>Year</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,3%	1,3%	1,4%	1,3%	1,5%	1,4%
Defence Expenditure as % of Government Spending	2,7%	2,7%	3,0%	2,6%	2,7%	2,6%
Total Defence Expenditure (in millions)	€ 2.210	€ 2.281	€ 2.592	€ 2.463	€ 2.686	€ 2.707
Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 421	€ 433	€ 490	€ 464	€ 503	€ 505

<b>Year</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,3%	1,4%	1,4%	1,3%	1,5%	1,5%
Defence Expenditure as % of Government Spending	2,5%	2,5%	2,4%	2,3%	2,7%	2,7%
Total Defence Expenditure (in millions)	€ 2.654	€ 2.857	€ 2.862	€ 2.714	€ 3.183	€ 3.208
Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 493	€ 528	€ 526	€ 497	€ 581	€ 584

<b>Year</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>
Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,4%	1,4%	1,5%	1,5%

Defence Expenditure as % of Government Spending	2,6%	2,7%	2,9%	2,6%
Total Defence Expenditure (in millions)	€ 3.185	€ 3.313	€ 3.673	€ 3.518
Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 578	€ 601	€ 665	€ 636

Tabel 9.3: Defence expenditure data for Finland (2005-2020)

For 2022 and the next few years, the absolute defence expenditures in euros will further increase. The budget for 2021 for defence was EUR 4.346 million and corresponds to about 1.7% of GDP. The actual budget for 2022 amounts to EUR 5.102 million, which is already just over 2% of Finland's GDP. Finland's defence expenditures are proposed to increase by EUR 756 million to an amount of EUR 6.103 million in 2023 according to the recent budget draft from August 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022 on the state budget proposals online service of the Finnish Ministry of Finance (2022d). Annual increases of about EUR 408 – 536 million will follow between 2024 and 2026 as decided in the 2023-2026 Fiscal Plan (Finland's Ministry of Finance, 2022a). In total, the budget will rise with approximately EUR 2.2 billion between 2022 and 2026 (Finland's Ministry of Defence, 2022d).

<b>Year</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2026</b>
(Expected) defence expenditures, in EUR millions	4.346	5.102	6.103	7.302

Tabel 9.4: Expended defence expenditures (2021-2026) (Finnish Ministry of Finance, 2022d)

According to those measures, it can be concluded is clear that the Crimea invasion in 2014 was an important turning point for Finland regarding its defence spendings as they started to rise again. Finland currently has more than sufficient defence spendings of 2% of GDP according to international standards of defence expenditure calculations and will continue to increase its budget in the near future.

## 10 Costs of NATO membership for Sweden and Finland

This section provides an answer to sub research question 9. For both Sweden and Finland, costs related to NATO membership are analysed and compared to their current spendings regarding defence.

Costs involve on the one side direct funding concerning the common-funded NATO budget, and on the other side indirect funding for NATO, what corresponds to complying to the 2% defence spendings threshold. These costs are first discussed for Sweden and then the same is done for Finland. A conclusion which summarizes all costs is given on the end of this section. and Denmark as a comparison for Finland. A total costs overview is then summarized in a final table.

### 10.1 Costs for Sweden

First, costs for Sweden for the common-funded direct budget are discussed and compared with a similar NATO member state in terms of their GNI. For Sweden, Belgium is taken as a representative country as it has a similar GNI. Secondly, costs related to NATO's indirect budget, as already discussed in section 9, are summarized here.

#### 10.1.1 Costs for Sweden related to NATO's direct funding budget

As can be verified from the website of OECD (2022b), Sweden's GNI amounted to USD 644.520 million in 2021 at current prices, at the same magnitude order as Belgium, which had a GNI of USD 619 359 million in 2020 (for 2021, there was no data available yet for Belgium). Belgium currently pays 2.1043% of NATO's direct funded budget as already illustrated in table 5.1 in section 5 (NATO, 2022d). If Sweden were to pay the same percentage of the total NATO direct funding budget of EUR 2.5 billion, Sweden's yearly contribution as a NATO member for NATO's direct budget would amount to EUR 53 million as illustrated in table 10.1.

NATO direct funding budget	Belgium's share in direct budget	Costs for Sweden related to NATO's direct funding budget
EUR 2,5 billion	2.1043%	EUR 53 million

Table 10.1: Sweden's yearly cost contribution to NATO's direct funding budget

### 10.1.2 Costs for Sweden related to NATO's indirect funding budget

As already analysed in section 9, Sweden is expected to reach 2% of GDP allocated to defence expenditures in the near future, as soon as practically feasible. At the rate of their GDP estimation for 2021 at current prices according to the website of OECD (2022a), they would have to spend a yearly amount of 2% of USD 626.614 million, which corresponds to USD 12.532 million. At the exchange rate of August 5<sup>th</sup> (1,0233 USD = 1 EUR), this is EUR 12.247 million as illustrated in table 10.2.

Sweden's GDP in 2021	Costs for Sweden related to NATO's indirect funding budget
USD 626.614 million	USD 12.532 million = EUR 12.247 million

Table 10.2: Sweden's yearly cost contribution to NATO's indirect funding budget

## 10.2 Costs for Finland

First, costs for Finland related to the direct budget are discussed and compared with a similar NATO member state in terms of their GNI. For Finland, Denmark has a similar GNI and is taken as a representative country. Secondly, costs for NATO's indirect budget are summarized, which are already analysed in section 9.

### 10.2.1 Costs for Finland related to NATO's direct funding budget

Finland's GNI amounted to USD 308.642 million in 2021 current prices. This is at the same magnitude order as Denmark, which had a GNI of USD 391.918 million in 2021 at current prices according to the website of OECD (2022b). Denmark pays a 1.3116% fraction of

NATO’s direct funded budget (NATO, 2022d). Finland’s yearly contribution to NATO’s direct funded budget is then EUR 33 million as illustrated in table 10.3.

NATO direct funding budget	Denmark’s share in direct budget	Costs for Finland related to NATO’s direct funding budget
EUR 2,5 billion	1.3116%	EUR 33 million

Table 10.3: Finland’s yearly cost contribution to NATO's direct funding budget

10.2.2 Costs for Finland related to NATO’s indirect funding budget

Finland is expected to reach the 2% threshold in 2022 as discussed in section 9. Taking their GDP estimation of USD 303.019 million for 2021 according to current prices on the website of OECD (2022b) into account, they need to spend USD 6.060 million. At the exchange rate of August 5<sup>th</sup> (1,0233 USD = 1 EUR), this is EUR 5.922 million as illustrated in table 10.4.

Finland’s GDP in 2021	Costs for Finland related to NATO’s indirect funding budget
USD 303.019 million	USD 6.060 million = EUR 5.922 million

Table 10.4: Finland’s yearly cost contribution to NATO's indirect funding budget

10.3 Conclusion

According to the calculations, Sweden would yearly pay EUR 64.855 million if they were to become a NATO member. For Finland, this would amount to a yearly contribution of EUR 38.712 million. The surplus cost for both countries is in the direct NATO budget, as both countries have to support NATO’s organization if they become a member. However, this is only a very small fraction of both countries’ indirect budget contributions to commit to the 2% threshold. It has to be noted that both countries would be expected to have a similar policy regarding national defence spendings if they had decided not to apply for NATO membership. It can thus be concluded that NATO membership will not result in too much surplus costs for both countries. Costs are compared in table 10.5.

	Sweden	Finland
Costs for direct NATO budget	EUR 53 million	EUR 33 million
Costs for indirect NATO budget	EUR 12.247 million	EUR 5.922 million
<b>Total costs</b>	<b>EUR 12.300 million</b>	<b>EUR 5.955 million</b>

Table 10.5: Total yearly costs for Sweden and Finland regarding NATO membership

## 11 Implications of Türkiye's refusal to accept Sweden and Finland into NATO

NATO has always stressed the importance of collaboration and each decision within its organisation needs to be approved unanimously by all 30 members. It appears that this principle of NATO could prove disadvantageous to Sweden and Finland as Türkiye is currently still sending out ambiguous signals regarding their ratification of the Accession Protocols. Türkiye has lifted its veto against NATO membership for Sweden and Finland end June 2022 and signed the Accession Protocol, but the agreement still needs to be ratified by the Turkish parliament according to Türkiye's national legislation. Because of those complications, the consideration needs to be made how the geopolitical situation would be affected if Türkiye eventually decides to withdraw their support.

This section provides an answer to sub research question 10. First, recent developments regarding Türkiye's refusal of membership of Sweden and Finland into NATO are described. Afterwards, the possibility of removing Türkiye from the Alliance is discussed. To conclude, geopolitical consequences of this removal for NATO and consequently for Sweden and Finland are analysed.

### 11.1 Recent developments regarding Türkiye's refusal (May 13<sup>th</sup> – August 5<sup>th</sup>)

After Türkiye signed the Accession Protocol in July 2022, it is still uncertain if the agreement will successfully pass Türkiye's parliament. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been threatening to withdraw NATO support for both countries. The current step in the accession process is the ratification of the Accession Protocols by each NATO member's government on a national level, which 23 out of 30 members already completed. NATO had stated before that they expected that ratification by all NATO members on a national level would probably take 6 to 12 months. However, it now appears that Türkiye could cause a delay to that timeline or even impede Sweden's and Finland's accession (Pitel & Milne, 2022).

After it was announced that Sweden and Finland would vote for NATO membership, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated on May, 13<sup>th</sup> that "Scandinavian countries are like terrorist-group guesthouses" (Aydıntaşbaş, 2022). On May 18<sup>th</sup>, Erdoğan stated that NATO,

being an organisation working towards security, cannot allow countries that take that security away. Erdoğan said those things as he accused Sweden and Finland of not wanting to hand over a list of people who are accused of terrorism-related charges in Türkiye. He also stated that none of the allies show enough respect to Türkiye regarding Türkiye's terrorism-related security situation. That same day, accession talks between NATO ambassadors started regarding Sweden's and Finland's application letter. However, Türkiye stopped a vote by clearly stating that they "were not saying they can't be NATO members", but that everyone "needs to be on the same wavelength" (Milne & Pitel, 2022c). On May 23<sup>th</sup>, to make tensions rise even further, Erdoğan stated that he no longer recognized the existence of Greece's prime minister, Mitsotakis (Yackley, 2022).

On the other hand, NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting on May 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, that he was confident about NATO finding a solution amongst its members as they have done already many times in the past and about welcoming Finland and Sweden as integral and fully contributing members of NATO. He mentioned that it is necessary to take into account Türkiye's concerns as a NATO member as well, as no single NATO member has become victim of more terrorist attacks than Türkiye or holds more refugees. He said that Türkiye's opinion needed to be respected especially as their geographic location is of vital importance to NATO (Stoltenberg, 2022). On June 1<sup>st</sup>, Stoltenberg stated in a press conference that he was in close contact with president Erdoğan and that officials of Türkiye, Sweden and Finland would come together in NATO's headquarters in a meeting (Stoltenberg & J. Blinken, Press Conference, 2022).

Several reasons circulate trying to explain Türkiye's ambiguous stance of NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. A first reason is that, according to Erdoğan, Sweden and Finland support organizations that perform terrorism acts in Türkiye and he wants both countries to renounce those as terrorist organizations. Those include the Gulen movement, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) and the Kurdish YPG militia (People's Defence Units/ People's Protection Units). Türkiye accused Sweden of giving asylum to members of the Gulen movement who are exiled from Türkiye. The Gulen movement is an Islamic sect that is, according to Erdoğan, responsible for the failed coup on the Turkish government on July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2016. The PKK is the militia that Türkiye's government has been military suppressing ever since the 1980s and is considered as a terrorist organization by the European Union, the USA and other nations. Türkiye blamed especially Sweden of supporting the Kurdish YPG militia, which is regarded by Türkiye as an extension of the PKK. Ties between the Kurdish YPG



militia and Sweden originated when Swedish troops fought together with the Kurdish YPG militia in a US-led coalition against ISIS. Swedish officials argue that the Kurdish forces are important to maintain stability in Syria. There is a clear sympathy for the Kurdish cause in Sweden which is deemed problematic by Türkiye (Milne & Pitel, 2022a). A second reason for holding off Sweden's and Finland's NATO membership is that Erdoğan might want to boost his popularity with the eye on the coming 2023 national elections. Türkiye currently experiences economic difficulties and this does not benefit Erdoğan's position as leader of the country. A way to gain public support is by reducing the PKK problem in Türkiye (Dougall & Samar, 2022). A third possible reason is frustration towards Europe and more in particular towards Sweden and Finland after they imposed sanctions on Türkiye regarding the export of weapons to Türkiye. These sanctions were introduced after Türkiye's attack on the People's Protection Units (YPG) in Syria in 2019 (Yackley, 2022). However, Sweden and Finland recently commented that they have no weapon embargo towards Türkiye. A last possible explanation is that Türkiye is trying to put pressure on the US Congress concerning the purchase of F-16s it wants and to reverse the decision of stopping the export of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye (Dougall & Samar, 2022).

The situation presented itself as the start of presumably many negotiation talks between Sweden, Finland, Türkiye and the USA. Meetings between Turkish, Finnish and Swedish delegations initially did not bring any progress in the penile situation and neither did separate calls between Erdoğan and Niinisto, Finland's president, between Erdoğan and Andersson, Sweden's prime minister, and between Erdoğan and Stoltenberg, NATO' Secretary General. On June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2022 however, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto stated that Finland might be interested in buying Turkish drones (Milne & Pitel, Finland woos Ankara with hint it could buy Turkish drones, 2022b). On the Swedish side however, as elections in Sweden will already follow in September 2022, it was believed to be hard for the Social Democrats in the Swedish government to give in to Türkiye's wishes. On top of that, the wishes of the Social Democrats' left wing were already set aside when the party decided to submit their NATO application.

After these struggles, a trilateral memorandum between Sweden, Finland and Türkiye was eventually signed on June 28<sup>th</sup>, the first day of the NATO Summit in Madrid to support Sweden's and Finland's NATO membership (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2022c). In exchange, Sweden and Finland had to commit to fight against terrorism and recognize PKK and the Gülen movement as a terrorist organization. In addition, they had to confirm that there

were no weapon embargoes against Türkiye (NATO, 2021). Lastly, the United States expressed public support towards Türkiye's purchase of American F-16 fighter jets. However, this decision would still need to be approved by the American Congress (Schwartz & Pitel, 2022).

Although an agreement was finally reached, Türkiye has still been threatening to freeze Sweden's and Finland's NATO bids afterwards. Erdoğan stated on June 30<sup>th</sup> that Sweden had to deliver 73 people on Türkiye's terrorist list to Ankara or else they would not bring the Accession Protocol before the Turkish parliament. However, this commitment was not mentioned in the memorandum signed between the three countries. Later, on July 27<sup>th</sup>, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu repeated that Sweden and Finland had to take their responsibility on the terrorist extradition if they wanted to retain Türkiye's support (Reuters, 2022b). On the Turkish side, it is not clear if they will ultimately still block Sweden and Finland from NATO membership. They have already received concessions in exchange for expressing support for Sweden's and Finland's case. However, It could very well be that the Turkish president only wants to benefit from the situation in the end by seeking even more opportunities (Schwartz, Milne, & Pitel, 2022).

## 11.2 The improbability of removing Türkiye from the Alliance

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Türkiye has already been showing goodwill by collaborating internationally after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it did support Ukraine militarily with armed drones and by limiting the passage of Russian military planes and warships through Türkiye's airspace and through the Black Sea. They emerged as mediator to forge a deal between Russia and the west about lifting a Russian naval blockade to export grain from Ukrainian ports. This way, Ukrainian export was stimulated and a global food crisis was averted (Seddon, Pitel, Olearchyk, & Srivastava, 2022).

However, Türkiye-NATO relations had already started to sour in the past years. Sanctions were incurred upon Türkiye by the west after the Turkish president's reaction on the so-called failed coup in Türkiye in 2016 and after it had invaded Syria in 2019. Demands to remove Türkiye from NATO had already been made in these cases (McCann, 2022). Thereafter in 2020, export of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye was stopped by the USA as a sanction after Türkiye's decision to purchase the Russian S-400 Air Defence system. After the invasion,

Türkiye made itself unpopular by not signing up for western sanctions against Russia as only NATO country as it has trade, energy and defence links with Russia. In addition, they allowed Russian ships to transport wheat and corn from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory to Turkish ports. Most recently, the Turkish and Russian president decided after a meeting on August 5<sup>th</sup> to deepen their economic ties, which would partly reduce the impact of the sanctions imposed by other NATO countries on Russia (Seddon, Pitel, Olearchyk, & Srivastava, 2022). It is important not to forget that Article 5 depends on a unanimous vote. It is not completely certain where Türkiye's priorities would lie in the case of a Russian attack on a NATO member state.

However, in contrast with other international organizations, NATO's treaty has not foreseen the possibility of suspending the rights of a member or even removing a member from NATO. NATO most often tries to find a solution by negotiating, as it has already done multiple times in the past. By including an option in the treaty which could phase out members, NATO would not show trust towards them in the first place. NATO often just decides to wait out a misbehaving government until a new government is rightfully elected that does comply with NATO's values. However, a NATO member could still be expelled from NATO if that ally is not complying with its principles of democracy, individual liberty and law which are stated in the North Atlantic Treaty. This would lead to a so-called material breach of the treaty. Within the meaning of Article 60, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is further specified that in the case of a very severe material breach of a treaty's principles, a unanimous agreement of the organization excluding the defaulting state can be sufficient to terminate the relations with the defaulting state. This means that the North Atlantic Council, excluding Türkiye, could in theory unanimously decide to remove Türkiye from the Alliance if it is in material breach of its commitments to NATO (Sari, 2019). If Türkiye were to be removed from NATO, membership for Sweden and Finland would certainly be facilitated. However, it needs to be emphasized that this scenario is very unlikely, as discussed in the next subsection.

### 11.3 Geopolitical consequences of Türkiye's removal from NATO

NATO needs to consider Türkiye's strategic importance before considering removing them from the Alliance. It has a geographical importance as is situated south of the Black Sea, which separates Russia and Türkiye. NATO has no other members that are positioned closer

to Russia in the Black Sea region. After the war emerged in February 2022, Türkiye blocked the transit for Russian warships in both directions over two waterways, namely the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which form the connection between the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. Eventual access for Russian warships to the Mediterranean Sea and the rest of the world was hereby denied. Maybe even more important than the control over warfare in the Black Sea is that Türkiye controls the global trade over the Black Sea waters. According to the 1936 Montreux Convention, Türkiye has the right to block ships in the Black Sea in times of war (Pitel, 2022). Türkiye has the second biggest military in the NATO after the USA, which increases the credibility of their blockade. Next to Türkiye's position at the border of the Black Sea, it is also strategically located north of the Middle East. As Türkiye has a large military presence in Syria, NATO can exert influence against the alliance between Russia and Syria's president, Assad.

If NATO would remove Türkiye as a NATO member, Türkiye would no longer have a direct reason to block Russia's entrance into the Mediterranean. In this regard, Russia would have military access to the Mediterranean over sea. NATO would lose the geostrategic advantage of its presence in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and would be weakened. Ukrainian grain would no probably no longer be able to be transported without Türkiye's aid. In addition, the balance in the Middle East would be seriously disturbed and Russia's position in the Middle East would be reinforced.

Greece would become much more important for NATO in the Black Sea region. More attention of NATO would be drawn to Greece and this could result in more financial support for the country to improve its Navy further. Greece would acquire a higher status within NATO. It already has one of the largest navies in NATO. However, it would be more difficult to block Russian access to the Mediterranean as Greece does not control the small straits where Russian ships have to pass. Greece only borders the Aegean Sea, which forms the connection between the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, Türkiye and Greece don't have positive diplomatic relationships. They have a tradition of being rivals in the eastern Mediterranean and almost entered into military conflict in 2020 when Türkiye used warships to look for hydrocarbons in Greek Mediterranean water. Türkiye annulled a military exercise in Greece in May 2022 (Aydıntaşbaş, 2022). They often have disputes regarding airspace violations in the Aegean Sea region (The Defense Post, 2022). Because of all these reasons, it seems improbable that Türkiye would agree with an increased Greek maritime presence in the Aegean Sea. This could on its turn increase tensions between NATO

and Türkiye in the Aegean Sea region and eventually drive Türkiye closer towards a possible Russian alliance. A build-up of military presence in the Aegean Sea region, next to increased tensions between Russia and the NATO, is then possible and could lead to an increased instability. However, this is merely speculation. It is rather uncertain what would happen if Türkiye were to be removed as a NATO member.

#### 11.4 Conclusion

For NATO, it would thus be better from a geostrategic point of view to keep Türkiye in the Alliance. Türkiye's importance for NATO cannot be underestimated. It speaks for itself that the Turkish president is very aware of this and that he tries to play this to his advantage. Without Türkiye's presence in the Black Sea and in the Middle East, NATO would be seriously weakened. As a consequence, its internal working would become suboptimal compared to the current situation. This would in its turn negatively influence its member's military capabilities, and thus also Sweden's and Finland's military capabilities if they were to join NATO.

## 12 Conclusion

In this master's dissertation, the author tried to answer what the opportunity was of NATO membership of Sweden and Finland. This opportunity was researched from different angles: on the one side, Sweden and Finland could possibly benefit from NATO membership. On the other side, both Nordic countries could possibly bring an added value to the Alliance.

The answer on the main research question is that Sweden, Finland and NATO would most certainly be better equipped to cope with the threat that is Russia if both countries became a member of NATO. This is the case for Sweden and Finland as the security guarantee that NATO offers to its members based on Article 5 from the North Atlantic Treaty would protect them against possible Russian aggression. This has become even clearer after having observed what happened with the sovereign country Ukraine as it stood mainly alone, without direct military support of NATO troops, when Russia invaded it. But it is also the case for the Alliance itself, as Sweden and Finland clearly can bring additional military strength to NATO and its individual member states.

In support of the main research questions, multiple sub research questions were answered.

First, it was concluded that Sweden and Finland would fit well into NATO as their geographics, demographics and internal state structure are similar to other NATO Allies. Information from Sweden's and Finland's national website was consulted.

Secondly, it was shown how Sweden's and Finland's political model evolved very slowly towards neutrality to break away from that status very abruptly in 2022. It is clear that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was the trigger that made both countries permanently reverse their international political status of military non-aligned country. Two history books were verified for this and additional information was found in news articles.

Thirdly, it was made clear that Sweden and Finland already had become dependent on many other international organizations throughout the years since World War II as they were being listed. The websites of those organizations were used as source.

The fourth research question was answered by describing NATO's organizational strengths. NATO could certainly provide Sweden and Finland of security guarantees to cause a deterrent effect against military aggression. Information was found on NATO's website.

Next, it was proven that Russia can clearly be considered as a military power and a dangerous threat towards sovereign states in Sweden's and Finland's security environment in the Baltic Sea region and Arctic Ocean region. Recent geopolitical events demonstrate reason enough to be integrated in a powerful military organization. A scenario where either Sweden or Finland joins the Alliance is strategically not favourable. It would be better if they both became a member simultaneously. However, staying outside of the Alliance would clearly make both countries very vulnerable in the case of a military attack. Information was consulted from government reports and news articles.

As an answer on the sixth research question, the political landscape in both countries was drawn. It was clear that 2022 marked an important turning point for some political parties who could no longer withstand pressure to break with their traditional political agenda of opposing NATO membership. Statistical government sources were used for the election results in addition to the websites of the political parties in Sweden and Finland.

Next, Sweden's and Finland's military capabilities were listed and it was clearly shown that especially their Navy and Air Forces could bring an added value to NATO's military strength. The Military Balance 2022 was used as well as both countries' defence websites.

Regarding both countries defence spendings, it was shown that they are doing rather well. Sweden is going to close the gap with the proposed 2% threshold, decided on the NATO Summit in Wales, in the near future. Finland is expected to spend 2% of their GDP on defence expenditures this year already. Finland has very high defence spendings per capita. Sources were mainly European Agency data and SIPRI data together with news articles.

As an answer on research question 9, it was proven that additional costs spent on NATO direct funded budget are not significant in comparison with the costs Sweden and Finland already spend on their national defence. Government reports with budget proposals were used as source.

Lastly, it is not certain whether Türkiye will eventually accept Sweden and Finland in the Alliance. However, it is clear that it is an indispensable ally and that their removal from NATO could decrease NATO's sphere of influence. NATO finds itself in a very precarious situation and will need to handle this problem as well as possible.

This research is very relevant in the light of recent geopolitical events in 2022. Academic literature was very scarce, especially from independent sources. Reports and articles were

often consulted from Sweden's and Finland's government websites, or from NATO's website, which often results in a certain bias. This report has incorporated those sources as objectively as possible and tries to provide more independent academic literature.





Appendix 2: Political map of Finland



Figure 0.2: Political map of Finland

Appendix 3: NATO members and their date of accession

Belgium	1949	UK	1949	Estonia	2004
Canada	1949	USA	1949	Latvia	2004
Denmark	1949	Greece	1952	Lithuania	2004
France	1949	Türkiye	1952	Romania	2004
Iceland	1949	Germany	1955	Slovakia	2004

Italy	1949	Spain	1982	Slovenia	2004
Luxembourg	1949	Czech Rep.	1999	Albania	2009
Netherlands	1949	Hungary	1999	Croatia	2009
Norway	1949	Poland	1999	Montenegro	2017
Portugal	1949	Bulgaria	2004	North Macedonia	2020

Table 0.1: NATO members and their date of accession

#### Appendix 4: NATO's working structure




Figure 0.3: NATO's working structure

## Appendix 5: Main stages of accession to NATO




Figure 0.4: Main stages of accession to NATO (*Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2022b, p. 50*)

## Appendix 6: Defence expenditures of NATO countries in absolute amounts (2014-2022)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021 <sup>6</sup>	2022 <sup>7</sup>
Albania	178	132	131	145	176	197	197	224	293
Belgium	5.200	4.204	4.258	4.441	4.845	4.761	5.324	6.245	7.361

<sup>6</sup> Figures for 2021 are estimates.

<sup>7</sup> Figures for 2022 are estimates.

Bulgaria	747	633	671	724	962	2.159	1.121	1.276	1.430
Canada	18.172	18.689	17.708	23.700	22.399	22.572	23.330	26.153	28.106
Croatia	1.064	883	837	924	966	1.002	981	1.363	1.403
Czech Republic	1.975	1.921	1.866	2.259	2.750	2.982	3.199	3.915	4.040
Denmark	4.057	3.364	3.593	3.780	4.559	4.487	4.886	5.274	5.716
Estonia	514	463	497	541	615	637	719	749	869
France	52.022	43.496	44.209	46.133	50.507	49.493	52.520	56.561	55.939
Germany	46.176	39.833	41.606	45.470	49.772	52.549	58.652	62.766	62.725
Greece	5.234	4.520	4.637	4.752	5.388	5.019	5.492	8.006	8.393
Hungary	1.210	1.132	1.289	1.708	1.615	2.190	2.767	3.112	3.045
Italy	24.487	19.576	22.382	23.902	25.641	23.559	30.084	33.157	32.423
Latvia	294	282	403	485	710	692	743	824	909
Lithuania	428	471	636	817	1.057	1.094	1.176	1.308	1.690
Luxembourg	253	250	236	326	356	381	426	403	523
Montenegro	69	57	62	65	75	74	83	91	107
Netherlands	10.349	8.673	9.112	9.643	11.172	12.067	12.838	13.953	16.696
North Macedonia	124	105	104	101	120	146	154	204	247
Norway	7.722	6.142	6.431	6.850	7.544	7.536	7.228	8.438	9.104
Poland	10.107	10.588	9.397	9.940	11.857	11.824	13.363	15.099	17.806
Portugal	3.007	2.645	2.616	2.738	3.249	3.299	3.273	3.899	3.753
Romania	2.691	2.581	2.645	3.643	4.359	4.608	5.050	5.294	6.013
Slovakia	999	987	1.004	1.056	1.298	1.802	2.049	1.985	2.416
Slovenia	487	401	449	477	547	572	568	763	788
Spain	12.634	11.096	9.975	11.889	13.200	12.630	12.828	14.849	14.810
Türkiye	13.577	11.953	12.644	12.971	14.168	14.089	13.396	13.443	9.272
United Kingdom	65.692	59.505	56.362	55.719	60.380	59.399	63.500	71.938	72.171
United States	653.942	641.253	656.059	642.933	672.255	750.886	770.650	793.990	821.830
<b>NATO Europe and</b>	<b>289.275</b>	<b>254.423</b>	<b>255.595</b>	<b>275.100</b>	<b>300.167</b>	<b>301.675</b>	<b>325.944</b>	<b>361.290</b>	<b>368.045</b>

<b>Canada</b>									
<b>NATO total</b>	<b>943.217</b>	<b>895.676</b>	<b>911.654</b>	<b>918.033</b>	<b>972.422</b>	<b>1.052.561</b>	<b>1.096.594</b>	<b>1.155.280</b>	<b>1.189.875</b>

Table 0.2: Defence expenditures of NATO countries in absolute amounts in USD millions, in current prices and current exchange rates (2014-2022) (*NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022*)

### Appendix 7: Yearly defence expenditures of Sweden as % of GDP (1960-2021)

<b>Yearly defence expenditures of Sweden, % of GDP</b>							
<b>Year</b>	<b>% of GDP</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>% of GDP</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>% of GDP</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>% of GDP</b>
<b>1960</b>	3,78%	<b>1976</b>	3,00%	<b>1992</b>	2,34%	<b>2008</b>	1,14%
<b>1961</b>	3,72%	<b>1977</b>	3,10%	<b>1993</b>	2,26%	<b>2009</b>	1,13%
<b>1962</b>	3,86%	<b>1978</b>	3,15%	<b>1994</b>	2,13%	<b>2010</b>	1,16%
<b>1963</b>	3,97%	<b>1979</b>	3,12%	<b>1995</b>	1,75%	<b>2011</b>	1,07%
<b>1964</b>	3,87%	<b>1980</b>	2,92%	<b>1996</b>	1,48%	<b>2012</b>	1,09%
<b>1965</b>	3,91%	<b>1981</b>	2,95%	<b>1997</b>	1,91%	<b>2013</b>	1,07%
<b>1966</b>	3,86%	<b>1982</b>	2,85%	<b>1998</b>	1,87%	<b>2014</b>	1,09%
<b>1967</b>	3,61%	<b>1983</b>	2,74%	<b>1999</b>	1,87%	<b>2015</b>	1,03%
<b>1968</b>	3,48%	<b>1984</b>	2,67%	<b>2000</b>	1,82%	<b>2016</b>	1,01%
<b>1969</b>	3,46%	<b>1985</b>	2,67%	<b>2001</b>	1,78%	<b>2017</b>	0,97%
<b>1970</b>	3,36%	<b>1986</b>	2,59%	<b>2002</b>	1,64%	<b>2018</b>	0,97%
<b>1971</b>	3,41%	<b>1987</b>	2,48%	<b>2003</b>	1,60%	<b>2019</b>	1,05%
<b>1972</b>	3,41%	<b>1988</b>	2,45%	<b>2004</b>	1,44%	<b>2020</b>	1,21%
<b>1973</b>	3,28%	<b>1989</b>	2,43%	<b>2005</b>	1,42%	<b>2021</b>	1,28%
<b>1974</b>	3,22%	<b>1990</b>	2,46%	<b>2006</b>	1,28%		
<b>1975</b>	3,08%	<b>1991</b>	2,32%	<b>2007</b>	1,27%		

Table 0.3: Yearly defence expenditures of Sweden as % of GDP (1960-2021), according to SIPRI (2022) data (1960-2004, 2021) and European Defence Agency (2021) data (2005-2020)

### Appendix 8: Extended defence expenditure data for Sweden (2005-2020)

<b>Sweden</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
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<b>Total Defence Expenditure (in million euros)</b>	€ 4.433	€ 4.295	€ 4.528	€ 4.026
Total Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,42%	1,28%	1,27%	1,14%
Total Defence Expenditure as % of Government Expenditure	2,70%	2,51%	2,57%	2,28%
Total Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 491	€ 473	€ 495	€ 437
<b>Defence Investment (in million euros)</b>	€ 1.370,0	€ 1.424,7	€ 1.589,0	€ 1.136,4
Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 1.217,0	€ 1.158,1	€ 1.289,6	€ 901,2
Defence Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 153,0	€ 266,7	€ 299,4	€ 235,2
Defence Research and Technology (R&T) Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 150,0	€ 140,2	€ 129,1	€ 119,2
Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	n.a	€ 40	€ 40	€ 41
European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	n.a.	€ 0	€ 0	€ 0
Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in million euros)	n.a.	€ 30,4	€ 25,4	€ 27,1
European Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in million euros)	n.a.	€ 27,8	€ 21,0	€ 23,4

<b>Sweden</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>Total Defence Expenditure (in million euros)</b>	€ 3.510	€ 4.265	€ 4.331	€ 4.632
Total Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,13%	1,16%	1,07%	1,09%
Total Defence Expenditure as % of Government Expenditure	2,15%	2,27%	2,13%	2,13%
Total Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 377	€ 455	€ 458	€ 487
<b>Defence Investment (in million euros)</b>	€ 940,6	€ 1.142,8	€ 1.068,6	€ 1.130,4
Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 789,5	€ 1.036,0	€ 966,0	€ 1.044,8
Defence Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 151,1	€ 106,8	€ 102,6	€ 85,6
Defence Research and Technology (R&T) Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 92,1	€ 85,9	€ 77,6	€ 79,4
Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 63	€ 67	€ 24	€ 79
European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 0	€ 47	€ 23	€ 78
Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 25,2	€ 27,2	€ 21,6	€ 18,0
European Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 23,6	€ 26,3	€ 20,3	€ 16,8



<b>Sweden</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Total Defence Expenditure (in million euros)</b>	€ 4.673	€ 4.711	€ 4.632	€ 4.683
Total Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,07%	1,09%	1,03%	1,01%
Total Defence Expenditure as % of Government Expenditure	2,06%	2,13%	2,08%	2,04%
Total Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 487	€ 486	€ 473	€ 471
<b>Defence Investment (in million euros)</b>	€ 1.128,5	€ 1.283,2	€ 1.162,4	€ 1.094,5
Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 1.010,0	€ 1.177,7	€ 1.052,6	€ 982,0
Defence Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 118,5	€ 105,5	€ 109,8	€ 112,5
Defence Research and Technology (R&T) Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 64,5	€ 61,1	€ 67,2	€ 65,1
Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 70	€ 101	€ 94	€ 134
European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 53	€ 100	€ 92	€ 69
Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 14,8	€ 13,4	€ 11,7	€ 11,9
European Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 13,2	€ 9,1	€ 7,7	€ 8,1

euros)				
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<b>Sweden</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>
<b>Total Defence Expenditure (in million euros)</b>	€ 4.639	€ 4.573	€ 4.982	€ 5.700
Total Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	0,97%	0,97%	1,05%	1,21%
Total Defence Expenditure as % of Government Expenditure	1,96%	1,95%	2,13%	2,28%
Total Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 461	€ 449	€ 485	€ 551
<b>Defence Investment (in million euros)</b>				
	€ 1.064,5	€ 1.088,2	€ 1.381,2	€ 1.545,0
Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 1.004,3	€ 1.026,3	€ 1.314,8	€ 1.454,4
Defence Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 60,2	€ 61,9	€ 66,3	€ 90,6
Defence Research and Technology (R&T) Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 60,2	€ 61,9	€ 66,3	€ 90,6
Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 31,1	€ 74,8	n.a.	n.a.
European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 30,4	€ 28,3	n.a.	n.a.
Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 10,8	€ 9,1	n.a.	n.a.

European Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in million euros)	€ 7,3	€ 5,6	n.a.	n.a.
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Table 0.4: Extended defence expenditure data for Sweden (2005-2020), according to European Defence Agency (2021)

#### Appendix 9: Yearly defence expenditures of Finland as % of GDP (1960-2021)

Yearly defence expenditures of Finland, % of GDP							
Year	% of GDP	Year	% of GDP	Year	% of GDP	Year	% of GDP
1958	1,71%	1974	1,27%	1990	1,56%	2006	1,32%
1959	1,87%	1975	1,51%	1991	1,78%	2007	1,39%
1960	1,77%	1976	1,34%	1992	1,91%	2008	1,27%
1961	1,84%	1977	1,41%	1993	1,87%	2009	1,48%
1962	2,51%	1978	1,43%	1994	1,76%	2010	1,45%
1963	1,93%	1979	1,48%	1995	1,42%	2011	1,35%
1964	1,86%	1980	1,67%	1996	1,53%	2012	1,43%
1965	1,80%	1981	1,55%	1997	1,54%	2013	1,41%
1966	1,71%	1982	1,64%	1998	1,46%	2014	1,32%
1967	1,62%	1983	1,82%	1999	1,22%	2015	1,52%
1968	1,76%	1984	1,60%	2000	1,24%	2016	1,49%
1969	1,44%	1985	1,68%	2001	1,14%	2017	1,41%
1970	1,38%	1986	1,72%	2002	1,15%	2018	1,42%
1971	1,45%	1987	1,65%	2003	1,45%	2019	1,53%
1972	1,53%	1988	1,61%	2004	1,47%	2020	1,48%
1973	1,45%	1989	1,53%	2005	1,34%	2021	1,32%

Table 0.5: Yearly defence expenditures of Finland as % of GDP (1960-2021) according to SIPRI (2022) data (1958-2004, 2021) and European Defence Agency (2021) data (2005-2020)

Appendix 10: Extended defence expenditure data for Finland (2005-2020)

<b>Finland</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>
<b>Total Defence Expenditure (in millions)</b>	€ 2.210	€ 2.281	€ 2.592	€ 2.463
Total Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,34%	1,32%	1,39%	1,27%
Total Defence Expenditure as % of Government Expenditure	2,73%	2,73%	2,97%	2,64%
Total Defence Expenditure per capita	421,22	433,14	490,10	463,52
<b>Defence Investment (in millions)</b>	€ 579,4	€ 648,3	€ 627,6	€ 683,0
Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure (in millions)	€ 538,8	€ 617,6	€ 583,6	€ 655,4
Defence Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure (in millions)	€ 40,6	€ 30,7	€ 44,0	€ 27,6
Defence Research and Technology (R&T) Expenditure (in millions)	€ 32,0	€ 20,0	€ 14,2	€ 25,5
Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 23,3	€ 0,0	€ 34,9	€ 32,8
European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 23,3	€ 0,0	€ 34,9	€ 32,8
Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in millions)	€ 2,3	€ 0,9	€ 1,3	€ 4,1
European Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in millions)	€ 2,3	€ 0,9	€ 1,3	€ 4,1

<b>Finland</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>Total Defence Expenditure (in millions)</b>	€ 2.686	€ 2.707	€ 2.654	€ 2.857
Total Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,484%	1,447%	1,348%	1,430%
Total Defence Expenditure as % of Government Expenditure	2,709%	2,643%	2,479%	2,544%
Total Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 503,06	€ 504,79	€ 492,55	€ 527,70
<b>Defence Investment (in millions)</b>	€ 780,2	€ 736,4	€ 475,0	€ 660,0
Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure (in millions)	€ 736,1	€ 698,1	€ 457,0	€ 623,0
Defence Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure (in millions)	€ 44,1	€ 38,3	€ 18,0	€ 37,0
Defence Research and Technology (R&T) Expenditure (in millions)	€ 12,5	€ 16,9	€ 6,0	€ 29,0
Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 32,8	€ 29,8	€ 0,0	€ 0,0
European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 32,8	€ 29,8	€ 0,0	€ 0,0
Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in millions)	€ 3,3	€ 3,3	€ 4,4	€ 3,0
European Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in millions)	€ 3,3	€ 3,3	€ 4,3	€ 2,9

<b>Finland</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Total Defence Expenditure (in millions)</b>	€ 2.862	€ 2.714	€ 3.183	€ 3.208
Total Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,408%	1,321%	1,519%	1,487%
Total Defence Expenditure as % of Government Expenditure	2,448%	2,273%	2,658%	2,656%
Total Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 526,27	€ 496,79	€ 580,87	€ 583,77
<b>Defence Investment (in millions)</b>	€ 621,2	€ 468,4	€ 534,1	€ 614,5
Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure (in millions)	€ 587,6	€ 433,4	€ 477,5	€ 556,3
Defence Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure (in millions)	€ 33,5	€ 35,1	€ 56,7	€ 58,2
Defence Research and Technology (R&T) Expenditure (in millions)	€ 25,6	€ 24,7	€ 56,7	€ 58,2
Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 0,0	€ 0,0	€ 0,0	€ 0,0
European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	€ 0,0	€ 0,0	€ 0,0	€ 0,0
Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in millions)	€ 2,3	€ 1,3	€ 1,0	€ 0,5
European Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in millions)	€ 2,2	€ 1,3	€ 1,0	€ 0,5

<b>Finland</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>
<b>Total Defence Expenditure (in millions)</b>	€ 3.185	€ 3.313	€ 3.673	€ 3.518
Total Defence Expenditure as % of GDP	1,4%	1,4%	1,5%	1,5%
Total Defence Expenditure as % of Government Expenditure	2,6%	2,7%	2,9%	2,6%
Total Defence Expenditure per capita	€ 578	€ 601	€ 665	€ 636
<b>Defence Investment (in millions)</b>	€ 567,7	€ 621,9	€ 866,2	€ 654,3
Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure (in millions)	€ 527,1	€ 576,7	€ 818,2	€ 606,3
Defence Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure (in millions)	€ 40,6	€ 45,2	€ 48,0	€ 48,0
Defence Research and Technology (R&T) Expenditure (in millions)	€ 9,3	€ 14,0	€ 33,6	€ 33,6
Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in millions)	€ 0,7	€ 0,9	€ 0,6	€ 0,9
European Collaborative Defence R&T Expenditure (in millions)	€ 0,7	€ 0,9	€ 0,6	€ 0,9

Table 0.6: Extended defence expenditure data for Finland (2005-2020) according to European Defence Agency (2021) data

## Appendix 11: NATO member's GDP (2014-2022)

**Table 5 : Real GDP**

**Billion US dollars (2015 prices and exchange rates)**

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021e	2022e
Albania	11	11	12	12	13	13	13	14	14
Belgium	453	462	468	476	485	495	467	496	508
Bulgaria	49	51	52	54	55	57	55	57	58
Canada	1.546	1.557	1.572	1.620	1.665	1.696	1.607	1.680	1.743
Croatia	49	50	52	54	55	57	53	58	60
Czech Republic	178	188	193	203	210	216	203	210	214
Denmark	296	303	312	321	328	335	328	343	353
Estonia	22	23	24	25	26	27	26	28	29
France	2.415	2.441	2.465	2.525	2.571	2.620	2.413	2.576	2.637
Germany	3.313	3.355	3.426	3.529	3.568	3.607	3.429	3.527	3.593
Greece	196	196	195	197	200	204	185	201	206
Hungary	121	125	128	134	141	147	140	150	156
Iceland	17	18	19	19	20	21	19	20	21
Italy	1.824	1.836	1.861	1.894	1.909	1.919	1.744	1.860	1.907
Latvia	26	27	28	29	30	31	30	31	32
Lithuania	41	41	42	44	46	48	48	51	51
Luxembourg	59	60	63	64	65	67	66	71	73
Montenegro	4	4	4	4	5	5	4	5	5
Netherlands	751	766	782	806	824	840	808	849	874
North	10	10	10	10	11	11	11	11	11



<b>Macedonia</b>									
Norway	378	386	390	399	403	406	404	419	436
Poland	458	477	492	516	544	570	557	591	617
Portugal	196	199	203	211	217	222	204	214	225
Romania	173	178	186	200	209	217	209	222	227
<b>Slovak</b>									
Republic	84	89	90	93	97	99	95	98	100
Slovenia	42	43	44	47	49	50	48	52	54
Spain	1.152	1.196	1.232	1.269	1.298	1.325	1.181	1.242	1.292
Türkiye	815	864	893	960	988	997	1.015	1.127	1.157
<b>United</b>									
Kingdom	2.882	2.957	3.024	3.089	3.140	3.192	2.896	3.112	3.368
<b>United</b>									
States	17.726	18.206	18.510	18.927	19.480	19.925	19.247	20.339	20.838
<b>NATO</b>									
<b>Europe and</b>									
<b>Canada</b>	<b>17.547</b>	<b>17.898</b>	<b>18.250</b>	<b>18.791</b>	<b>19.159</b>	<b>19.483</b>	<b>18.258</b>	<b>19.312</b>	<b>20.022</b>
<b>NATO Total</b>	<b>35.273</b>	<b>36.104</b>	<b>36.760</b>	<b>37.719</b>	<b>38.638</b>	<b>39.408</b>	<b>37.505</b>	<b>39.650</b>	<b>40.859</b>

Notes: Figures for 2021 and 2022 are estimates. The NATO Europe and Canada and NATO Total aggregates from 2017 onwards include Montenegro, which became an Ally on 5 June 2017, and from 2020 onwards include North Macedonia, which became an Ally on 27 March 2020.

Table 0.7: GDP of NATO members (2014-2022) in USD billions according to 2015 prices and exchange rates (*NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022*)

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