Hate Speech in Ukraine: How Can Civil Society and the EU Work Against Inflammatory Language and Towards Reconciliation?

Samvel Minasyan

Master's Research Paper for Erasmus Mundus Master in "Global Studies- European Perspective"

Political and Social Sciences: Ghent University

Prof. Dr. Fabienne Bossuyt

August 11, 2021

Wordcount: 26,251

Abstract

This work examines the issue of hate speech in polarized Ukraine for the purpose of identifying its implications for the reconciliation efforts by the EU and civil society organizations in Ukraine. The questions driving the research process are: How exactly does hate speech manifest itself in the context of socio-political polarization informed by the crisis in Ukraine? What are its implications and what can the EU and civil society do to address them? Hate speech in Ukraine in the context of crisis-related divisions can be grouped into anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian. Further, both groups represent an obstacle on the way of reconciliation and cannot be disregarded by those forces that try to bring the polarized parts of the society together. Along with categories of hate speech in Ukraine, the paper presents recommendations for the EU and civil society to fight this phenomenon as an essential part of their reconciliation efforts.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Contextual Background and Literature Review

Introduction

The "deeply polarized" Ukraine (Atlantic Council, 2020) that is being "stitched together" with the EU seeks to demonstrate its commitment to liberal goals and values, placing high emphasis on human rights, diversity, and mutual respect (Stefanishyna, 2021). The "strengthened civil society" in Ukraine pushes for reforms (Khomei, 2019) and promotes those values and good governance (Terzyan, 2020). However, the country still faces issues related to hate speech (Council of Europe, 2020). The question is: How exactly does hate speech manifest itself in the context of socio-political polarization informed by the crisis in Ukraine? What are its implications and what can the EU and civil society do to address it?

There is only a limited number of studies dedicated to investigating hate speech in Ukraine within the context of a society still partially divided by the ongoing conflict (Zaharchenko, 2015; Temchur, 2019; Udupa et al., 2020). None of them presents the implications of hate speech on the attempts to overcome this polarization. Further, there is a lack of studies in English language that compile and categorize hate speech terms that originate in Russian and Ukrainian languages (Fiialka, 2016; Radchenko & Arkhipova, 2018).

Therefore, this work aims to examine the manifestations of hate speech in the context of a divided society in Ukraine. It argues that hate speech in Ukraine in the context of crisis-related divisions can be grouped into anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian. Further, these manifestations of hate speech represent obstacles for reconciliation and cannot be disregarded by the agents that seek to bring the polarized parts of the society together.

The following sections of Chapter One present relevant background information on the crisis in Ukraine, briefly talking about its main events and how they have overall contributed to the existing divisions in the country. Afterwards, the literature review on hate speech is examined to understand this phenomenon and contribute to the development of the approach for this work. Instead of an imposition of a theory on the case, this work develops categories from the "ground" of media space and tests these categories for validity on different media channels. Finally, this chapter reviews the existing literature on approaches to reconciliation which will help to study the approaches adopted by the EU and civil society to reconciliation in Ukraine.

Contextual Background

The Crisis in Ukraine

The situation in Ukraine received different names from a diversity of academics: 'conflict', 'insurgency', 'war', 'armed conflict', 'civil war' or 'anti-terrorist operation'[1] (Lazarenko, 2018). The choice of the name depends on the perception of the nature of these events and the angle from which one is looking at them. A strain of literature sought the explanation for the crisis exclusively in the factors outside Ukraine locating it in the geopolitical game of big powers. As a case in point, some academics describe the war in Donbas as "a Russian invasion", which was launched by the special units of 'green men' that were followed by regular Russian troops (Czuperski et al., 2015). Others regarded the events as a "civil war" accompanied by Russian military intervention (Katchanovski, 2016). In the attempt to identify the label for the situation there is a need to look into the literature which tries to trace its origin.

Several authors from the realist school of thought, trying to prove the relevance of "realpolitik", have attempted to attribute blame to the United States and its European allies for this crisis. They identify the "taproot of the trouble" in NATO enlargement which was seen by these authors as "the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and integrate it into the West" (Mearsheimer, 2014; Santacroce, 2020). Further, two other critical elements were the eastward expansion of the EU and the "West's backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine" starting from the Orange Revolution in 2004 (Ibid.). The EU policies were regarded by some as tools for societal mobilization which resulted in differential empowerment of domestic actors that led to the eruption of conflict (Burlyuk & Shapovalova, 2018). Similarly, roots of the crisis were found for some to be in the war of 2008 between Georgia and Russia with which the NATO enlargement prospects for Ukraine and Georgia came to a halt. The start of the global financial crisis that seemed to have boosted the confidence in regional economic arrangements has also been examined as a contributing factor (Trenin, 2014). Trenin argues that Russia and the EU had diverging conclusions from the crisis. Other scholars analyze with rigor the "negative-sum scenario resulting from years of zero-sum behaviour on the part of Russia and the West in post-Soviet Eurasia" (Charap & Colton, 2018). They find the reason for the growth of aggression in Russian policies to be in the internal political dynamics of the Russian Federation and the

---

[1] The latter was the label used by the government up until February 22, 2018, when the label of the Anti-terroristic Operation was replaced with the Operation of Joint Forces (Lazarenko, 2018).

first attacks on the Putin's regime (McFaul, Sestanovich & Mearsheimer, 2014). This line would assume the conflict to be the proper name for the situation.

On the other hand, there were those who, in their attempts to avoid simple explanations and attributing all the blame to outside forces, tried to find contributing factors like nationalism, which was seen as both fuelling the conflict and being a "relevant obstacle to its resolution" (Harris, 2020). Some examined the level of emotional intensity, that as a major "driving force for polarization", can eventuate in an "onset of collective behavior" provided necessary level of conformity and homophily (Romenskyy et al., 2018). Others believed that the conflict was precipitated when different sections of Ukrainian population began to develop "conflicting perspectives of the past, of the role of Russia in Ukraine's history and of how relations with the West should evolve" (Matveeva, 2016). The polarized identities together with mutually exclusive ones were to become the consequences of these developments. Instead of conceptualizing the state-orchestrated information war over Ukraine, this line of thought considers the role of citizens and their activities in the battle over truths during the conflict (Golovchenko, 2018). Further, it pays attention to other internal factors like the corruptness of governance, lack of integral society, vulnerability and weak statehood, as well as an over-centralized power extracting resources from the regions (Paul, 2014). In the same vein, McMahon believes, that "the crisis stems from more than twenty years of weak governance, a lopsided economy dominated by oligarchs, heavy reliance on Russia, and sharp differences between Ukraine's linguistically, religiously, and ethnically distinct eastern and western halves" (2014).

This paper chooses the concept of "crisis in Ukraine" as it is large enough to encompass the myriad of events including, the political turbulence originating in November 2013, former President Vyktor Yanukovych's loss of regime, Crimea's "referendum" and "accession" to Russia, the crash of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, the ongoing conflict and the general situation around Donbass (Feng, 2015). It seeks to avoid the labelling of events according to a specific perspective or narrative. The crisis provides ample ground for the battle of geopolitical, nationalist, structuralist and legal narratives which demonstrate the diversity of existing interpretations of the situation tailored to the interests of specific groups and which are connected with the divisions related to Ukraine's complex national identity (Smoor, 2017). This does not mean that the work ignores the existing explanations or considers all of them to be wrong, it simply aims at showing the multiplicity of existing views for the purpose of thinking about the subject at hand from a critical stance without falling into the trap of

monocausal explanations and acknowledging the existence of multiple factors contributing to the situation.

It has been illustrated that the crisis had different causes depending on the angle from which one is examining it. The crisis erupted in November 2013 when the supporters of the Association Agreement with the EU expressed their protest against the government's decision to unilaterally delay its signing (Shveda & Park, 2016). The extremely critical attitude of the people regarding the policy shift from pro-European to pro-Russian, as well as the authoritarian use of power, were regarded as key explanations for the "dramatic and rapid expansion of the civil resistance" (Ibid.). Here, however, it is important to consider the role of polarization conceptualized as a "a process whereby the normal multiplicity of differences in a society increasingly align along a single dimension and people increasingly perceive and describe politics and society in terms of 'Us' versus 'Them'" (McCoy, Rahman & Somer, 2018). This alignment, while might result in opportunities for democracy, generates also a principal source of the risks for democracy i.e., social-psychological intergroup conflict dynamics, as well as politics and discourse of opposition. In this manner, polarization is activated when large portions of society mobilize politically to achieve fundamental alterations in institutions, structures and power relations. The grounds for this polarization, however, should be found in the preceding times by looking at the issue of identity.

Several studies have shown the complexity of Ukrainian national identity and divisions existing within it (Onuch & Hale, 2018). The regional divisions, which have multiple layers including economic, geographical, and cultural ones (Pavlenko & Viter, 2006), are expressed today in extensive disparities in national awareness and lifestyle (Olujko, 2005), were impossible to eradicate throughout the existence of Ukrainian statehood (Radchenko, Kuczabski & Michalski, 2014). As an outcome, the people from various regions assume a larger extent of cultural differences among themselves than with people from neighbouring countries. This results in divergent national identity aspirations expressed through different choices of political leadership (Pratiwi, 2019). M. Riabchuk, while admitting the existence of differences and division in the nation, does not believe it to be along the lines of ethnicity or even "East-West" but more ideological – between two diverse sorts of Ukrainian identity (2015). According to this author, factors like region, ethnicity, language, income, education and even age only correlate to different degrees with the principal ones. However, the existence of an external threat to the nation renders all the above irrelevant, accentuating the issue of values epitomized by different identities. Furthermore, it has been illustrated that ethnic identity is not responsible for polarized preferences but rather for shaping political

attitudes, and that instead of language related issues and foreign policy influences, the local concerns and perceptions of the government determine the attitude towards the crisis in Donbas (Giuliano, 2018). To better understand this divide, there is a need to have a glance at history and understand its origins and evolution.

Brief Overview of the Main Events

After the collapse of the Soviet Empire and formation of Ukraine in 1991, the country represented a mosaic of ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and linguistic identities and cleavages (Sasse, 2002). Some authors believed that ethnic Ukranians, concentrated in western and central parts of Ukraine, and ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukranians, living mostly in the eastern and southern parts of the country, were in a struggle over defining the country's national identity, thus trying to advance their corresponding cultures (Shulman, 1998). The existence of more than one mentality was also explained by the domination of various parts of the country by different empires in the past (Salnykova, 2014).[2] This gave ground for some authors to speak of "two Ukraines" (Riabchuk. 1992) and even describe it as an "unexpected nation" (Wilson, 2000), considering the linguistic, ethnic and regional diversity and the poorly united national consciousness. The expressed regional diversity led to the label of "state of regions" as societal mobilization and political competition were believed to be structured along regional lines (Sasse, 2010). To illustrate, already in 1995, the trend of a deepening split between "nationalist West" and "Russian-oriented East" was seen in political parties polling specificities (Holdar, 1995). It was argued that the central variable explaining the regional specificities was the language itself (Arel & Khmelko, 1996).[3] The salient issues were the status of the Russian language and Ukraine's geopolitical orientation towards the Russian state.

---

[2] One part of Ukraine known as Galicia became part of Poland in the 1380s and continued to be under Polish dominion until its partition in 1772. Afterwards, it became a part of Austria, whereas the other parts of Ukraine came under Russian control already in 1654 when the Cossacks asked for the protection of the tsar. The phenomenon of Cossackdom bypassed only Galicia. From that moment on the influence of Habsburg and Romanov would be felt on Ukrainian identities. The lack of basic civic freedoms in the Russian empire was juxtaposed to the constitutional Austrian environment which allowed Ukrainian identity politics to thrive in the Western part. Another important period that had a lasting impact on the formation of Ukrainian identity was the establishment of Ukrainian SSR that allowed for education, cultural institutions, Ukrainian-language media, unification of Ukrainian lands and even expulsion of national minorities. The Soviet Ukrainian identity was completely different from the one being forged in Galicia driven fully by nationalist sentiments. The latter was to be squished after the establishment of Soviet domination (Himka, 2006).

[3] The traditional census question of native language (ridna mova), however, was not statistically significant. The language which people preferred to use when given a chance, named as "language of convenience" (afterwards turned into "language of preference") showed the greatest significance in statistical terms (Arel & Khmelko, 1996).

Some authors believed that the situation started to slightly change in the aftermath of the events labelled as the "Orange Revolution" (Riabchuk, 2015).[4] In 2005, sociological surveys were showing unprecedented levels of primary identification with Ukraine, as all the previous surveys demonstrated primary loyalties to be either local, regional, residual Soviet or supranational East Slavonic (ibid.). However, others brought the results of 2004 and 2006 elections as another proof of the existence/persistence of a regional divide (Kuzio, 2006). Further, these authors believed the division became even more pronounced after these events which could be seen in the clear alignment of support for electoral candidates (Colton, 2011).

When the crisis erupted in 2014, the Ukrainian government lost control over Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk. It is believed that the electoral and political tensions between eastern and western parts of Ukraine relaxed after "the loss of the core of eastern regionalism" (Torikai, 2019). While a large plurality is still in favor of giving an official status to Russian, the identification with Ukrainian language is also augmenting (Arel, 2018). At the same time, Arel warns of possible reactions by a majority of the population against government enacted policies of decommunization and censorship of certain films and books in Russian.

The results of one study, analyzing territorial homogenization, heterogeneity, and polarization of electoral behavior in Ukraine based on data from polling stations for 2002-2014 parliamentary elections demonstrated that Ukraine was continuously homogenizing in territorial terms, while simultaneously remaining territorially polarized. The national territorial homogenization index was falling down (which implied higher homogenization) while the index for specific regions (Donbas and Galicia) was persistently high (higher polarization) in 2006-2014 for Donbas and in 2002-2012 for Galicia oblasts (Dobysh, 2018).

Overall this part discussed to a certain extent existing polarization and divisions in the Ukrainian society even before the crisis. They were afterwards supplemented, if not aggravated by it.

---

[4] A result of mass falsifications in the Presidential elections in 2004 which led to a socio-political outburst. This brought to power politicians who were unable to conduct proper reforms, displayed similar and even increased level of corruption resulting in disillusionment among the population who started believing in the idea of the "Orange Revolution" being a "revolutionary coup d'état" (Reznik, 2016).

Literature Review

Hate Speech

Definitions: Hate speech is like a "breathtaking punch to the stomach, a quick stiff jab to the nose, or a forcible slap to the face. It pummels, ambushes, cuts, insults and silences." (Cortese, 2006). It is speech designed to promote hatred based on religion, race, ethnicity, or national origin (Rosenfeld, 2002). Cortese adds to this list gender, age, physical conditions, and sexual orientation as traits upon which hate speech "puts people down" (2006). In the media, those are defined as "protected characteristics" which also include caste and occupation, as well as refugees, migrants, immigrants, and asylum seekers (Facebook, 2021). Further, can manifest itself in the form of promotion of violence, direct attacks, or threats (Twitter, 2021; MacAvaney, 2019).

Being regarded as a communication phenomenon by some (Whillock & Slayden, 1995) and ideology (Warner & Hirschberg, 2012) by others, hate finds expression through a particular form of offensive language which disparages a person or a group based on one of the abovementioned characteristics or any other (Nockleby, 2000). An important aspect here is the fact of a deliberate attack (Davidson et al., 2018; de Gilbert et al., 2018) based on attributes "which can be in forms of violent or dehumanizing speech, harmful stereotypes, statements of inferiority, expressions of contempt, disgust or dismissal, cursing and calls for exclusion or segregation" (Facebook, 2021). It thus involves the act of "unnecessary labeling of an individual as belonging to a group" (Warner & Hirschberg, 2012) which can be done using different linguistic styles, "even in subtle forms or when humour is used" (Fortuna & Nunes, 2028). This unnecessary evocation of the specific trait of an individual turns into a means of invoking a well-known and disparaging stereotype, "dehumanizing comparisons that have historically been used to attack, intimidate, or exclude specific groups, and that are often linked with offline violence" (Facebook, 2021). Hatred against each different group is usually expressed through a small set of high frequency stereotypical words which can be used both positively and negatively (Warner & Hirschberg, 2012).

For some, vituperation and usage of epithets constitute important elements for identifying hate speech (Weinstein, 2017), whereas others regard it in terms of expression which substantially and materially may cause harm to its targets in the use of such speech and not necessarily in form of a discreet and consequential harm (Gelber, 2017). For the followers of this later form of "discursive harm" definition, hate speech targets historically identifiable

minorities who face systemic discrimination in order to differentiate this from other kinds of speech which can also offend, hurt people's feelings, be vituperative, or contain epithets.

It has been illustrated that a universally agreed definition of hate speech does not exist (Stakic, 2011). All of the presented definitions emphasize diverse aspects, but they share certain features like the fact of hate speech being directed against someone or some group, it highlighting a generalizable feature to tap into existing stereotypes, and doing so based on specific stylistic choices that demonstrate the intention to be derogatory, humiliating, diminishing, directly attacking, threatening or inciting to violence.

Typology: Some authors have attempted to provide a typology for differentiating between various forms of hate speech. More obvious forms of hate speech, described as "hate speech in form", include racist insults or invectives whereas other utterances not directly or explicitly conveying insults but coded in a way to deliver hatred and contempt can be characterized as "hate speech in substance" (Rosenfeld, 2002). H. Kozhevnikova built a system for identifying different forms that hate speech can take, differentiating between harsh, medium, and soft options which were to be distinguished based on a certain semantic meaning and emotional colour (2006). The first form incorporates either open or covert calls for violence, discrimination and hatred or calls for not letting a certain phenomenon be established in the city/region/state.

Verkhovsky, basing his own system upon this, adds the use of common slogans and the prism of historical examples to encourage the above-mentioned phenomena (2007). The second or medium form of hate speech involves justifications, in form of public statements or publications, of recognized facts or historical cases of violence or discrimination; mitigations of those facts; insistence on historical fairness of discrimination against a specific group; asserting that some limitations turn discrimination against a particular group of people into a deserved and justifiable practice; highlighting the existence of unpleasant for society defects of a specific group; accusations against a specific religious/ethnic/social group for impacting the state, society and the lawmaking process; accusations for group expansion, seizure of territories or ousting another group of people and; denial of legitimate granting of citizenship to members of a particular class or group. The last form includes the creation of negative image of a particular group, statements that attribute inferiority to a certain group of people or emphasize the moral flaws of a specific group of people, using, citing, or providing xenophobic statements in negative contexts or without the commentary.

Another classification suggests false attribution (of hostile attitudes and intentions to members of a specific group), false identification (development or enforcement of a certain

negative stereotype), and imaginary defense (calling for defensive actions without reasonable explanations) (Kroz & Ratynova, 2005). None of the classifications is exhaustive as they complement each other and sometimes contradict. Further, they illustrate the importance of the context for differentiation, therefore this work compares the empirical evidence with existing categories for the purpose of identifying a context-specific categorization of hate-speech in Ukraine.

Hate Speech in Ukraine: There is a notable lack of academic literature on this subject in the Ukrainian context. In the contexts of divided societies that are transitioning to democracy and in fragile environments there is fertile ground for the thriving of hate speech and instrumentalization of novel spaces provided by Internet access for violent ends (Gagliardone, 2014). In fact, some studies have shown how this type of speech impacts on-the-ground conflicts leading to intergroup tensions, structural, direct or intense violence, as well as dehumanization (Vollhardt, 2007; Pronoza et al., 2021). Therefore, this work aims to contribute to existing literature on hate speech by filling the gap of hate speech in Ukrainian context against the ethnic element. There are studies that confirm the fact of the representatives of other national groups like Russians, Jewish people, and Roma, being the principal object for hate speech usage in various publications (Gorodnycha, Olkhovyk & Gergul, 2020). One of the main difficulties in this regard is the issues of semantic analysis – there is currently no dictionary for identifying hate speech in Ukraine, and there are only imperfect tools for text analysis (Kyslova, Kuzina & Dyrda, 2020).

A dearth of literature partially tackling the hate speech issue in Ukraine[5] tried to explore the issue of hostility targeting the LGBTQ+ community (Nyman & Prozovin, 2019). Hate speech based upon the trait of sexual orientation "has become normal state discourse", particularly in the media (Martsenyuk, 2012). The work by Nyman and Prozovin analyzes the harmful effects that hate speech can produce on its targets. The authors identify novel challenges and more widespread occurrence of hate speech owing to the increasing usage of the Internet and social media networks. These findings reveal "constitutive and consequential harms" caused by both offline and online hate speech to the LGBTQ+ community and activists. Among suffering labeled as constitutive harms, Nyman and Provozin list the negative effects on self-esteem, psychological distress, as well as silencing and restrictions on freedom of association and movement. Whereas the consequential harm included physical violence, negative stereotyping, and normalization of discrimination. One of the most

---

[5] Many studies did not specifically focus on the Ukrainian case but compared, for instance in this case, the situation in Ukraine and Moldova.

important findings is that people experience the harmful effects and the content of hate speech differently depending on the context in which one witnesses the production of hateful language. The authors find that hate speech in Ukraine has been much more aggressive and violent than in neighbouring countries like Moldova.

Another scholarly work, written in Ukrainian, illustrates how the modern information space, serving as a battlefield between "us" and "them", used by novel interactive communication media as well as traditional media in the country, is fraught with hate speech (Isakova, 2016). The author illuminates the role of memes as evidence of hate speech, which perform a "specific function and a symbolic act on the collective unconscious" having a direct impact on human behavior (Ibid.). Others have examined the question of hate speech against the Roma minority (Rudchenko, 2011; Kyslova, Kuzina, Dyrda, 2020; Bidzilya et al., 2021). Rudchenko illustrated the use of myth for the formation of hate speech through publications which were discriminatory and negative towards the ethnic minority (2011). A ontemporary study by Bidzilya et al. revealed only minor interest given to this community by ordinary users on social networks, rendering uncommon hate speech against them on Ukrainian web space (2021). Nevertheless, the study presents valuable insight on the mechanisms of forming hate speech against minorities in an online environment including "ethnicity-related stigmatization; spread of negative stereotypes, fears and prejudices; emphasis on "otherness"" (Ibid.). There are also some works regarding anti-Semitic discourse and hate speech in Ukraine (Likhachev, 2016).

There are works that specifically target the issue of hate speech in the context of "armed confrontation between Ukraine and Russia" (Zaharchenko, 2015; Pryshchepa, 2017; Mykhailychenko, 2017; Temchur, 2019). The findings illustrate the use of hate speech for the purposes of propaganda by Russian and Ukrainian sides. The author claimed that hate speech used by Ukrainian publications was more "means of expressiveness and expression of journalists' emotions rather than manifestation of propaganda," whereas for the Russian side, he attributed "recourse to military topics, complete contempt for the Ukrainian side, sarcasm, frank lie, high level of verbal aggression, deliberate humiliation or complete leveling achievements of the Ukrainian conflict side." (Ibid.). This illustrates the need of studying hate speech on both sides, to show the peculiarities of each and their development since the time past after these publications.

Along with academic literature there are several publications from NGOs that call for attention to the matter of the rising number of hate crimes, including hate speech, around the country and further aggravation of the issue (Kravchuk, 2018). Kravchuk attributes blame to

the "existing outdated national legislation and the established practices of police activity in this area." (Ibid.). It is noteworthy to mention that while several draft laws have been submitted to restrict hate speech in the media, as of now the state still does not regulate it (Laba, 2020).

Overall, the review has shown the main targets of hate speech existing in Ukraine which include the representatives of separate social, ethnic, and national groups (Kuznietsova, 2019). A small number of studies examined the phenomenon from the perspective of the conflict in Ukraine and their work allowed the grouping of hate speech into anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian.

Approaches to Reconciliation

A vast amount of literature attempts to provide a definition of reconciliation touching upon different aspects of this multifaceted phenomenon. A review of those materials allows to identify two principal trends in the understanding of the concept: one focused on bottom-up (cognitive, psychological, emotional-spiritual) and another on top-down (political, national strategy, structural) reconciliation. In the case of bottom-up reconciliation, the primary focus is on interpersonal relationships and individuals, whereas the second approach prioritizes issues of structural interdependence where the top negotiates and imposes solutions.

Bottom-up: Some of the examined definitions consider reconciliation to be an "emotional decision" (Worthington Jr., 2006) necessitating "confrontation of anger" (McThenia & Shaffer, 1985), "resolute overcoming of hatred" (Murphy, 1988) and an act of compassion (Meierhenrich, 2008) which would help to achieve perceptual shift necessary for promotion of empathy and "rehumanization" (Halpern, 2004). This approach thus emphasizes forgiveness and repentance regarding them as integral to reconciliation and adding a "spiritual-moral flavor to it" (Auerbach, 2004).

Another strain of literature highlights the cognitive aspect speaking of the psychological process of reconciliation which includes shifts in motivations, attitudes, beliefs and emotions of the major parts of society (Bar-Siman Tov, 2004). Thus, the removal of psychological barriers as well as negative emotions and attitudes like contempt and distrust (Hameiri, Bar-Tal, & Halperin, 2014; Nadler, 2002) constitutes a prerequisite for achieving "peaceful relations on the ground" (Saguy, 2017) and "improvement in the relationship between two or more parties" (Radzik & Murphy, 2015). Further, this improvement can manifest itself with different degrees having minimal and maximal versions (Crocker, 1999).

In this manner, the repertoire of conflict can gradually evolve into a new socio-psychological base shared by society members for a culture of peace.

Reconciliation then appears as bottom-up and gradual reconfiguration of mutual perception in a cognitive framework that is not conflictual. Based on this, there is a conception of reconciliation as a social space which necessitates encounters, relationships and a discourse that illustrates a shift in paradigm that would not be state-oriented anymore (Lederach, 1997). The encounters, dialogue, and knowledge of the "other" help to increase understanding and prevent conflict (Bhutto, 2014). Furthermore, the process of reconciliation should be regarded as a "voluntary act" that cannot be imposed from outside or above (Hamber & Kelly, 2004). This sort of social reconciliation primarily targets alienation that exists within or between communities (Pope, 2014) and its objective can be reached at communal and grassroot level via group encounters and dialogues that will help to tackle issues pertaining to human relationships (Krondorfer, 2018).

Following the cognitive approach, certain authors from the International Relations tradition viewed reconciliation in terms of a narrative that in pursuit of coexistence seeks to incorporate tensions between two or more differing interpretations of events, beliefs, values, instead of erasing those tensions (Dwyer, 1999). In addition to narratives, some regard the ritual behaviors i.e. habitual, performative activities connected to significant events as substantial components of reconciliation due to their role in reaffirming identities of those who engage in them as a group or society (Gainer, 2019). Along these lines, reconciliation is narrowed down to an exchange of positive behaviors between individuals displaying antagonism toward each other (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002).

Top-down: There is a political conception of reconciliation that instead of an ahistorical ideal of social harmony strives for a sense of commonness through framing "a potentially agonistic clash of worldviews within the context of a community that is not yet" (Schaap, 2004). Its purpose is to move beyond "collective forms of enmity", focusing on economic, socio political and security issues which can only be solved by officially authorized bodies (Pope, 2014). In this sense, reconciliation creates space for politics and takes place at the top level (Höglund & Sundberg, 2008). Here, a shift from divisive and antagonistic identities to a more bridging and inclusive national identity is of critical value (Rumelili, 2018). Nevertheless, its implications must be thoroughly considered, having in mind the potential of reconciliation to create more conflict instead of resolving it through the means of generating further anxieties (Little, 2012).

Some authors define reconciliation as a matter of strategy imposed from above based on cost-benefit calculation (Petersen et al., 2010). Further, some have discussed reconciliation strategies as exclusive of certain types of voices and as creators of silences which leads to undermining of the rule of law (Wilson, 2003). Wilson and Borneman pinpoint how national reconciliation projects, described as ambiguous and paradoxical, seek in reality to build hegemony and fabricate legitimacy by state elites (Borneman, 1997). Moreover, institutions other than states involved in the process of reconciliation often pursue their own agenda, which has a chance of coinciding with the nation-building projects of elites.

V. Rosoux identifies a structural approach to reconciliation as part of efforts aimed at peacebuilding (2008). Instead of relationships, this approach accentuates political, economic, cultural and security problems for the purpose of establishing an environment conducive to cooperation and coexistence between affected parties. Its primary goal is the construction of a social/political order that establishes corresponding rights and duties (Lu, 2017). Viewed as a political technique, reconciliation is, therefore, supposed to put an end to violence and thus promote peace in a fractured national society (Humphrey, 2005). While it aims at addressing the conflict between antagonistic groups, which is usually defined along religious and/or ethnic cleavages, its larger purpose is the re-establishment of the state authority, in particular, the reinstatement of a liberal state predicated upon a social contract between the state and civil society. As a consequence, reconciliation presents itself as a government project, bolstering state legitimacy as its primary target (Courtney, 2018). Some even go further and claim that reconciliation may serve as a spectacle for securing, legitimating, and reproducing different forms of domination and exploitation (Daigle, 2019).

To sum up, reconciliation can imply multiple things depending on the context and circumstances. The two pillars, identified in this review, one aimed at regulating interpersonal relations and the other at tackling structural interdependencies, are not mutually exclusive and do not constitute homogenous or unchanging groups. In other words, they can be applied by different actors at the same time. To see their application, the next section will overview studies of reconciliation in the Ukrainian context to show which approach is considered as the most optimal in this crisis.

Reconciliation in Ukraine

The crisis in Ukraine and its various aspects including the process of reconciliation have drawn the attention of various scholars. Those writing about reconciliation mostly emphasized the most optimal solutions and steps that can be undertaken either by the state

authorities or civil society organizations (Sakwa, 2017). At the same time they have pinpointed the limited capacity to reach reconciliation and the "potential for conflict resolution under the conditions of continuing external aggression and occupation" (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2016).

Overall, the investigated works can be divided into three streams – those who propagate the idea of bottom-up reconciliation, those who consider top-down to be the most viable option, and those who view the combination of both as the only possible way to deal with the consequences of this crisis.

To illustrate, some authors believe that local populations in various parts of Ukraine still share many features in common "– in particular, they want at least a negative peace (absence of war) and smoothing of contradictions in society." (Lazarenko, 2018). Lazarenko believes in the potential of such aspirations to turn into a platform for further reconciliation by means of restorative justice, dialogue, culture, and peace education programmes. Moreover, according to G. Bazilo & G. Bosse, "local CSOs promote "rehumanizing the other," which constitutes a quintessential process in achieving sustainable peace in Eastern Ukraine. "(2017). Further, T. Kyselova, analyzing a variety of professional communities, argues that Ukrainian "mediators and dialogue facilitators" hold the potential to act as independent actors in the reconciliation process and even provide guidance for state level actors and international bodies regarding best practices of dialogue and mediation (2018). On the other hand, A.D. Kovalova emphasizes the "disunited Ukraine", and believes the absence of grassroot justice to be a primary "obstacle" and reason for failing to cope with the "abuses of war and bridging" of the society (2018).

Contrary to the latter view, reconciliation of different ethnic identities with that of Ukrainian civic identity is already reached at the level of individuals as "manifold ethnic features are united with a single civic identity, forming an overarching identity" (Henke, 2020). This mechanism is based upon multicultural and multilingual traits of each person. As a result, civic identification with the nation in question is a layer of identity which also includes the ethnic traits of the minority group. However, this scholar believes there is a lack of top-down mechanisms, in particular from the legislative branch, to ensure the reconciliation process.

Thus, this range of authors argue for a top-down approach and choosing "wise Ukrainian leaders" that "would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country." (Kissinger, 2014; Sakwa, 2017). They believe that the conflict "cannot be stopped by seminars on tolerance and conferences on reconciliation"

(Zhurzhenko, 2016). Some even call for "manager(s) who have coercive abilities, deep pockets, strong networks and management expertise," lamenting the fact that the biggest issue that Ukraine faces today is that there is no alternative to "oligarchic network" (Marlin, & Butts, 2018).

There is also a third trend that does not find one of the options to be sufficient for reconciling societies, furthering democratization, and even improving bilateral relations between states which, according to I. Nuzov can be achieved through "memorialization measures" (2016). These practices may be of various forms and shapes deriving from a diversity of sources. Corresponding events can be organized by CSOs who might also lobby the state for investigations, reforms and public apologies for the victims while preserving their memory. The government can form truth commissions, announce new public holidays, open museums, make necessary changes in history education curricula and even adopt memory laws for the purpose of regulating historical discourse. These laws can prescribe criminal sanctions for certain displays of symbols or appraisal of crimes, and they might also be purely declarative. The effectiveness of this combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches has been illustrated in a myriad of contexts (Bell & O'Rourke; 2007; Butiku, 2016; Dhizaala, 2018; Astarita, 2020).

All in all, the above literature review review shows that scholars studying the case of reconciliation in the case of Ukraine's conflict have focused their analysis mostly on the bottom-up and top-down reconciliation approaches. This work argues for the third option of equal combination of the two considering the effectiveness of such matters to reach "rehumanization" of the "enemy" while creating the necessary institutional settings and conditions for the establishment and maintenance of reconciliation.

Methodology

While there is some existing literature that discusses hate speech in Ukraine, there is a notable lack of academic work that examines the issue of hate speech within the context of reconciliation. Moreover, literature on anti-Russian hate speech within the context of Ukraine, particularly in non-Russian languages, is also lacking. This research work aims to address these gaps and analyze how anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian hate speech creates obstacles for reconciliation in a society where ethnic and linguistic divisions continue to play a destructive role. Due to the lack of academic literature on this topic, this paper largely draws on other types of secondary sources, such as think tank publications, policy briefs and news media coverage. It also engages in specific case-study analysis of digital media sources,

including social media platforms. Finally, the recommendations presented in Chapter Three utilize the insights drawn from personal communication with representatives of civil society organizations that focus their work on reconciliation in Ukraine. Their names are not given for the purpose of protecting confidentiality.

Conclusion

All in all, this part discussed the existing polarization in Ukraine and contribution of the crisis to this matter. Further, it introduced literature on the concepts of hate speech and approaches to reconciliation. The first term did not have any universally accepted definition and thus the paper resorts to the approximate definition based on similarities shared by approaches of different scholars. Instead of looking for categories of the phenomenon in the literature, the paper will resort to deducing them from the "ground" of media space. On top of that, the paper identified top-down and bottom-up approaches to reconciliation and argued for combining those two by actors in Ukraine.

Based on the conducted literature review, Chapter Two delves into a deeper analysis of hate speech in Ukraine, while Chapter Three pays particular attention to the possible paths to reconciliation in the country. Chapter Two is divided into sections that discuss anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian hate speech which are later sub-categorized based on the analysis. Chapter Three discusses the implications of the research for reconciliation, the efforts of the EU and civil society in this regard, concluding with recommendations based on the analysis. The paper concludes with main results and offers suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2: Hate Speech in Ukraine

Introduction

The first section in this Chapter engages in a discussion of anti-Ukrainian hate speech based on material collected from secondary sources. It illustrates the role of pro-Russian propaganda and the level of consumption of pro-Russian media products. Then, it deduces categories from the literature in Ukrainian language and later illustrates their presence on media space and on different channels. Similarly, the second half of this Chapter discusses anti-Russian speech through the analysis of primary and secondary sources. As in the previous case, this half deduces the categories from the "ground" and investigates their application on the media space. This chapter demonstrates how both anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian hate speech seek to "dehumanize" their targets, sow or perpetuate divisions and delegitimize either Ukrainian or Russian state.

Anti-Ukrainian Hate Speech

A recent case of the Security Service of Ukraine capturing a woman described as an "anti-Ukrainian propagandist" illustrates the complexity of the issue at hand (SBU, 2021). According to the official website of the SBU, this woman, administering anti-Ukrainian resources in a popular social network, "justified and legitimized the annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine" (ibid.). Further, she, "the attacker", urged the President of Russia to bring troops into the territory of Ukraine and join the south-east parts of the country to Russia. She had recourse to online communities for the organization of fake petitions and distributed publications from the Russian propaganda information resources and social networks. According to the website, the Armed Forces of Ukraine units were discredited by these materials while the activities of "DNR terrorist militants" were being promoted (Ibid.). This example not only shows the presence of a fight against anti-Ukrainian propaganda, but also exemplifies how this "propaganda" manifests itself according to the Ukrainian state and academic discourse. This section presents what scholars have written about the matter at hand, what the state of Ukraine has done with regards to this and how pro-Russian media production material is consumed. Then, based on the existing literature, it analyzes one of the most popular social media networks of Russian speaking audiences – VKontakte (VK) – to deduce categories for analysis and afterwards present the reflection of

these categories in the news articles, comments and channels that are traditionally regarded as pro-Russian.

Pro-Russian Propaganda and the Ukrainian Response

Before the eruption of the crisis in Ukraine, the country's media space was saturated with Russian media products inter alia the entertainment segment (Melykh & Korbut, 2020). Only in 2017 Ukraine imposed restrictions on access to certain Russian media products and social media in its territory in its attempts to counter disinformation and protect user data from use by Russian security services via their access to the social media located in the Russian jurisdiction. In spite of all the measures undertaken by Ukrainian authorities to build resilience, address security challenges and battle disinformation in the media, the Russian entertainment media's impact on public opinion persists significantly (Ibid.). The content of these media serves as a soft power or cultural affinity element alongside manipulations and misinformation through information content or news. The usage of historical references displaying moral and civilizational superiority that seeks to demonstrate Slavic brotherhood allows Russia and Russo-centric forces to use entertainment media for the purposes of shaping and manipulating public opinion. The capacity of distributing narratives and manipulative messages is enhanced by the shift of content consumption from linear media like television to more non-linear clusters of digital and conventional outlets. All the above leads to the undermining of the country's resilience and jeopardizing national security in the context of the Ukrainian crisis (Ibid.).

Viewing information in the context of power and security, Russia has been deploying information offensive against Ukraine for decades now (Magda, 2015). For instance, it has been illustrated that Russian publications are fraught with recourse to military topics, contempt for the Ukrainian side, high level of verbal aggression, sarcasm, frank lie, deliberate humiliation, or denigration of Ukrainian side's achievements in the conflict (Mykhailychenko, 2017).

Besides, a qualitative study of online visual materials, entries and discussions by certain group commentators and administrators revealed how these accounts were primarily driven by neo-Soviet myths and hopes for a novel form of USSR to emerge (Kozachenko, 2019). This Soviet nostalgia and pragmatic discourse were to be replaced by using re-constructed World War II memories for the purpose of justifying Russian aggression and undermining national belonging in Ukraine. Such reliance on wartime myths permitted the labelling of pro-Euromaidan people as "fascists" that should be exterminated "once again". This memory

work allowed for effective mobilization on the ground; it further escalated the conflict that turned from street protests into an armed struggle (Ibid.).

Following the Soviet technique of demonizing the opponent, Russian media started to resort to offensive terms for describing Ukrainians and the government during the Euromaidan when terms like "radicals", "Bandera"[6], "nationalists", "Nazis" and "fascists" became to circulate as labels to evoke World War II terror and attribute it to the actions of the participants of the Maidan (Ivanenko & Bidnyi, 2021). This was not only done at the level of the media, but by politicians and diplomats. To illustrate, "Open glorification of Nazi accomplices, inciting interethnic strife slogans, calls for violent actions against persons of other nationalities – all this brings up sad pictures from the historical past." said the head of Russian permanent mission to OSCE (2014). Similarly, the President of Russian Federation left this comment after the eruption of the crisis in Ukraine: "This is a junta, some kind of clique. If the regime in Kiev began to use the army inside the country, then this would be a very serious crime against its people" (Krechetnikov, 2014). Today, the official position of the Russian government is that there is no Nazi government in Ukraine, however: "No one will be able argue with the fact that supporters of Nazism and Bandera are held in high esteem in Ukraine. They are there, and they have a huge impact on the public and internal political life of Ukraine," was announced to reporters on July 5 by the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov (TASS, 2021).

The "propaganda" was carried out through all possible channels of influence, almost constantly, and the amount of information was quite large, in addition, it was well prepared and therefore, had the appropriate capacity, which indicates the conduct of propaganda by trained professionals (Topalski & Ivanenko, 2020). Websites like LiveJournal, social media platform VK and blogging platforms were instrumentalized for justifying Kremlin's actions and policies (Hussain et al., 2018). Hussain et al. discuss the recruitment of over 250 trolls with each getting $917 per month of 24/7 work aimed at producing posts on mainstream and social media. Their main task was to counter "unflattering Western articles" regarding Russia with invectives through posting multiple comments and blog posts (Ibid.). The use of "web brigades" or troll armies helped to disseminate fake videos, pictures and coordinate some very efficient disinformation campaigns (Ibid.).

---

[6] Stepan Bandera, a fighter for Ukrainian independence, who led the nationalist Organizations of Ukrainians Fighters, claimed to be a "Nazi collaborationist" in the report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2020).

In the first three years of the conflict Russian media demonized Ukraine and Ukrainians, used demeaning vocabulary to name them, forming a system of aggressive images ("fascists", "Nazis", "punishers", etc.). This stands in contrast to the word "militiaman" widely used by pro-Russian Internet media to denote those who protect their family and land (Fiialka, 2016). The principal narratives of disinformation have not altered since that time but begun to be manifested by novel "examples" that, with the purpose of delegitimizing Ukraine as a sovereign country, emphasize the "defectiveness of Ukrainian state" while labeling Ukrainians as "fascists" (Petrenko et al., 2021).

Consumption of Pro-Russian Media Products by Ukrainian Audiences

The national and regional information space of Ukraine is not dominated by this "pro-Kremlin agenda" according to a Detector Media report (Petrenko et al., 2021). Pro-Russian disinformation in local and social media networks was especially weakened in the regions where local authorities selected "economic" slogans for local elections of 2020.[7] In fact, there are only a few outlets with a relatively small share of the market. Nevertheless, they manifest an increase in the number of audience and level of trust.

The report by Petrenko et al. illustrates that 70% of examples containing pro-Russian disinformation narratives circulate on the outlets supposedly connected to the leadership of a very popular pro-Russian political party "Opposition Platform – For Life" (OPFL) (2021). During the above-mentioned local elections, pro-Russian disinformation was the most intensive in the regions where OPFL was the most active (Ibid.). Viewers of the "Medvedchuk Group"-owned pro-Russian television channels which include ZIK, 112 and NewsOne,[8] illustrate a greater tendency to trust the Russian media than other respondents. They are fully guaranteed to receive Russian and pro-Russian disinformation messages. On February 2, 2021, the government of Ukraine tried to battle their influence by imposing sanctions on Taras Kozak (the legal owner of these TV channels) for "financing terrorism" (Dickinson, 2021). In his twitter account, President Zelensky expressed what a "difficult decision" it was for him to impose sanctions (Dam & Gorbunova, 2021). Nevertheless, he

---

[7] While those playing up the "Ukraine is a "defective" state" could have appeared in an advantageous position, the usage was not systematic.

[8] In the run-up to the snap parliamentary elections of 2018-2019, the official owner of NewsOne and 112 channels and a close ally of Viktor Medvedchuk, Taras Kozak bought ZIK and announced about the establishment of News holding. This was regarded as a consolidation of the news media in the hands of a politically powerful group with Pro-Russian agenda that uses media assets for political goals (Korbut, 2021).

considers it to be a necessary part of the "information war for truth" (Ibid.).[9] Although the TV channels were banned afterwards, their broadcasting still continues on Youtube while Kozak is suing the government for this decree.

In order to inculcate or reinforce the faked trustworthiness of its messages, the pro-Russian propaganda, instead of relying on outright disinformation, resorts to a range of manipulative means which helps to increase its influence through exploitation of Ukrainian society's vulnerabilities including war fatigue, fear of the COVID-19 pandemic, uncertainty about the future, interethnic tensions, dissatisfaction with living standards, religious and language issues.

Along with growing polarization over language issues, the legacy of Maidan and the crisis in Ukraine, there are more and more people with undecided political allegiances. Thus, in comparison with 2015, not only a greater number of pro-Russian rhetoric supporters can be observed, but also a lot more individuals find it harder to have a clear position on issues affecting the country. In this atmosphere of increased vulnerability, it is easier for pro-Russian disinformation and manipulation to capitalize upon doubts not only in Donetsk and the neighboring Zaporizhian regions, which display the most "worrisome vulnerabilities" for disinformation, but also for instance in Odessa and Kharkiv (Gerasymchuk & Maksak, 2018). In the former, the narrative of nationalist control over the government is mixed with that of the oppression of the Russian language. Whereas in the latter, the Maidan is rejected and nostalgia for the Soviet times dominates together with a commitment to authoritarian rule model following the Belarusian example.

A number of studies examined the phenomena of disinformation and hate speech together showing for instance, how they share common themes across time and space, including "exploitation of existing fears; viral transmission via social media; efforts to normalize violence; implicit or explicit support from government and key third parties; and lack of source transparency." (Young, Swammy & Danks, 2018) They attempt to shape "public commentary and opinion" (Kyaw, 2019) and thus, considering the potential of the "alarming trend" to cause harm (Santuraki, 2019), there are attempts to address those two from a "single, comprehensive regulatory framework" (Pielemeier, 2020). Regarding the connection between disinformation and hate speech, it has been shown that hate speech and swearing help to reinforce disinformation and conspiracy theories, which was demonstrated

---

[9] These sanctions sparked a fiery debate among Ukraine's human rights activists, journalists, and civil society. While some understand and support the government considering it as a necessary means in the information war, others ask for proof of terrorist activities (Dam & Gorbunova, 2021). The media owner is suing the government

to be used on a daily basis on an anonymous Instagram channel called "Soros Piglets" that published fake news and hate speech about civil activists, public officials and politicians (Bratushchak et al., 2021).

Hate Speech on VK.com

Despite the official ban on the Russian social media network VK in Ukraine along with Odnoklassniki in 2017 (Tregubov, 2021), it continues to operate in the country and maintain its high popularity. It also serves as a source for information regarding Ukraine and the world (Petrenko et al., 2021). VK remains one of the platforms where hate speech is flourishing (Iliuk, 2019). Some authors report that offences and cursing are incorporated into songs, poems, wordplays and allegories widely shared on the social media platform. Ukrainians are called "Ukes" or "Ukies" (belittling for "Ukrainians"), "khokhly" or "ukropy", "khokhlovyrodki" [bastard], "khokhlomrazi" [sc*mbag], "khokhlodurka" [b*nzo place]. "Slava Ukraine, Heroyam Slava" [Glory to Ukraine, Glory to Heroes], a famous Ukrainian greeting is transformed into offensive forms similar to "Slava Salu" [Glory to salo][10] (ibid.).

In order to see the relevance of hate speech on social media, this work takes the rooster of words enumerated by Fialka (2016) in her study of the comments under four pro-Russian news media channels[11] and categorizes them based on the roots of the words, their character and targets: *a) derogatory variations of Euromaidan: Antimaidan, b) Variations of Ethnophaulisms khokhol and ukr supplemented by slur c) invectives against those who share European values; d) labelling of Ukraine (the country and its government) filled with vulgar language; e) emphasizing inferiority of Russians to Ukrainians;* (2016). Afterwards, each of these words has been run through the VK search engine. The results of each search are divided by the engine into several sections, including All, People, News, Communities, Music, Video, and Services. The sections of People, Communities, Music, Video and Services illustrate approximate results for the searched words, meaning their findings do not help to see the actual usage and the context within which the words were used. Only the section News brings the exact mentioning of the specific term in the period of December 2013 – July 2021[12]. All the results include the number of mentions in both individual as well as group publications (see Table 1).

---

[10] Cured pork fat commonly used in Ukrainian cuisine.
[11] "Русская весна" (rusvesna.su), "Новороссия" (novorosinform.org), "Антифашист" (antifashist.com), "Новости Донецкой Республики" (www.dnr-news.com)
[12] Most of the terms began to be used from the later months of 2013 or the beginning of 2014.

Category	Hate Speech Term	№ of mentioning
Derogatory variations of Euromaidan: Anti-Maidan	майдалох	0
	майдабаг	0
	майдаплут	0
	майдабанда	0
	промайдавленный	0
	майдарасты	6
	майданобайтеры	47
	майданвошка	75
	майданофобия	111
	майданофилы	113
	майданничать	151
	майдануться	203
	майданёнок	264
	намайданиться	270
	майданопитеки	281
	отмайданить	465
	майданиться	496
	промайданить	575
	майданист	582
	майданист	582
	евромайдауны	1229
	намайданить	1280
	майданизм	1574
	домайданиться	1804
	помайданить	2504
	майданник	3455
	майданюки	6973
	майданщик	35266
	майдауны	71902
	майданутый	84242
	майданчики	121453
	майданить	2411402
Invectives Against Those who share European values	еврорекет	0
	евролжецы	9
	евросволочи	31
	европодонки	34
	еврогости	87
	евромусор	87
	евроморковка	216
	еврозрада	305
	еврофашизм	890
	Евросодом	1313
	укропейцы	2005
	Гейропа	61686
Variations of Ethnophaulisms khokhol and ukr supplemented by slur: Racialized categories	хохлонасекомые	0
	укропуки	2
	укроимбецил	2
	хохлонавоз	3
	укренок	5
	хохлодемократы	15
	укропармия	16
	хохложивотные	22
	укропнутые	26
	хохлопиндос	60
	укропост	82
	укроклоуны	216
	укрофилы	388
	вукраинцы	428
	хохлотроллям	451
	каклошвайн	485
	хохлинка	503
	хохлобыдло	661
	укробыдло	756
	хохломразь	889
	укретин	975
	скаклы	2728
	окраинцы	3002
	заукраинцы	3537
	укропитеки	9328
	укропитеков	9328
	хохляцкая	22490
	хохол	394319
Labelling of Ukraine (the country and its government) filled with vulgar language	Ухреина	0
	хохлополки	1
	Укропотамия	49
	укропизм	95
	хохлохунта	100
	Укростан	534
	Хохлостан	1895
	укровласть	3053
	Укруина	3148
	Вукраина	3624
	укровермахт	5800
	хохло-СМИ	9468
	Усраина	15793
Emphasizing inferiority of Ukrainians to Russians	недороссы	1589
	малороссы	149676

Table 1. Categories of anti-Ukrainian Hate Speech based on terms identified by Fiialka (2016).

a) The findings illustrate that the majority of usage refers to the first category that targets Euromaidan (2,747,305 and 335,903 without the verb "майданить" [to do maidan] which also means to run a casino business in Russian and may be used in different

contexts)[13]. This can be explained by the presence of a lot of channels that try to "present news and analysis" which means covering the events of Maidan as well. Further, some of the terms can be used by the Ukrainians themselves to comment upon them. But the latter comment may apply to all the other terms, so it provides only a partial explanation. Two terms are noteworthy to mention in this context which call the participants of Maidan as people "with Down syndrome" (71,902) while some of the terms highlighted exactly the Euro (1,229) part of it which illustrates the attitude towards pro-European sentiments in Ukraine. Verbal innovations of this "Anti-Maidan" rhetoric testify to their predominant rejection not so much of the new Ukrainian government as of the Maidan itself – the Ukrainian people, which demands democratic reforms in the country and defends its right to independence (Zhabotinskaya, 2015). These terms are being used by pro-Russian channels as derogatory labels for opposition (Shlyakhtin, 2021). "Ukrainian maidauny in backstage, chamber, private conversations admit that their opponents were still right." (Antifashist, 2021). The propaganda tries to illustrate the wrong choices Ukrainians have made, urging them to choose a different course of actions by resorting to violence (Romanenko, 2021).

b) This second-most popular category, refers to the stereotypical and racialized image of Ukrainians with 462,181 mentions. These words and their modifications are used in the comments under pro-Russian news media channels. Under this particular article it is possible to observe the comments left by the audience. In the first twenty comments left by readers, three contained anti-Ukrainian hate speech, two were anti-Semitic, seven agreed with the article and only two were opposing the things said. They mostly use pejorative language and slur when describing Ukrainians: "Khokhly[14]-idioty" [Ukrainians are idiots] "Look at any Ukrainian sc*m, mazepa [slob, rude] and hymno [sh*t]". Those who have chosen Zelensky are called "lokhtorat [mixture of loser and electorate], and ukurenny [stoned]" (Rusvesna, 2021).

c) The category targeting those who share European values was another popular set of invectives which was not, however, always used within the Ukrainian context (66,663). Nevertheless, this illustrates the significance of Russian propaganda in disseminating a

---

[13] While the usage of the verb seems to indicate a larger number than the actual usage in the context of hate speech, it does not skew the results as the number of terms under this category and the number of indicators outweigh others.

[14] Khokhol is an Ethnophaulism that appeared in Russia in the 16th century initially aimed at Poles-Catholics, and due to increased contacts with the Cossacks, it became an integral characteristic of the appearance of a Ukrainian-Cossack. Starting from the 17th century, in dynamics, this term acquired both an openly expressive negative connotation and an ironic one. Gradually, ethnophaulism spread to non-Cossack Ukrainians. (Steoanov, 2020) Today, it is a sign of racism and served as a reason for banning several Facebook accounts for using the term.

negative image of Europe among Russian speaking audiences. In this set, the noteworthy is "eurosodom" [Europe and Sodom] with 1,313 mentions, a term used to promote the narrative of "Anti-Christian Europe" (Molodets, 2011) or "Sinful Europe" (Klyuchi Razumenia, 2020) where the "law defends different types of sins" (Kazakov, 2013). The purpose is not only to disparage "European values", but also to "predict" the inevitable collapse of "Sodomite West", that is going to be punished for its sins, while those who want to avoid the punishment should try to avoid it and not even look at it (Ibid.). Following this line of thought, another term used is "Geyropa" [Gay Europe] (61,686), which indicates the existence of negative attitudes against sexual minorities presented by reference to religious texts (Khmelnov, 2019). As a matter of fact, this sinfulness is presented in contrast to the true belief of Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches that are being oppressed by the atheist state (Novorossia, 2021e).

On top of that, terms like "maidarast" [the word Maidan combined with an offensive homophobic slur], "Gayropa" [Gay and Europe], "pidobanderovtsi" [homophobic derogatory term and follower of Bandera's ideas] (Antikhokhol, 2021) indicate at the existence of homophobic slurs used in Anti-Ukrainian hate speech. Moreover, hate speech directed at sexual minorities is not limited to social media networks, it is also supported and disseminated in the news media. A case in point is the title "To the front line: Ukraine plans to send a gay battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Donbass" (Crimea Ria, 2021). The title does not use slur but wants to emphasize that soldiers from the battalion belong to a sexual minority which purports to attribute certain quality to that battalion as a whole. An important note here, is that homophobic slurs are not used only against sexual minorities, but also against those who support the idea of European integration and are pro-Maidan. This shows how both those who use these terms and those to whom it is targeted understand the connotation of these terms and consider it to be offensive. In other words, being called gay, in its own right, is considered to be an offense.

d) The third category denigrates the state of Ukraine and its authorities (32,096). Important terms to consider in this section involve those which equate "ukropism" to some nationalist ideology. Terms like "ukrovermacht" (5,800 mentions) aim at creating an image of the state regime, which is equated to that of Nazism. "Zelensky and his entourage follow the path taken only by the Nazis and want to maintain their power with the help of "concentration camps" (Medvedchuk, 2020) – this is just one example of a title found on NewsOne and

other pro-Russian channels that try to delegitimize the Ukrainian state[15] (Rusvesna, 2021) and picture it as a set of "terrorist" institutions that need to be eliminated. Another example is "The terrorists of Zelensky will not release their hostages themselves – the terrorists must be eliminated, especially since the hostages of the Kiev regime are one people with us!" (Sharlay, 2021).

The attempts to create this image of a "terrorist-Nazi-state" is peculiar to some representatives of Ukrainian local authorities who acquired popularity through blogging. An anti-Maidan blogger Anatoliy Shariy turned into a leader in almost every social media network according to Detector Media report (Petrenko et al., 2021). To illustrate, 7% of the whole content of Telegram channels which have more than 25,000 followers are devoted to this blogger. Together with fellow blogger Olha, who is also his wife, they have regional and national popularity which not only outpaces bloggers but also national media outlets. Shariy is the 7th most followed figure, and in terms of popular recognition he is second only to the former president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko. He has been accused of "manipulation" for showing Russian military equipment as Ukrainian, and spreading "fake news" regarding children being taught how to "kill Russians" (Rikhlitskij, 2019) He is also a leader of the virtual "Party of Shariy" which could not overcome the barrier (he received only 326,000 votes) during 2019 parliamentary elections to enter the Verkhovna Rada. Nevertheless, his positioning as an "independent blogger and critical thinker" paid off and his popularity grew to the extent that his party in 2020 managed to enter some municipal councils during local elections in eastern and southern Ukraine (Vorobiov, 2020). In 2021, he was suspected of treason and violation of citizens' equality depending on nationality, race, religious beliefs, disability and other grounds. He was put on the wanted list of Ukraine's Security Service which attributed to him pro-Russia media campaigning (RFE/RL, 2021). He was declared persona non grata by Lithuania, and currently resides in Spain with the status of a political refugee (BNS, 2021).

At the time of writing, Shariy's YouTube channel has around 2.48 million subscribers and 3 billion 880 million views (Shariy, n.d.). His channel cover says "ANTINAZI" and under it "Broadcasting truth and common sense". This already indicates that the channel is trying to oppose something that is described as Nazi, which corresponds to the label used against the Ukrainian authorities and its leadership. One of his playlists is titled "Zelensky i

---

[15] An example would be the doubting of intellectual capabilities of the leadership (Rusvesna, 2021) whose words are regarded as "pitiful bubble of politically immature youth" (Novorossia, 2021b) that does not glorify its heroes (Novorossia, 2021a), and disseminates state propaganda expressed even in the education system (Novorossia, 2021c).

ego zashkvar[16]" [Zelensky and his disgrace] which indicates with its title that it is going to harshly criticize those in power. It is confirmed by the first video out of 167, where he names the authorities with a pejorative term of "gandon" [condom or d**chebag] speaking about their handling of COVID-related matters (Shairy, 2020). In his second video titled "Europe wants Ukraine" ("for having a big export market"), he talks about how the "state allows terrorist organizations to thrive" (Shariy, 2020a), and in another video he says that the state stands behind terrorist attacks (NewsOne, 2020). This shows the extent to which anti-Ukrainian hate speech has penetrated even political circles and acquired a wide outreach.

e) The last category seeks to suggest inferiority of Ukrainians towards their "elder brother" Russia (151,265 mentions) who will always come to rescue (Novorossia, 2021). This line is reinforced by ideas of powerful presence of and ties with Russians and Russian language. On one hand, Russian sources try to manipulate people into believing that half of the population in Ukraine considers themselves to be Russian (Stopfake, 2021). This shows the attempt to spread the myth of "odin narod" [one people] (Kuzio, 2019).

On the other hand, an article suggests that two-thirds of all TV series on the country's leading TV channels are in Russian which outraged the "language ombudsman" of Ukraine (Novorossia, 2021g). It wants to illustrate from one sight the power of Russian language and from the other the impotence of state authorities to do something about it. Another title "A chance for Putin. Blogger-Russophobe scared of the dominance of the Russian language in Ukraine" wants to promote the notion of Russian power illustrated even through the language that can terrify a "Blogger-Russophobe" (Novorossia, 2021f).

Anti-Russian Hate Speech

Articles that deal with anti-Russian hate speech usually discuss it from the perspective of "anti-Russian propaganda and information war" (Burakova, 2018; Pierzchała, 2019) or strategic narratives (Ramos & Vieira, 2019). The main themes covered in this propaganda include: a) Formation of the image of Russia as an enemy. The active dissemination of the ideas of Russophobia – "a negative attitude towards Russians, their statehood, culture, language, as well as fear of the domination of Russians and all Russian in the socio-economic and cultural space" (Nossov, 2015). b) At the same time, opposition candidates are accused of being "agents of the Russian government." (Ibid.) c) Consolidation in the mass consciousness of the confrontation between the "beautiful life" in the European Union and the United States and the "terrible life" in Russia (Ibid.). The image of a typical Russian citizen in Ukrainian

---

[16] Coming from a prison jargon in Russian, meaning humiliation and disgrace.

media engaging in propaganda is a person with low social responsibility, an alcoholic who "lives in mud and does nothing about it" (Ibid.). At the same time, the image of the Ukrainian who supports the modern Ukrainian government is the image of a progressive person who seeks to live well and fights against injustice and "outdated traditional Russian values." (Ibid.)

According to some authors, the language of some propagandistic Ukrainian media clearly fulfills the ideological task of dividing into white and black, good, and evil, making absolute that one side is definitely right, and the other is not. On the one hand, there are condensed, but not having a specific situational meaning, positive slogan words: "democracy, freedom, truth, justice, struggle, independence, heroes, glory, a single and indivisible country, sovereignty, European values, European choice, the future of Ukraine, protection, Motherland, we will return Crimea, East and West together" and others. And, of course, more specific ones: "Heavenly Hundred", "Maidan Heroes" and others (Sapunov, 2015). On the other hand, there is a negative connotative series: "Aggression, annexation, invasion, seizure, war, dictatorship, murderers, refugees, separatists," etc. This hatred is formed not only by linguistic means. An example is the openly Russophobic "Vata Show" on the Direct Channel, which is hosted by the self-proclaimed "blogger No. 1 of Ukraine" A. Poltava (Korochensky & Grebennikov, 2019). This media product, openly inciting ethnic enmity – and nevertheless praised by the former President P. Poroshenko, as an example of patriotic creativity, never became the object of media critical analysis at the Media Detector (Ibid.). Moreover, on Ukrainian TV, guests of various talk shows often use rudely expressive, obscene vocabulary in relation to Russia, Russian people, and language: "freaks, bad people, cattle, scum" (Radchenko & Arkhipova, 2018). In social networks, in addition to the usual "Moskal'[17] and

---

[17] For some pro-Ukrainian users, the word "Moskal" or "Muscovite" means "Russian in general", Firstly, a soldier, official or other representative of the central government in the Moscow Kremlin is called a Muscovite, deliberately following the logic by which in the 19th century people from Russia, soldiers and officials were called Moscal's. For those who use the word "Moskal'" in this sense, it is important to appeal to the authority of the historical semantics of the lexeme – they show that dysphemism refers not to "Russians", but to representatives of "colonial power". Secondly, in the Ukrainian discourse of this period, "Moscal'" may indicate the bearer of the imperial political position, who does not recognize Ukraine as an independent state. Such a "Moscal'" can belong to any ethnic group and have any citizenship (including being a citizen of Ukraine): "Moscal' is not a Russian, but an "occupier, an imperial, that it is not an ethnos, but an ethos" (Radchenko & Akhmetova, 2018).

katsap"[18], there are other expressions like: "Colorady"[19] (based on the color of the St. George ribbons), "vatniki",[20] "ukrop"[21], etc.

The Case Study of the VK Group "Ukrop": Deduction of Conditional Categories

To illustrate the presence of hate speech and anti-Russian sentiments on social media, this work engaged in analysis of a group account on VK with almost 484,000 followers. Its title is "Ukrop" with armed soldiers on the cover picture that also has the symbol of Ukraine over it. Interestingly, this derogatory word is usually used against Ukrainians. The group probably chose the name for the purpose of taking power back and emphasizing their patriotic nature coming from the term's root. The list of aspects it covers includes: News, Analytics, Economy, Discussions, Humor, Information War for Ukraine (n.d.). The presence of the military in the picture already illustrates that the publications will not be about promotion of peace. Further, inclusion of national symbols and taking up the responsibility to fight the information war for Ukraine assumes already that some of the publications are going to "attack the enemy".

---

[18] From Ukrainian кацáп (kacáp), prefixed form of цап (cap, "he-goat"), invoking an image of a stereotypical Russian man with a goatee beard.

[19] Colorady dysphemism has been locally recorded since 2001 in Berdyansk as a label for guests (including Russian citizens) who were coming for a vacation to the city. This lexeme reflects the stereotype about the number of visitors and their consumer opportunities. Colorady dysphemism is based on the metaphor of the Colorado potato beetle as a creature devouring everything in its path. Since 2014, Colorado, by means of metaphorical transfer, has become the name of combatants, whose identification mark was the black and orange St. George ribbon, and later – all pro-Russian ("imperial") minded residents of Donbass, and then Russia (Ibid.).

[20] The word "vatnik" denotes a coarse but warm outerwear (mainly associated with low-status groups – soldiers, prisoners, collective farmers) that appeared in 1930. In September 2011, a parody character Rashka-Square-Quilted-Jacket appeared on the Internet, created by user Anton Chadsky from Omsk to ridicule uncritical patriotism in Russia. Being portrayed as a "Russian" version of the cartoon character SpongeBob SquarePants – it is a man with a sleepy blue face and a black eye, wearing a padded jacket. He believes in everything told by TV and blindly supports those in power. By 2013, Rashka-vatnik has become a metonymic designation for the hyper-patriotic part of Russian society: Russia is mockingly called "Rossiyushka" there, and more often "Rashka-Vatnik". In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, the quilted jacket (already without Rashka) begins to denote a representative of the conservative-minded part of Russian society along with St. George's ribbon in the buttonhole, tarpaulins and a Kalashnikov assault rifle. In addition, the quilted jacket forms a beautiful semantic pair for the lexeme "Valenok" [boots made by felting] – dismissively towards the close-minded, uneducated, slow person – "yes, he is a full Valenok" (Skoibeda, 2013).

[21] With a high probability, it represents a truncation of the not very popular ukropatriot dysphemism that has existed since the early 2000s. There are only two cases of its occasional use as a proper name: this was the name of the Ukrainian educational center "Ukrop", opened in Simferopol in 2012, and the Ukrainian-Russian football championship "UkRoP" in 2013. Since 2014, the lexeme "Ukrop" denoted both a pro-European patriot of Ukraine and (more often) a participant in active hostilities in the east of the country: Ukrop, mercenaries, fascists, not Ukrainians in any way, Ukrainians have nothing to do with it.Ukrop dysphemism indicates an edible plant (dill) – that is, the task of such a nomination is to dehumanize the opponent, literally turning him into food. Therefore, the lexeme ukrop in relation to the combatants supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine generates stable language games that exploit gastronomic associations: mowing dill / chopping dill (into cabbage); fried dill; dill in a cauldron, etc. This dysphemism became part of the name for military equipment – for example, one of the BMP-2, which are part of the Armed Forces of Novorossia, bore the inscription Dill harvester.

The central themes identified in the group publications include COVID-related information, harsh critique of Zelensky, criticism of the Ukrainian government, spreading of news regarding the conflict, harsh disparagement of Russia, and its leader. Out of 200 posts published during the period of January 1, 2020, to June 23 2021, the group mentioned Russia 48 times.

Most of the posts evoked the image of Russia as an enemy with some calling it as "Rusnya" (depicting it as a naked lady with widely stretched legs and leather boots) and others using pejorative terms to describe its president (calling him "Putin khuilo" [Putin is a d***head] or depicting his face being swept down a drainpipe. Putin is perceived as an eternal ruler of a stagnating Russia that has not changed throughout centuries. In fact, it continues to have "staged politics" where the questions to the president are only a matter of theatrical performance. In response to a comment stating that Ukraine stands on originally Russian land, the group responds by stating that the "original Russian swamp" can be contained in the territory of Moscow if all the parcels of land gained through blood, violence and manipulations are taken out (Ukrop, 2020).

Further, Russia is portrayed as a country facing poverty, inflation, and high prices, that is filled with blind and superstitious believers who are irrational and who are going to fight COVID with prayers, "screaming out spells instead of actually resorting to science to find the necessary medicine against it". This country's representatives are equated to "biomass" or "bio-waste" that killed Ukrainians in Donbass. Its soldiers are labelled with a belittling phrase "neschastnye Russkie occupantiki" [miserable Russian occupiers] or "Russkie okkupationnye losers" [loser Russian Occupants] (Ukrop 2020).

Reminding of the history of the "Russian communist regime", the group is filled with antagonistic anti-Russian memes which also promote the Ukrainian soldiers. To illustrate, one of the cartoon memes demonstrates how a fully equipped Ukrainian soldier in a national uniform takes the two heads of the Russian eagle and strangles it. Another part of the memes concerns those which directly attack the people in Ukraine who promote pro-Russian propaganda. The latter are considered traitors, who have less or no rights at all compared to other Ukrainians. Further, those born in Donbas who want it to be out of Ukraine are compared to cockroaches, who can leave Donbas if they want, but they cannot decide upon its fate because it is Ukraine.

This case illustrates the main targets and themes of anti-Russian hate speech found on VK. The hate speech principally targets the Russian state as a whole with its institutions and in particular its current regime and leadership. It wants to illustrate in pejorative terms

horrible conditions and sense of crisis in the country at hand and horrendous institutional settings, but also channels the hate from the 'fascist-Rushist' top to the bottom of 'morons' and 'slaves', by illustrating how the people are "zombies" produced by the terrible leadership. The second category targets the Russian citizens as well as those Ukrainians and Russians that share Russian values and language which exposes them to Russian propaganda. This speech against "Vatniki", a title given to the latter category of people, represents the line of divide within the society that remains an obstacle to reconciliation and contributes to intersocietal violence.

Hate Speech Targeting Russian State and Its Regime: "Rushist" State

Those themes, usage of pejorative terms and derogatory memes are not limited to this single group. For instance, a group called Український простір [Ukrainian space] (n.d.) with more than 592,000 followers, posted in the period of 20 June-27 July, 2021 around 200 posts of which 38 were about Russian-fascist occupants. Russia is depicted as a "motherland of fascism". "Russia is a fascist state; The ideology of the "Russian world"[22] is neo-fascism". In fact, a video from a YouTube channel (with 211,000 subscribers) shared by another group, includes the definition and characteristics of the term "Rushism", a term widely used after the 2008 war with Georgia and more often used after the 2014 crisis in Ukraine. It is a type of totalitarian-fascist ideology, a symbiosis of the main principles of fascism and Stalinism. The term in one of its definitions denotes the barbarian geopolitics of the Russian Federation targeted at occupation and annexation of other countries for the sake of a "noble goal" – uniting of Russian lands. Its seven features include 1) "The Russian World" or nationalism (predicated upon the population of Russia from former Soviet republics) as a base of state, which places the interests of the nation in the first place and above people's interests; 2) authoritarianism with a strong leader, weak opposition, and a long-lasting ruling party; 3) a one party system, that has a majority in parliament and government; 4) state propaganda spread through mass media that is under the control of state while those not under the control are unable to operate; 5) militarism which involves bragging about military might; 6) controversial image of enemy, who is both scary and manageable and; 7) cult of heroism that accompanies militarism (Volnov, Strazdins & Minakov, 2021). To illustrate: "The frenzied

---

[22] It seems possible to define the Russian world as a historically established cultural and civilizational community of peoples and countries, in the center of which Russia and the Russian people are located. The Russian world is under the decisive influence of Russian statehood and culture, uniting people of different nationalities who are native speakers of the Russian language and the Russian sociocultural tradition, spiritually connected with Russia and who perceive this connection as an undoubted value (Suschy, 2020).

Kremlin pedophile Vovochka Putin is thirsty for blood. He matches the overwhelming majority of Russian lackeys and slaves, who, as always, with trepidation, are looking forward to military successes of their stinking mother Russia, while living up to their ears in sh*t...Russia is the newly appeared Reich and an absolute evil! Either the total destruction of this criminal state without delay, or the distraught Kremlin junta, through its duped and stupid Ivashki, will litter Europe with millions of corpses. Death of Russia! Glory to Ukraine!" (Amosov, 2021). Another example reads as follows: "Russia thrives on the smell of ammonia, urine and mold." (Vata Show, 2017.) Here, he is contrasting the life in Ukraine and Russia, a country with no future, where prices are high and the level of overall comfort is low – contrary to the situation in Ukraine (Vata Show, 2020b).

Hate Speech Targeting Russians: "Zombie Mass"

Whereas the above group targeted mainly the state and the leader of Russia, others aimed at Russian people. Another group with 8,196 followers, named Потрясающая Русофобия [Wonderful Russophobia] and with a cover photo that says "Russia is sh*t" (n.d.). Its title and cover photo already indicate that the group's content is anti-Russian. One example is this quote: "The Russian person has a selfless proneness to meanness. He will have nothing from this, but he will do nasty things to his neighbor." (Ibid.) A range of belittling and disparaging terms were used both in the memes and comments of this group including "Rusnyavka" (combination of the words Russia and dog), "kremlebotik" (mix of Kreml and bot), "Moskal'", "Kremlik" (belittling from Kreml), "Putinis"t (one that follows Putin like a cult), "Rashkauebok" (pejorative term and the word Russian), "bydlo" (cattle), pidorashka (an offensive homophobic slur combined with the word Russian), "SvinoRusy" (Russian pigs). The following quote demonstrates the level of hatred displayed in the group:

> "Goat-faced people, craven, envious, spiteful and arrogant. With a black vengeful soul. Aggressive from powerlessness and understanding that they are worse than others. Much worse. And they want superiority so badly. And how to get this superiority if you do not know how to do anything. If you can only drink and steal. If you can only boast of victories, to which you have nothing to do. If the vanquished helps you the victor with humanitarian aid and credit so you will not starve to death. If 95% of your territory is stolen from other people. Your flag and coat of arms are plagiarized. The name of your country is also taken from others while history is written by storytellers. The only thing you can brag about is the high price on gas and oil while being scared that it will stop being bought or Americans will reduce its price" (Kviatkoski, 2020).

This is not only a matter of hate speech being limited to some marginal groups in VK. The same types of slurs and disparagement can be found on the account of an official representative of the local authorities. Andrey Karpov, a secretary of the Poltava City Council, member of "European Solidarity" who was running in 2020 to become the mayor of Poltava as a representative of that party, also authored and hosts the "Vata Show" (Poltava, 2021). His channel which has around 250,000 subscribers and more than 22 million views posts online dialogues with Russian-speaking people in which both sides exchange invectives and languages fraught with slur and anti-ethnic hate speech. He compares Russian citizens with dirt eating pigs, thus dehumanizing them. For Karpov, they are "Zombie Biomass", puppets who correspond to their master, cattle, "vatniki", "dolboeby" [stupid a**], "Rossiyanskoe suschestvo" [Russian creatures], "dirty", "stinky", "ebanuty" [loony, cranky], "vegetables" (Vata Show, 2017), "drunkards", "Russians do not exist they are made out of Ukrainians" "Mama chukcha, Papa turok, a ya russkiy poludurok" [Mom is from Chukchi people, Dad is a Turk and I am a Russia semi-fool]), "Russians were exchanged with hunting sighthound, cattle" (Vata Show, 2020) and "have no rights or anything else" (Vata Show, 2020a). The second-last quote also points to an existence of intersectional hate speech that combines anti-Russian inflammatory language with xenophobic narratives.

Hate Speech Against Russian and Ukrainian "Vatniki"

Another major flow of hate speech is directed against "traitors" who share Russian values, use Russian language within Ukraine and seek union with it or simply take pictures with the enemy at the Olympics (Ukrainian mood, n.d.). They are labelled as "Putinist Propagandony" (Mixture of Propaganda and d**chebag), "separy" and "separotyanki" (male and female separatists), "vatniki", "makaki lynyry" [macaques of LNR], "lugandontsi" (mixture of Lugansk and d**chebag) whose main characteristics are "stupidity" and squalor of "vata" (Wonderful Russophobia, n.d.),

Not only local authorities, but also officials representing the country abroad are implicated in this kind of hate speech. A diplomat of the Embassy of Ukraine in Paris authored an animated cartoon series, which was released in the first year of Russia's war against Ukraine and was about both "Putinists" and Ukrainian pseudo-patriots, who "arranged their golden children and dear relatives" for pathetic speeches (Laschenko, 2019). These cartoons are still "relevant", insists Irena Karpa (Ibid.). The cartoon which today has more than half a million views has the following description: "As you know, these unique creatures live in Russia and Ukraine. They love KrymNash, Putin, they practice simple human joys in

the form of vodka and scuffle and similar delights of life. We decided to start typologizing these very creatures. Watch the first episode – "Vatnik obverse". We hope that you will not recognize yourself as today's hero." (Podrobnosti, 2021).

This demonstrates a high level of dehumanization because some people are regarded as "unique creatures" that should be "typologized". Further, it degrades people to the level of human instincts, who only need the "simple delights of life". They are addicted to vodka and only need fighting. However, demeaning does not stop with the description, as the content is fraught with pejorative and derogatory terms: "Once upon a time there was a "Chmo. (schmuck)"", which is a slur presented for the sake of political correctness as an abbreviation for a "morally relieved person". This label is used constantly throughout the video to name and probably emphasize the nature of the character. To further diminish this character, it is reduced to a level of a pervert that looks at ladies in the bathroom and beats up "weak people" in the school. The "Chmo" is only engaging in sports as well as arts and crafts only to drink alcohol afterwards. Moreover, his only "meaning of life" is beating others and he is easily brainwashed by the TV that glorifies the "heroic Soviet past and victories". In one of the scenes, the "Chmo" sends a letter to Santa Claus, but because of the "Moscow main post office" it is received by "the evil dwarf" that is sitting in the room with a bear lying next to it, vodka. the Russian flag standing on the table, and the Russian eagle fixed on the top of its chair. The Russian flag and the eagle in the room are the official symbols of the Russian Federation and their presence next to the "evil dwarf" creates a sense of a cabinet. Further, the bear lying next to him is a typical Russian stereotype[23] and symbol, while vodka on the working table is supposed to indicate that Russians drink even when they are working (to disparage them as alcoholics).

Another interesting detail is the fact that the message was intercepted by Russia which is a widely held narrative of "Cybered-Bear" (Unwala & Ghori, 2015). The mentioning of the

---

[23] In Russian folklore a bear is, as a rule, a stupid creature, a bear can be easily deceived by even a mosquito or a hare, not to mention a fox, so this is a strange character for the self-identification. The only time Russia (more precisely, the Soviet Union) managed to avail of it consciously and successfully was the Olympic Bear, created by the artist Chizhikov in 1977 as the mascot of the 1980 Olympic Games. But in 1999, the Interregional Movement Unity (BEAR) Election Bloc appeared, which was created specifically for the elections to the Duma and to support Putin in the presidential elections. In 2000, this electoral bloc was reorganized into a political party, and in 2001 it was renamed United Russia, but the bear's emblem has remained and remains to this day. Thus, the party symbol for all these years has been presented as a national symbol, as a marker of genuine Russianness, as a kind of archetype that supposedly goes into the depths of history. The fact that the bear in archaic cults and in the Christian tradition has infernal characteristics was also ignored. The bear marked Russia on geographical maps of the 16th-17th centuries (mostly Dutch). The use of a mascot was probably an attempt to illustrate the deep connections to history (Rossomakhin, 2016).

term "Colorady" and the Saint George Ribbon[24] as well as a soldier wearing it in one of the scenes are used as signs of Russophilia which is the main accusation addressed to the people represented in this movie by the character of "Chmo". On top of that, one of the scenes mocked the "Caucasian[25] accent" coming from a man with a long beard and a hat. The specificity of this phenomenon lies in the fact that as such a "Caucasian accent" does not exist in reality, since all of the Caucasian languages are heterogeneous in their characteristics and origin (Anastasiia, 2016).[26] Such a homogenizing view supplemented with mockery adds a xenophobic aspect to the existing anti-Russian hate speech.

Russia does not only intercept messages but sends vodka with ammunition to the "Chmo". The latter drinks that vodka but remains unsure about the usage of the guns and grenades. For that purpose, the Caucasian agent sent by the "evil dwarf" explains the dangers of the state that "Chmo" is going live in if he does not proceed with the commands coming from Russia: "Banderovtsy" will take over, the Russian TV series and songs will be replaced with or translated to Ukrainian, the Russian language will disappear, Christian guys will be oppressed, and concentration camps will be opened. All of this is shown on the TV to illustrate the force of Russian propaganda channeled through mass media and the themes of its manipulative messages that terrify the "Chmo and its ilk". To contrast that image, the agent also shows "what is happening in Krymnash [Crimea is ours]". The "'green people' give cats to children, help babushkas to cross streets and sell sausages for a cheap price'. This is supposed to illustrate the illusory promises of the Russian side that allure people from Donbass.

Being confronted with the choice of facing the rule of "Petlyuras[27] and ukrops", implying the Ukrainian nationalists hinting at their links to antisemitism, and the perspective of living prosperously in Russia, the Chmo went to "some referendum" to "vote for something" and it "slowly turned into vatnik". Another recourse to derogatory terms to

---

[24] Military and patriotic symbols in Russia depicting black and orange bicolour patterns with two orange and three black stripes. Since 2014, these symbols have turned into a "symbol of loyalty to the Kremlin and/or Russian nationalist leanings" (Zhurzhenko, 2015).

[25] Here, the term Caucasian refers to people from the Caucasus region which encompasses dozens of ethnic groups, including Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Chechens, Circassians, Georgians, Ingush, and others.

[26] The emergence of the very concept of "Caucasian accent" is due to the fact that native speakers of the Russian language, as a rule, do not distinguish among themselves by ear the Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian and other accents in the speech of the inhabitants of the Caucasus, which merge into a certain generalized image. Thus, "Caucasian accent" is a household name for a mixture of bright accent features (primarily phonetic) inherent in the speech of speakers of various languages of the Caucasian and Transcaucasian regions. In other words, the simulated accent is a linguistically haphazard mixture based on the perceptually vivid features of the Russian speech of the natives of the Caucasus (Anastasiia, 2016).

[27] Coming from the name of a nationalist, the former head of the directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Simon Petliura who was allegedly responsible for the killings of many Jews after the collapse of the temporary government (Knyazev & Lobanov, 2021).

describe those "unique creatures" inhabiting Ukraine and Russia. Their participation in an act of voting is described as just an enforced order coming from Russia. Further, they are completely stripped of agency as they are unaware of what kind of referendum is going on and what they are voting for. They did not understand how they turned into "vatnik" and began glorifying Putin which can be seen in the poster the "Chmo" was holding.

One of the episodes describes the "Vatny mir" [Russian world] as a product of "drunk Russian philosophers" which was to be spread by "zombies" to the West as they had the right of an "elder brother". As "Ukrops" did not agree to give more land the main "zombotvorec" [zombie producer] began sending more and more zombies to die for more land. The episode degrades Russian people to zombies who follow the orders of the mastermind i.e., Putin who is called "Russisch Schwein" [Russian pig] in another episode (Podrobnosti, 2014a).[28] The folklore image of a Russian "Ivan" is rhymed with "baran" [sheep], another way to disparage Russian people.

Conclusion

Within the context of the crisis in Ukraine, Anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian hate speech manifests itself in both Russian and Ukrainian-speaking media spaces. It is not only limited to social media networks where it is relatively hard to trace the origin of publications, but also to YouTube channels and blogs of official representatives of the state. This points to the existence of a certain electorate in the country which if not directly supports then indirectly approves of hate-speech containing agenda. Categories on both parts illustrate similar trends: firstly, both target the state of either Ukraine or Russia, their governments presenting them as "fascist" or "terrorist regimes" which hold the society under constant threat and totalitarian control. In addition, both resort to stereotypes and deprecating terminology to describe either Russian citizens or Russians and Ukrainians who support actions of Russia on the side of anti-Russian, and Ukrainians as a nation or Ukrainians and Russians who supported the Maidan and European values on the side of anti-Ukrainian hate speech. Lastly, the similarities in both languages determine the resemblance in the style and roots of derogatory and pejorative terms circulating in the media space. An important distinction is that anti-Russian narratives are accompanied by an emphasis on the distinctiveness between Russians and Ukrainians, whereas the anti-Ukrainian hate speech involves the narrative of "one people" with an emphasis on the inferiority of the Ukrainian elements within it.

---

[28] This episode talks about the inactivity of "Western nations" in the face of Russian aggression. In particular, it mocks the negotiations and invitations to peace talks emphasizing the necessity of urgent military measures.

Chapter 3: Research Implications and Recommendations

Introduction

This Chapter discusses the implications of this research on hate speech for efforts aimed at reconciliation in Ukraine. In particular, it examines how hate speech serves as an obstacle to achieving reconciliation. Further, it highlights the significance of studying homophobic speech used in Anti-Ukrainian speech which was not the focus of any study on hate speech in Ukraine – an intersectionality of inflammatory language that has not been discussed in the existing literature. Furthermore, this Chapter presents recommendations to combat hate speech, focusing specifically on the roles of CSOs and the EU within the context of reconciliation in Ukraine, and highlighting their contributions to this field thus far. Finally, the Chapter concludes with a summary of this research work and potential avenues for further research.

Research implications

Hate Speech Is an Obstacle to Reconciliation

According to the UNHCR, reconciliation "involves (re)building relationships among people and groups in society and between the state and its citizens. Healing trauma, building trust, enabling forgiveness, and sharing narratives are some of the many elements of reconciliation". Hate speech and divisive rhetoric present obstacles to the process of reconciliation. This problem becomes especially acute when politicians utilize hate and inflammatory speech. As the examples presented in Chapter Two demonstrate, state officials in Ukraine, including a representative of the municipal council, a political party leader, and a diplomat, have used hate speech to propagate their ideals and rally supporters. In his study on "Political Hate Speech and Domestic Terrorism," James A. Piazza argues that "hate speech by politicians deepens political polarization" and in turn "produces conditions under which domestic terrorism increases" (2020). As politicians and elites push the boundaries of what is considered acceptable speech, the phenomena of hate speech within the general society becomes more normalized and could lead to violent outcomes. This could be observed in settings outside of Ukraine. For example, hate speech related to the COVID-19 pandemic spiked during periods of high levels of offline organized hate speech (Uyheng and Carley 2021). In particular, anti-Chinese sentiments promoted by state leaders would correlate with high levels of anti-Chinese and anti-Asian hate speech online. This rise in hate speech led to

an increase in anti-Chinese and anti-Asian hate crimes, including a rise in violence against these groups (Human Rights Watch 2020).

The presence of anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian hate speech in mainstream, and particularly social, media platforms contributes to divisions within the Ukrainian society, sowing distrust and preventing cultural and societal reconciliation. Increasing the level of trust between different ethnic and linguistic groups within Ukraine is especially important for peace-building and reunification of the country. As Oksana Iliuk states, "In terms of reintegration of Donbas, it is crucial to understand how to bring regions closer to one another. Even though [hate speech] is a worldwide issue that is still not being addressed effectively, Ukraine should commit itself to tackling hate speech as a country at war and hopefully, someday, peace" (2019).

The war in East Ukraine claimed the lives of over 14,000 people and forced over 2 million to flee the region. On numerous occasions the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky made commitments to bring peace to Donbas and Ukraine as a whole. He has called for the expansion of the Normandy group to include the United Kingdom and Canada and has expressed interest in meeting with Vladimir Putin (Hall 2021). While these are important steps on the path to peace in Ukraine, it is important to consider the societal and political divisions evident among the populations of the separatist and Kyiv-controlled areas of Donbas. According to the results of a February 2021 survey conducted by the Levada Center, only 12% of the respondents from the DNR/LNR would wish to see the reintegration of the breakaway region into Ukraine (O'Loughlin et al. 2021). On the other hand, the majority of respondents in the Kyiv-controlled part of Donbas believe that the regions should be returned to Ukraine (Ibid.). Moreover, two-thirds of the respondents in the DNR/LNR attribute blame for the conflict to the Ukrainian government or the West, while those in the Kyiv-controlled areas attribute blame equally to the Russian and Ukrainian governments. These differences are consistent with the hate speech and disinformation narratives examined in Chapter Two.

The findings presented in Chapter Two illustrated how hate speech and disinformation are transformed into tools in an information warfare between the states of Ukraine and Russia. Whereas some claim that Russia is engaged in propaganda and Ukraine is simply attempting to counter the efforts (Mykhailychenko, 2017), the resulting effects on the consciousness of citizens (Zhabotinskaya, 2015) cannot be ignored when thinking about reconciliation. The latter process, or at least part of it identified as bottom-up reconciliation, involves bridging socio-psychological and emotional barriers. It is difficult to imagine its feasibility considering that both sides attempt to present each other as "fascist" and "terrorist"

regimes, with their own machinery of propaganda which instead of protecting their citizens makes them into a "biowaste" or "mass of Zombies" that only follows orders without critically evaluating them. This propaganda comes through news media channels as well as from political circles in both countries who resort to YouTube, blogs and social networks to disseminate certain narratives which further magnifies the outcome of the issue.

Nevertheless, one cannot regard the audience as a simple recipient of information stripped of agency. Assuming that the hate speech is only a matter of existing propaganda would equate to exactly disregarding the role people play in the realm of ongoing warfare. Therefore, this work investigated a social media network, VK popular among the Russian speaking audience, to show the agency of people and how they perceive, react and contribute to the existing hate speech in the media. It has been shown that a lot of accounts and groups post content that reflects the central concepts of hate speech found in the literature. Considering that some of those publications might be a product of bots hired exactly for the purpose of disseminating, it is still impossible to disregard the existence of such rhetoric among ordinary users. Remarkably, the fact of hiring these bots illustrates that there are those in the media space who must be exposed to or shown this kind of information. In fact, the variations of the same terms and their evolution may illustrate the agency of ordinary users who not only come up with novel terms but also modify existing ones.

The choice of language, use of stereotypes and calls for violence illustrate the gravity of its consequences which can come in the form of stress expression, emotional outbursts (Saha, Chandrasekharan & De Choudhury, 2019), creation of controversies (Sponholz, 2016) enabling of conflict through reinforcement or creation of mistrust, fear, exclusion and anger towards perceived external as well as internal enemies (Kimotho & Nyaga, 2016; Udupa et al., 2020). Taking into consideration the potential consequences of hate speech and its use by Russian and Ukrainian-speaking audiences it is hard to imagine overcoming divisions and establishment of tolerance, mutual acceptance and certain extent of harmony in the Ukrainian society without necessary interventions.

Hate Speech Against Members of the LGBTQ+ Community

As demonstrated in Chapter Two, homophobic hate speech often goes hand-in-hand with hate speech aimed at other groups. The use of the term "gay", as well as offensive homophobic slurs, is considered an insult regardless at who it is aimed at. In other words, within the context of the type of hate speech discussed in this research work (ex. "maidarast"), to be called gay is as much, if not more, an insult as a non-homophobic anti-Ukrainian slur like

"maidanutiy". This points to the intersectionality of hate speech within the Ukrainian context – a phenomenon that has been currently understudied. It also highlights the general presence of homophobia in Ukraine and the stigmatization which members of the LGBTQ+ community face in the country. At the time of writing, the Ukrainian Criminal Code on hate crimes does not include provisions which would criminalize offences motivated by anti-LGBTQ+ intolerance (Nash Mir Center, 2021). Most people in Ukraine perceive homosexuality as "something alien," says gay activist Zoryan Kis (Burridge, 2016). He says that gay couples are sometimes asked to leave restaurants. Most Ukrainians want gays to leave the country, he adds, and many homosexuals did leave in pursuit of more accepting and safe environments. Moreover, according to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, in 2020 only 14% of Ukrainians believed that homosexuality should be acceptable in the society, demonstrating the lowest share (along with Russia) among seventeen European countries that were surveyed (RFE/RL, 2020).

The use of the word 'gay' and homophobic slurs as insults further stigmatizes and alienates the LGBTQ+ community. According to a study conducted by Fasoli et al., "after exposure to a homophobic epithet, compared with a category label or a generic insult, participants associated less human-related words with homosexuals, including dehumanization" (2015). This dehumanization can at times manifest itself through violent means. According to KyivPride, a non-governmental organization that organizes an annual LGBTQ+ parade in Ukraine, "In 2021 the community center of the LGBT Association 'LIGA' has received bomb threats twice this year. These actions are widely supported by many Ukrainian politicians and MPs and the number of attacks on LGBTI activities by far-right groups has sharply increased: 24 cases in 2020 against 11 in 2019" Emson, 2021). While there has been undoubtedly a steady increase of support for the LGBTQ+ cause in Ukraine, as evidenced, for example, by the size of the Kyiv Pride event – about 50 people attended in 2013 compared to over 10,000 in 2019, "the situation remains far from satisfactory" (Hoefer and Magid, 2021).

Perpetrators of hate crimes against gender and sexual minorities often function with impunity as "the police are not doing nearly enough to address such attacks and hold the perpetrators accountable" (Emson, 2021). For example, in 2018, twenty members of a far-right group showed up at the venue where an LGBTQ+ rights meeting was held and under threat of violence made the organizers cancel it (Amnesty International, 2018). One of the organizers of the event was Amnesty International which later reported about five district police officers idly standing at the crime scene without showing any effort to intervene.

Participants managed to leave the venue safely only after the arrival of the City Patrol Police which, nonetheless, also did not signify any arrest of the far-right members would take place. The lack of sufficient involvement from law enforcement often allows perpetrators of hate crimes to commit hateful and violent actions with impunity.

While this research paper primarily focusses on anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian hate speech and how it presents obstacles for reconciliation, considering the prevalence of homophobic hate speech and its integration into other forms of derogatory language, it is impossible to ignore this topic while discussing reconciliation in Ukraine. Anti-LGBTQ+ language, including homophobic hate speech, in itself creates division within Ukraine – a country that on one hand is working to adopt liberal European values, but on the other still facing resistance to their acceptance. Political leaders in Ukraine have utilized homophobic language to rally supporters and reaffirm their commitment to 'traditional' Ukrainian values. For example, at a family forum held in Kyiv in 2019, Oleksandr Turchynov, the former head of the National Security and Defence Council, made the following statement: "Under the guise of defending human rights, an anti-Christian term [gender] is being forced on our society [...] We need to remove the ideological terms from our laws and reinstate the word 'sex' instead of the artificial 'gender' that has been forced on us" (Matsuka, 2019). Furthermore, religious leaders in Ukraine have also engaged in hate speech against members of the LGBTQ+ community. For example, in 2020, Patriarch Filaret, head of the Kyiv Patriarchate, stated that the COVID-19 pandemic was "God's punishment for the sins of men, the sinfulness of humanity," specifying that "first of all, [he] mean[s] same-sex marriage" (Bacchi, Georgieva & Thomson Reuters Foundation 2020). Insight, a Ukrainian LGBTQ+ group filed a lawsuit against Patriarch Filaret, seeking an apology for his remarks. In response, the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate issued a statement saying that "as the head of the church and as a man, the Patriarch has the freedom to express his views, which are based on morality" (Villarreal, 2020).

Overall, this section draws attention to homophobic slurs and anti-LGBTQ+ language which was illustrated to be part of hate speech directed against Ukrainians. The circulation of these terms on social media networks demonstrates not only the existence of negative attitudes against sexual minorities but represents a symptom of a bigger disease of non-acceptance of differences and low level of tolerance. Both the "symptoms" and the "disease" express themselves at the level of ordinary users of VK as well as the elites of the society who, while not openly resorting to these terms, explicitly contribute to the maintenance of societal rigidity. Intolerance towards diversity and hate against minorities,

whether ethnic or sexual, represent the obstacles that need to be overcome for the purpose of achieving reconciliation and understanding within the Ukrainian society.

Recommendations

For Civil Society Organizations in Ukraine

Ukrainian civil society[29] began to gain momentum through increased participation in post-Euromaidan Ukraine, although its impact on the political field remained limited (Kyselova, 2019). The general environment in the state, in terms of regulations and policies, is conducive to grassroot civil society activism in Ukraine. On the other hand, after the crisis of 2014, there is an increased competition for funding between the CSOs in different parts of Ukraine, as major financial means were directed to organizations in the proximity of the conflict zone.

Among approximately eighty thousand registered NGOs in Ukraine, the number of organizations directly or indirectly fulfilling functions related to building peace does not even reach two hundred, from which Peace Insight pinpoints only twenty-one to be very active at the moment (Peace Direct, 2021). Kyselova identifies two clusters of CSOs engaged in peace promoting activities: the one adopting the rights-based approach and the other focusing more on interests and needs (2019). The boundaries between the two are sometimes confusing, but nevertheless the author pinpoints at their possible cooperation for achieving reconciliation. She discusses the case of the Slovyansk Book of Reconciliation published by human rights organizations and edited by dialogue promoting professionals for ensuring the reconciliatory tone.[30]

Local CSOs identify the lack of understanding as a primary element influencing the conflict(Bazilo, & Bosse, 2017). Priorities for civic peacebuilding are the consolidation of society in Ukraine, strengthening of inter-group confidence, as well as "rehumanizing" those left on the opposite side of the conflict. Their emphasis is on the unity among communities, the rebuilding of empathy and deconstruction of negative images of the other as the primary aims in their reconciliation activities. In order to reach their aims, CSOs emphasize the role

---

[29] An important caveat here to be made is that the civil society does not represent a single unitary actor with homogenous views. It is characterized by its diversity and plurality of form, content and significance. There is for example a significant number of right extremists and militant groups which may be regarded under the banner of civil society (Likhachev, 2018). Their actions and intentions oppose the exact principles of reconciliation, which again highlights the need for dealing with exactly these actors to find compromises and paths toward peace. The most obvious reason for this is that ignoring them would only sharpen their sentiments and produce new grounds for conflict and intensify the already existing tension.

[30] There were attempts to coordinate and bring together those two clusters through the CivilM+ Platform organized by the DRA (CivilM+, 2021)

of people and local organizations in producing reconciliation and dialogue activities. The local CSOs thus turn into a promising agency in the matter of fostering reconciliation (Ibid.).

Civil society in Ukraine championed the provision of humanitarian aid to people who became affected by the conflict (USAID, 2018). The spontaneous actions of volunteers of civil society helped a substantial number of people to find shelter from shelling and be provided with basic supplies, thus fulfilling the work of interventionists in the relief stage (Kystelove, 2019). Along with that, civil society in Ukraine has a prior experience and good understanding of early-warning systems and Human Rights violations monitoring (Ibid.). Founded in 2014, the coalition "Justice for Peace in Donbas", represents a great example of cooperation between seventeen NGOs[31] aimed at monitoring human rights violations in the conflict zone in order to guarantee their reception of the legal aid.

Marzalik mentions the overcoming of the gap in the society through an initiative like a nationwide GoCamp summer school (the establishment of an education center), where students from all of Ukraine would be able to exchange ideas and interact. The initiative was organized by an NGO called Global Office founded two years after the Maidan events and managed to incorporate more than 60,000 students in a brief period of time (2017). Further, regular counselling and group therapy, the psychosocial help aspect of rehabilitation is provided by a program like AVP in Ukraine that is of psychological and communicative nature that tries to create safe space for marginalized people (AVP in Ukraine, 2021).

In its efforts to promote reconciliation and dialogue civil society organizations like Caritas Ukraine organize programs and training for communities affected by the conflict. Another organization named Slavic Heart mobilizes women for peacebuilding work. The initiator of youth training and dialogue is a different NGOs called "The Country of Free People". Among other reconciliation-related activities, CSOs in Ukraine, are reported by Chatham House to conduct media literacy programmes (with more than 15 being at the state of operating in 2018) identified as "resilience building against Russian aggression" (Boulègue, Lutsevych, & Marin, 2018). An NGO tries to "look at Ukraine through Donbas prism" (Donetsk Institute of Information, 2021), with their target audience being people from the "area of ATO", the inhabitants of occupied territories, the Ukrainian army officers and their families (Ibid.). They emphasize that the media should not be a commercial or propaganda tool but be part of democratic progress. Another organization named Detector

---

[31] Crimean Human Rights Group,Crimea SOS, Democracy Development Center; Donbas SOS, Center for Civil Liberties, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, Lugansk Regional Human Right Center "Alternatyva", ZMINA Human Rights Information Center, Vostok SOS.

Media, operating since 2004, more directly states its mission to counter propaganda and misinformation, increase media literacy and improve the quality of Ukrainian media (Detector Media, 2021).

While civil society in Ukraine has undoubtedly made invaluable contributions in supporting vulnerable populations and promoting peace in Ukraine, more can be done in the field of reconciliation. Below are some of the key recommendations for civil society organizations working in this field within the Ukrainian context:

Making the problem of hate speech more explicit: The issue of hate speech is not emphasized by any of the aforementioned organizations. One of the primary suggestions would be to incorporate this concept into their statements to emphasize the existence of this phenomenon. Even if it is implicit in the misinformation and propaganda, explicit mentioning would help to warn the reader to be cautious when they notice something. Reliance on ordinary citizens that can engage in counterspeech and flag hate speech has proven to be an adequate means to battle it (Kunst et al., 2021).

Development of common framework: The framework would be developed in collaboration with politicians and social network representatives in which definition of principal concepts of hate speech like the ones identified in this work; risk analysis should constitute the first step. Further, the framework should incorporate goals, possible responses and courses of action while developing indicators that would be able to measure and evaluate progress (Guhl & Baldauf, 2019).

The use of CSO community media space and their lobbying power: All CSOs involved in peace-building and reconciliation activities, regardless of their work direction, are advised to collaborate in this regard, flag and share information regarding both propaganda and hate speech. Considering the threats that media spaces pose today, it is advised to hold a permanent staff or at least have digitally literate activists which would be able to ensure regular and quality moderation as well as community building (Ibid.). Development of national lobbies of civil society actors that will be concerned with a public interest test for the algorithms used by the platforms which should come to replace individualistic and preventative approaches applied by most of the platforms with regards to their freedom to deliver content (Napoli, 2015).

Hotline for Hate Speech. It is impossible to always monitor all the spaces, therefore, the victims of hate speech can be regarded as an important source for detecting this phenomenon. Establishing a hotline where instances of hate speech can be easily reported would help to support and help those affected by it, detect types of hate speech used, their

sources, identify and warn future potential victims (Personal Communication with a CSO representative, 2021).

The Vaccine of Love against hate speech: In addition to fighting against hate speech through monitoring, detecting, and illustrating, it is also necessary to disseminate the "peace-propaganda" (Benesh, 2014), by trying to soothe edges of difference and remind of shared features. Their major targets should be advocacy of social inclusion and diversity. So, instead of just publishing about divisive speech, it is important to disseminate more information about reconciliatory publications like simple comments from the audience (Odessdkaya Alcove, 2021).

For the European Union

The EU reaction to the crisis in Ukraine followed immediately in February 2014 when it attempted to broker a peace deal with a mediation mission consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Poland, and afterwards imposed sanctions (freezing of assets and visa ban) on individuals responsible for human rights' violations (Council of the European Union, 2014). The deployed diplomatic mission including German MFA Steinmeier, his Polish and French counterparts Sikorski and Fabius was to mediate between President Yanukovich and the opposition (DWa, 2014). The resulting agreement aimed at peace-building envisioned the re-establishment of Ukrainian constitution of 2004, establishment and shaping of a national government, constitutional reform completed by September of that year which would establish an equilibrium of power between the executive and legislative branches, investigation and prohibition of violent acts (Maas, 2019).

Since the beginning of the crisis, the EU has assisted in dealing with the social, economic, and humanitarian consequences of it in the eastern regions of the country while contributing to the OSCE monitoring mission. The EU as a whole and its member states are the largest humanitarian donors who address the needs of affected communities, IDPs and refugees fleeing the area as well as returnees (EEAS, 2016a). The EU, jointly with four agencies of the UN including UNDP, UNFPA, FAO and UN Women, contributes to the peacebuilding and reconciliation in Ukraine through its project of "EU Support to the East of Ukraine – Recovery, Peacebuilding and Governance, 2018-2022"(Hartwig, 2018). The contribution equals 25 million euro and aims to support the economic recovery of communities affected by the conflict, strengthen social cohesion and community security while furthering the implementation of healthcare reforms and work towards decentralization of Ukraine-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk.

The EU's initial approach to reconciliation in Ukraine was fully directed at top-down solutions which were aimed at reforms in line with the EU standards and norms provided by the signing of the Association Agreement (Ibid). The EU signed the DCFTA with Ukraine as a symbol of its support to political, social, and economic transformation in Ukraine (Natorski, 2017). This document shows that the EU did not highlight the role of local agencies, in particular civil society, in matters of peace. This can be seen by looking at the language of the text where "result-oriented and practical cooperation between the Parties for achieving peace, security and stability on the European continent" where the "Parties" are the state of Ukraine and the EU as a whole (Official Journal of the EU, 2014). The role of civil society was limited to monitoring functions, cooperation and culture-related matters (Ibid.). The continuity of this approach can be seen in its roadmap for engagement with civil society in Ukraine where it is stated civil society merely "identifies solutions that promote peace and regional stability" instead of being an active agent in the matter (EEAS, 2016).

After the downing of flight MH17 in Ukraine, the EU imposed a ban on arms, in particular sensitive technologies and on the sales of Russian banks' bonds and equities in European Markets (DW, 2014). Along with that, the establishment of a Support Group for Ukraine was aimed at fulfilling the objectives of reform in Ukraine through assistance provided to Ukrainian authorities. On the proposal of the UK, Sweden, and Poland "Civilian capacity-building CSDP mission" was established (has started operating since July 1, 2015) to support the judicial system and police in Ukraine which would enable a prompter action in case of altering dynamics in the state (Nováky, 2015). The European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) aimed at increasing the speed of "sustainable reform of the civilian security sector, providing strategic advice and practical support for specific reform measures" that should correspond to EU standards, international principles of human rights and good governance (EUAM, 2021). It was launched upon the Ukrainian government's request for assistance in border control, monitoring and prevention of trafficking (Zarembo, 2017). Initially it included only 200 members (today it has 350) in its staff, though it was criticized for lack of vision (ibid.). Afterwards, technical provisions and training were added to its objectives, and another field office was added in Donetsk to the existing three (EUAM, 2021). Its website shows that the mission in strategic partnership with the Parliament assisted in drafting 59 laws, advised on the approval of 27 key strategic documents and trained 15,000 people since 2015 (ibid.). This mission has a deterrent effect, according to Zarembo, as it illustrates the EU's presence in the region which explains the willingness to increase its regional outreach and strength (2017). Nevertheless, the author warns not to overestimate its

significance which was clearly demonstrated by the increasing tensions as a consequence of opening a bridge connecting Crimea with Russia in 2018 and open confrontation in the Sea of Azov in November 2018.

Considering that illustration of its presence did not have the desired effect, the EU now shows its willingness to act. The recent military build-up of Russian forces on the Crimean Peninsula led the EU to approve participation of NATO members, Norway, Canada and the US, in a project of Permanent Structured Cooperation which aims at speeding up troop and military equipment movement across borders. The European Union has approved the participation of NATO members the United States, Canada, and Norway in a project aimed at speeding up the movement of troops and military equipment around Europe (RFE/RL, 2021).

Another major shift can be seen in the rhetoric of the EU regarding civil society actors. In a programme statement of Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace it is emphasized that "Support to in-country civil society actors in conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness will continue in conflict-affected or post-conflict countries and regions" (European Commission, 2021).

The realization of the efficiency of combining top-down with bottom-up approaches illustrated in literature (Crescenzi & Giua, 2016) was confirmed in a non-structured personal communication with one of the representatives of the EU that wanted to remain anonymous. According to the source, the EU considers the role of both the state and civil society, in their own rights and capacities, crucial in post-conflict settings. Therefore, the EU and its instruments try to cooperate with both in a similar manner (Participant 1, 2021).

This seems to illustrate that the argument regarding the "EU narrative being exclusively focused on states and top-down conflict resolution mechanisms", if it did before, no longer holds true (Bazilo & Bosse, 2017). This does not mean that the paper claims that the EU approach has significantly altered as the change in rhetoric does not automatically imply shift in the actions. This has been to a certain extent confirmed by the communication with a representative of a civil society organization in Ukraine which deals with human rights issues and focuses on IDPs-related matters. When asked about the EU's role in the process of reconciliation, another respondent indicated that its role can be tremendous as it can provide expertise and resources that organizations lack on the field. Nevertheless, the participant mentioned the lack of any direct contacts with any representative of the EU highlighting the fact that it "deals with more global issues" and "it does not notice them [meaning, the CSO actor]" (Participant 2, 2021). In spite of the change in rhetoric, some of the representatives of civil societies still feel being ignored by the EU. There are, of course, those who feel their

voice is being heard in Brussels to which they might even travel and express their concerns (Participant 3, 2021). This shows the ambiguity of the situation and a necessity of further research to evaluate to what extent did the change in narrative affect the actions of the EU on the ground?

All of the above indicates that the EU narrative has evolved from the exclusive focus on top-down to emphasizing the combination of bottom-up and top-down approaches to reconciliation. This implies that the EU must invest efforts in not only establishing peace, negotiating with the aggressor, but also the achievement of "rehumanization" of the other, which remains "quintessential" for the establishment of lasting peace (Bazilo & Bosse, 2021).

In this regard, the fight against hate speech within the context of dealing with the consequences of the conflict and engagement in reconciliation efforts constitutes an essential area where a lot more must be done. Within the EU, the Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech was launched in May 2016 in cooperation with Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Microsoft (European Commission, 2020).[32] In its neighborhood, the EU, in cooperation with the Council of Europe funds today a regional project "Strengthening access to justice for victims of discrimination, hate crime and hate speech" which launched an activity aimed at systemic mapping on national responses on hate speech in Ukraine (Council of Europe, 2021). This work advises the promotion of this type of activities within the context of the conflict and reconciliation efforts. It offers the following steps for improving the approach to the matter at hand:

Appearing and distributing knowledge and expertise: Firstly, the EU's presence could be made more visible to the local civil society organizations and instead of waiting for them to reach out, it could attempt to map all the CSOs and reach out to them as well as explain to them its purposes, goals, ways of operating and opportunities it could offer to them (Participant 2, 2021). Secondly, it can serve as a hub of expertise and knowledge which local grass-root organizations really need, as some of the organizations were formed during after the eruption of crisis in Ukraine by people who did not have any experience in social activism and came to the field as volunteers concerned for their fate and that of their compatriots (Participant 3, 2021).

Bridging social media networks, civil society, and state for a common framework against hate speech: Considering the potential of the EU to serve as a "great tech enforcer"

---

[32] The concept of "hate speech" did not figure in the EU global strategy of 2016 which dealt with peace-buildings and inclusive societies, it only mentioned that "We will also offer rapid, factual rebuttals of disinformation. . We will continue fostering an open and inquiring media environment within and beyond the EU, also working with local players and through social media" (EEAS, 2016).

(Manancourt & Lau, 2021), the EU must contribute to the efforts of development of a common framework battling hate speech in Ukraine which would define its concepts, corresponding responses and courses of actions to take. It is also important to note the responsibility of social media platforms in monitoring their digital spaces and ensuring that they are as safe as possible for all their users. The EU can serve as a bridge between local civil society actors and representatives of social media platforms to promote collaboration and effective context-specific monitoring of digital spaces.

Lobbying the Ukrainian government to make amends in legislation:[33] The amends could include the following aspects: having only one set of laws on criminal liability for hate speech, in the ideal case, in the Criminal Code; isolation of hate speech criminal rules from other forms of speech; inclusion of points regarding the specific intent to incite to hatred, definition of "hostility" emphasizing the intensity of emotion; inclusion of a reference to incitement to violence as well as clarification of the definition of "incitement"' (OSCE, 2018).

Conclusion

This Chapter discussed how hate speech represents a hurdle for those who attempt to reconcile the society in Ukraine by reinforcing divisions, dehumanizing the constructed image of an enemy, creating a sense of unsafety allegedly created and sustained by illegitimate authorities. It also highlighted how civil society in Ukraine contributes to reconciliation by applying a bottom-up approach. It demonstrated the evolution of the EU's narrative from top-down to combining both approaches to reconciliation. However, there is also a partial mismatch between rhetoric and action. To address this, this Chapter provided a set of recommendations, including making the problem of hate speech more explicit; developing a common framework; using the CSO community media space and their lobbying power; setting up a hotline line for hate speech report; and undertaking the Vaccine of Love approach against hate speech. The recommendations for the EU include appearing and distributing knowledge and expertise; bridging social media networks, civil society and state for a common framework against hate speech and; lobbying the Ukrainian government to make amends in legislation.

---

[33] It should be noted that in this regard acts upon through its Committee on Ukraine's Integration into the EU that recently approved the Draft Law on Amendments to the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses and the Criminal Code of Ukraine on Combating Discrimination, which should basically provide certain level of protection to sexual minorities (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2021).

Conclusions

Manifestations of hate speech vary depending on contexts, users, and targets across space and time. Thus, there is no universally valid definition of hate speech, but mere approximation based on resembling features of these phenomena across scholarly works. Further, categories of the term developed by different authors cannot be simply imposed on every context in order to avoid fitting the data into a framework. Therefore, this work undertook the approximation of definition and examined secondary sources for identified concepts of hate speech in the context of the crisis-related divisions in Ukraine. Afterwards, it deduced the categories from these terms and applied them. The first set focused on anti-Ukrainian hate speech, subcategories of which included: a) derogatory variations of Euromaidan: Antimaidan; b) Variations of ethnophaulisms "khokhol" and "ukr" supplemented by slur; c) invectives against those who share European values; d) labelling of Ukraine (the country and its government) filled with vulgar language; e) emphasizing inferiority of Russians to Ukrainians. The second set focused on anti-Russian hate speech which involved the use of narratives of: 1) a "Rushist state"; 2) "Zombie Mass" and 3) Russian and Ukrainian "Vatniki") within the examined media space. Findings reveal the existence of hate speech not only on social media networks dominated by unidentified sources but also the political elite of the country. This shows that those terms appeal to certain types of electorates and are used for political gains.

The existence of this phenomenon and its wide outreach constitute a major obstacle to the efforts aimed at reconciliation as it contributes to the sowing and persistence of divisions, as well as construction, and maintenance of the "enemy Other". Furthermore, it shakes the foundation for potential relative unity in the country by calling to and resulting in violence. To overcome this, this research paper advises the two actors already involved in the efforts of reconciliation in Ukraine – the civil society and the EU – to mix the bottom-up/top-down approaches, and in the case of the EU, to incorporate this issue on their agenda.

Finally, more systematic analysis of social media networks (in addition to VK, Telegram, Twitter, and Facebook) should be done to search for the applicability and modification of these categories which may serve as a building block in the development of a framework to fight hate speech. A major research gap identified in this work is regarding the intersectionality of hate speech in both anti-Ukrainian and anti-Russian categories. Hate speech does not simply target identified groups but uses homophobic slur which illustrates the attitudes against both sexual and other minorities.

Bibliography

Akhmetova, M.V. (2015). Operationalizing Local Group Nicknames: History and Modernity. *NI Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod Herald*, (3).

Amosov, R. (2021, April 12) Death to Russia! Glory to Ukraine! [Wonderful Russophobia Community post] Vkontakte]https://vk.com/narodnyevesti?w=wall-50152213_131242%2Fall

Anastasiia, Z. (2016). Phonetic characteristics of the Caucasian accent imitation: Evidence from the speech of characters of Soviet and Russian films and serials. (Bachelor's Final, St Petersburg State University) Retrieved from https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/3318/1/VKR_Zabolotnyaya_A__N_.pdf

Antifashist (2021, November 11) The chilling horror of the maydaun: "Vata" was right! *People's Correspondent* https://nk.org.ua/politika/ledenyaschiy-ujas-maydauna-vata-byila-prava-00194734

Antikhokhol (n.d.) Home [VK Community] Vkontakte Retrieved from July 5, 2021 https://vk.com/public198022105

Arel, D. (2018). How Ukraine Has Become More Ukrainian. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 34(2-3), 186–189. doi:10.1080/1060586x.2018.1445460

Arel, D. & Khmelko, V. (1996). "The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine." *The Harriman Review* 9 (1–2): 81–91

Astarita, C. (2020). The Trap of an Official Apology: the Power of Civil Society in Promoting Reconciliation. East Asia: *An International Quarterly*, 37(1), 21-43.

Atlantic Council (2020, October 2). Overcoming Polarization in Ukraine. *Atlantic Council* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/overcoming-polarization-in-ukraine/

Auerbach, Y. (2004). The role of forgiveness in reconciliation. From conflict resolution to reconciliation. In Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (Ed.) *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation* (pp. 149-175) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bacchi, U; Georgieva, M. & Thomson Reuters Foundation (2020, April 13) LGBT+ group sues Ukraine religious figure linking coronavirus to gay marriage, *Reuters* https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-ukraine-lgbt-idUSL8N2BI6C7

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (Ed.). (2004). *From conflict resolution to reconciliation.* Oxford University Press.

Bazilo, G., & Bosse, G. (2017). Talking Peace at the Edge of War: Local Civil Society Narratives and Reconciliation in Eastern Ukraine. *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal*, (3), 91-116.

Bazilo, G., & Bosse, G. (2017). Talking Peace at the Edge of War: Local Civil Society Narratives and Reconciliation in Eastern Ukraine. *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal*, (3), 91-116.

Bell, C., & O'Rourke, C. (2007). The people's peace? Peace agreements, civil society, and participatory democracy. *International Political Science Review*, 28(3), 293-324.

Benesch, S. (2014). Defining and diminishing hate speech. State of the world's minorities and indigenous peoples, 18-25. Retrieved from July 21, 2021 https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/mrg-state-of-the-worlds-minorities-2014-chapter02.pdf

Bhutto, B. (2014). *Reconciliation: Islam, democracy and the West*. Simon and Schuster.

Bidzilya, Y., Haladzhun, Z., Harmatiy, O., Kunanets, N., & Shunevych, K. (2021). Hate speech in media towards the representatives of roma ethnic community. (Article) Retrieved from July 8, 2021 http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2870/paper56.pdf

BNS (2021, June 3) Lithuania strips Ukrainian blogger Shariy of political asylum. *Delfi.en* https://www.delfi.lt/en/politics/lithuania-strips-ukrainian-blogger-shariy-of-political-asylum.d?id=87367657

Borneman, J. (1997) *Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice and Accountability in Post-Socialist Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Boulègue, M., Lutsevych, O., & Marin, A. (2018). Civil Society Under Russia's Threat: Building Resilience in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. (Research Paper, Chatham House) Retrieved from July 22, 2021 https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-11-08-civil-society-russia-threat-ukraine-belarus-moldova-boulegue-lutsevych-marin.pdf

Bratushchak, O.; Golovenko, R. Golub, O.; Danylyuk, N.; Dovzhenko, O.; Illyuk, O.; Zubchenko, Y.; Krasovska, Z.; Romanyuk, O. (2021) Pro-Russian and Anti-Western Conspiracy Theories of Information War. Research Study. (Research Study Detector Media & IMI) Retrieved from July 19, 2021 https://imi.org.ua/upload/media/2021/06/23/60d2fe77f341d-imi-infowarnarratives2020-2021-eng0.pdf

Brosnan, S. F., & De Waal, F. B. (2002). A proximate perspective on reciprocal altruism. *Human Nature*, 13(1), 129-152.

Burakova, A. I. (2018). Anti-Russian Propaganda in Ukrainian Mass-Media: Goals and Means. *College of Editors*.

Burlyuk, O., & Shapovalova, N. (2017). "Veni, vidi, … vici?" EU performance and two faces of conditionality towards Ukraine. *East European Politics*, 33(1), 36–55. doi:10.1080/21599165.2017.1280470

Burridge, T. (2016) Gay rights in Ukraine: the weight of change, *BBC News: Russian Service* https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2016/06/160612_ukraine_gay_rights

Butiku, J. W. (2016). Civil society-government cooperation: consolidating the peace and reconciliation agenda in the Great Lakes Region. *Conflict Trends,* 2016(1), 28-34.

Charap, S., & Colton, T. J. (2018). E*veryone loses: The Ukraine crisis and the ruinous contest for post-Soviet Eurasia.* Routledge.

Colton, T. J. (2011). "An Aligning Election and the Ukrainian Political Community." *East European Politics and Societies* 25 (1): 4–27. doi:10.1177/0888325410388561.

Cortese, A. J. P. (2006). *Opposing hate speech*. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Council of Europe (2020, September) Ukraine's Hate Crime, Hate Speech and Discrimination Data Collection System Recommendationsfor Improvement and for Adopting a Joint Approach and National Situational Analysis Report. *EU and Council of Europe* https://rm.coe.int/final-data-collection-report-ukraine-en/16809fac70

Council of Europe (2021, March 22) Launch of the mapping of national responses to hate speech in Ukraine. *Council of Europe* https://www.coe.int/en/web/inclusion-and-antidiscrimination/-/launch-of-the-mapping-of-national-responses-to-hate-speech-in-ukraine

Council of the EU (2014, February 20) Foreign affairs council meeting. EU agrees on targeted sanctions, Brussels. Ukraine. *European Council: Council of the EU* https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/02/20/

Courtney J. (2018) Reconciliation: six reasons to worry, *Journal of Global Ethics*, 14:2, 252-265, DOI: 10.1080/17449626.2018.1507000

Crescenzi, R., & Giua, M. (2016). The EU Cohesion Policy in context: Does a bottom-up approach work in all regions?. Environment and Planning A: *Economy and Space*, 48(11), 2340-2357.

Crimea Ria (2021, March 7) To the front line: Ukraine plans to send a gay battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Donbass, Ria Novosti: Crimea https://crimea.ria.ru/world/20210307/1119334067/Na-peredovuyu-Ukraina-planiruet-otpravit-v-Donbass-gey-batalon-VSU.html

Crocker, D.A., (1999), "Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 13 (1): 43–64.

Czuperski, M., Herbst, J., Higgins, E., Polyakova, A., & Wilson, D. (2015, October 15). Hiding in plain sight: Putin's war in Ukraine. Retrieved from July 25 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/hiding-in-plain-sight/

Daigle, M. (2019). The spectacle of reconciliation: On (the) unsettling responsibilities to Indigenous peoples in the academy. Environment and Planning D: *Society and Space,* 026377581882434. doi:10.1177/0263775818824342

Dam, P. & Gorbunova, Y. (2021, February 11) In Ukraine, taking three pro-Russia channels off the air raises complex issues, *Human Rights Watch* https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ukraine-taking-three-pro-russia-channels-air-raises-complex-issues

Davidson T, Warmsley D, Macy MW, Weber I. (2017) Automated Hate Speech Detection and the Problem of Offensive Language. *ICWSM*.

de Gilbert O, Perez N, Garcia-Pablos A, Cuadros M. (2018) Hate Speech Dataset from a White Supremacy Forum. In: *2nd Workshop on Abusive Language Online* @ EMNLP

Detector Media (2021) Who We Are [Home page] Detector Media https://go.detector.media/about/#what

Dhizaala, J. T. (2018). Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations and the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In J. Brankovic & H. van der Merwe (Ed.) *Advocating Transitional Justice in Africa* (pp. 43-63). Springer International Publishing

Dickinson, P. (2021, February 5) Analysis: Ukraine bans Kremlin-linked TV channels. *Atlantic Council*. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/analysis-ukraine-bans-kremlin-linked-tv-channels/

Dobysh, M. (2018). Territory, Place, Scale, and Polarization of Electoral Preferences in Ukraine, 2002-2014. *Geography* 4 (73), 63-68

Donetsk Institute of Information (2021) About, Our Activities, [Home page]]DII https://go.detector.media/about/#what; https://dii.dn.ua/en/projects

DW. (2014, July 30). EU adopts broad economic sanctions against Russia. *DW.* http://www.dw.de/eu-adopts-broad-economic-sanctions-against-russia/a-17820786

DW (2014, February 21) "Deal" Reached in Kyiv, EU Diplomats Urge Caution, *DW* https://www.dw.com/en/deal-reached-in-kyiv-eu-diplomats-urge-caution/a-17448526

Dwyer, S. (1999). Reconciliation for Realists. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 13, 81–98. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.1999.tb00328.x

EEAS (2016, June) Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy (Global Strategy, EU) Retrieved from July 11, 2021
https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

EEAS (2016) EU RoadMap For Engagement with Civil Society in Ukraine. *EEAS*
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/roadmap_for_cs.pdf

EEAS (2016a) Ukraine and the EU. *Delegation of the EU to Ukraine*
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/1937/ukraine-and-eu_en

Emson, L. (2021, November 6) Understanding the Fight to Protect LGBTQI+ Rights in Europe and Eurasia, *KyivPride*
https://www.congress.gov/117/meeting/house/112760/witnesses/HHRG-117-FA14-Wstate-EmsonL-20210611.pdf

EUAM (2021) About US [Home Page] EUAM: Ukraine
https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/about-us/

EUAM (2021a) Progress in Reform [Home Page] EUAM: Ukraine
https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/progress-in-reform/

European Commission (2020, June 22) The Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, *European Commission*
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_1135

European Commission (2021) Instrument Contributing to Stability and peace, *European Commission*
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/about_the_european_commission/eu_budget/db_2021_programme_statement_instrument_contributing_to_stability_and_peace.pdf

Facebook (2021) Objectionable Content: Hate Speech (Facebook Community Standards) Facebook Retrieved from July 27, 2021
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/objectionable_content

Fasoli, F.; Paladino, M. P.; Carnaghi, A.; Jetten, J.; Bastian, B.; Bain, P.G. (2015, August 1) Not "just words": Exposure to homophobic epithets leads to dehumanizing and physical distancing from gay men. *Time*
https://www.time.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/bab62-not-just-words.pdf

Feng, Y. (2015). An Assessment of the Impact of the Ukraine Crisis. *International Strategic Relations and China's National Security,* 1 29–55. doi:10.1142/9789814675741_0003

Fiialka, S.B. (2016). Hate Speech on the Internet Pages of Supporting Russia Media in Social Networks, *Information Society* (24), 14-21.

Fortuna P, & Nunes S. A (2018) Survey on Automatic Detection of Hate Speech in Text. *ACM Comput Surv.* ; 51(4):85:1–85:30. https://doi.org/10.1145/3232676

Gagliardone, I. (2014). Mapping and analysing hate speech online. (Working Paper) Retrieved from July 17, 2021 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314552833_Mapping_and_Analysing_Hate_Speech_Online

Gainer, S. R. (2019). Rituals of Reconciliation: The Use of Peaceful Interactions to Repair Relationships (Doctoral dissertation, *The University of Alabama at Birmingham*).

Gelber, K. (2017). Hate Speech-Definitions & Empirical Evidence. *Const. Comment.*, 32, 619.

Gerasymchuk, S. & Maksak, H. (2018) Ukraine: Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism" . In A. Yeliseyeu & V. Damarad (Ed.) *Disinformation Resilience in Central and Eastern Europe (*pp. 301-328) Kyiv Retrieved from July 28, 2021 http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRI_CEE_2018.pdf

Giuliano, E. (2018). Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 34(2-3), 158–178. doi:10.1080/1060586x.2018.1447769

Golovchenko, Y., Hartmann, M., & Adler-Nissen, R. (2018). State, media and civil society in the information warfare over Ukraine: citizen curators of digital disinformation. *International Affairs*, 94(5), 975–994. doi:10.1093/ia/iiy148

Gorodnycha, L., Olkhovyk, M., & Gergul, S. (2020). Linguistic Analysis of Slavic Media Texts Containing Hate Speech. *EUREKA: Social and Humanities*,(6), 40-46.

Guhl, J., & Baldauf, J. (2019). 7. Suggested solutions: hate speech and extremism in the context of the NetzDG–recommendations to policymakers, social networks and civil society. *Hate Speech and Radicalisation Online*, 58.

Hall, B. (2021, April 25) Ukrainian leader calls for revamp of peace process to end Donbass war. *Financial Times.* https://www.ft.com/content/ed40d675-16b3-4a35-a157-b9bf0078b507

Halpern, J., & Weinstein, H. M. (2004). Rehumanizing the other: Empathy and reconciliation. *Hum. Rts. Q.,* 26, 561.

Hamber, B., & Kelly, G. (2004). *A working definition of reconciliation.* Democratic Dialogue.

Hameiri, B., Bar-Tal, D., & Halperin, E. (2014). Challenges for peacemakers: How to overcome the socio-psychological barriers. *Policy Insights From the Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 1 (164-171).

Harris, E. (2020). What is the Role of Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Russia–Ukraine Crisis?. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 72(4), 593-613.

Hartwig, B. (2018, November 9) European Union renews support for recovery, peacebuilding and governance reforms in conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine. *UNDP: Ukraine* https://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2018/EU-support-for-recovery-of-eastern-Ukraine.html

Henke, N. (2020). Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine: Reconciliation of Identities from a Conflict Prevention Perspective (Research Paper #125, ECMI) Retrieved from July 25 https://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Research_Paper_125.pdf

Himka, J. P. (2006). The basic historical identity formations in Ukraine: a typology. *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. 28(1/4), 483-500.

Hoefer, A. & Magid, S. (2021, June 24) Ukraine offers hope in an increasingly homophobic neighborhood, *Atlantic Council* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-offers-hope-in-an-increasingly-homophobic-neighborhood/

Höglund, K., & Sundberg, R. (2008). Reconciliation through Sports? The case of South Africa. *Third World Quarterly,* 29(4), 805–818. doi:10.1080/01436590802052920

Holdar, S. (1995). Torn between East and West: the regional factor in Ukrainian politics. *Post-Soviet Geography*. 36(2), 112-132.

Humphrey, M. (2005). Reconciliation and the Therapeutic State. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 26(3), 203–220. doi:10.1080/07256860500153492

Hussain, M. N., Bandeli, K. K., Al-Khateeb, S., Tokdemir, S. S., & Agarwal, N. (2018). Examining Strategic Integration of Social Media Platforms in Tracking Disinformation Campaign Coordination. In 2018 *International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling, and Prediction and Behavior Representation in Modeling and Simulation*, BRiMS 2018.

Iliuk, O. (2019, September 13) Fire and fury: anti-Ukrainian hate speech on Russian social networks, Ukraine World, *Ukraine World* https://ukraineworld.org/articles/infowatch/anti-ukrainian-hate-speech-VK

Iliuk, O. (2019, September 13) Fire and fury: anti-Ukrainian hate speech on Russian social

    networks, *Ukraine World*

    https://ukraineworld.org/articles/infowatch/anti-ukrainian-hate-speech-VK

Ivanenko, S., & Bidnyi, V. (2021). The Use of Military-Historical Issues in Russian

    Anti-Ukrainian Propaganda. *Sciences of Europe*, 63 (3).

Katchanovski, I. (2016). The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?.

    European Politics and Society, 17(4), 473–489. doi:10.1080/23745118.2016.1154131

Kazakov, V. (2013, November 29) Do We Need European Values?, *Soyuznoe Gosudarstvo*

    [Union State] https://www.postkomsg.com/actual_comment/198489/

Khmelnov, A. (2019, June 14) When did homosexuality stop being a crime in Europe?

    Euronews: Russian Edition

    https://ru.euronews.com/2019/06/14/homosexuality-legalised-europe-ru

Khomei, O. (2019, December 22). Increasing the Power of Civil Society in Ukraine. *New*

    Eastern Eastern Europe: 2011-2021.

    https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/12/22/increasing-the-power-of-civil-society-in-ukraine/

Kimotho, S. G., & Nyaga, R. N. (2016). Digitized ethnic hate speech: Understanding effects

    of digital media hate speech on citizen journalism in Kenya. *Advances in Language and*

    Literary Studies, 7(3), 189-200.

Kissinger, H. (2014). How the Ukraine crisis ends. *The Washington Post*, 6, 2014.

Klyuchi Razumenia (2020, November 20) Will sinful Europe perish as a punishment of God?

    [Yandex Zen Post] Yandex Zen

    https://zen.yandex.ru/media/keysofknowledge/pogibnet-li-greshnaia-evropa-nakazannaia-bogom-5fb162bfb321633937b37979

Knyazev, S. & Lobanov, M. (2021, May 25) His army looked like a big gang and was

    engaged in pogroms": 95 years ago, Simon Petliura was killed. *RT.*

    https://russian.rt.com/science/article/865422-ubiistvo-simon-petlyura

Korbut, A. (2021, Aprile 23) Strengthening public interest in Ukraine's media sector.

    Chatham House

    https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/04/strengthening-public-interest-ukraines-media-sector/03-ukraines-main-media-actors

Korochensky, A.P. & Grebennikov, B. (2019). Ukrainian Media Criticism in the

    Informational War (2014-2019). *Scholarly Editors*, 45.

Kovalova A.D. (2017) Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Post-War Ukraine. *Journal of Conflict and Integration*. 2017 Dec;1(2):124-50.

Kozachenko, I. (2019). Fighting for the Soviet Union 2.0: Digital nostalgia and national belonging in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 52(1), 1-10.

Kozhevnikova, G. (2006) Hate Speech: Typology of Journalist Mistakes. Applied Conflictology for Journalists, Moskow: Human Rights, *Center for Extreme Journalism*, pp. 95–105.

Kravchuk, A. (2018). Hate crimes and incidents in Ukraine. (Publication, Our World Center) Retrieved from July 18, 2021 https://gay.org.ua/publications/hatecrime2018-e.pdf .

Krechetnikov, A. (2014, April 25) "Junta" i "Terroristy" Voyna Slov Moskvy i Kieva, *BBC* https://www.bbc.com/russian/blogs/2014/04/140425_blog_krechetnikov_harsh_speech

Krondorfer, B. (Ed.). (2018). *Reconciliation in Global Context: Why it is Needed and how it Works*. SUNY Press.

Kroz, M. & Ratinova, N. (2005) The Price of Hatred. Expert Assessment of Materials Aimed at Arousing Enmity and Hatred. The Price of Hatred, Moscow: *Sova Center*, pp. 75–92.

Kunst, M., Porten-Cheé, P., Emmer, M., & Eilders, C. (2021). Do "Good Citizens" fight hate speech online? Effects of solidarity citizenship norms on user responses to hate comments. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, 1-16.

Kuzio, T. (2006). The Orange Revolution at the crossroads. *Demokratizatsiya-Washington*, 14(4), 477.

Kuzio, T. (2019). Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians and why Novorossiya failed. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 52(4), 297-309.

Kuznietsova, T. (2019) The Hate Speech in The Regions: The Modern "Achievements" in The Odessa Media. ISSN 2078-7324. *Lvov University Herald. Journalistic Series*. 45 (203).

Kviatkoski, I. (2020, March 17) Image [Wonderful Russophobia Post] Vkontakte https://vk.com/narodnyevesti?z=photo-50152213_457241329%2Fwall-50152213_129760

Kyaw, N. N. (2019, May). Facebooking in Myanmar: From hate speech to fake news to partisan political communication. *ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute*. 36

Kyselova, T. (2018). Professional peacemakers in Ukraine: mediators and dialogue facilitators before and after 2014.*Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal* 3 (2017): 117–136

Kyslova, O., Kuzina, I., & Dyrda, I. (2020). Hate Speech Against the Roma Minority on Ukrainian Web Space. *Ideology and Politics*, № 2(16),

Laba, K. (2020). Ukraine. Media Sustainability Index, (Panel Discussion Report, IREX) Retrieved from July 17, 2021 https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/media-sustainability-index-europe-eurasia-2019-ukraine.pdf

Laschenko, A. (2019, June 1) Irena Karpa: "Vishivatnik" i "Vatnik" - Znaki Protilejni, Ale Osnova V Obokh CRSR ["Embroirdery" and "Vatnik" stand for opposite things but both derive from the USSR]. *Radio Svoboda* https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/29970092.html

Lazarenko, V. (2018). Conflict in Ukraine: multiplicity of narratives about the war and displacement. *European Politics and Society,* 1–17. doi:10.1080/23745118.2018.1552108

Lazarenko, V. (2018). Conflict in Ukraine: multiplicity of narratives about the war and displacement. *European Politics and Society*, 1–17. doi:10.1080/23745118.2018.1552108

Lederach, J. P. (1997). Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington, DC: USIP.

Likhachev, V. (2016). Antisemitism in Ukraine, 2016: Preliminary Report. *Euro-Asian Jewish Congress*.

Little, A., (2012). Disjunctured narratives: rethinking reconciliation and conflict transformation. *International political science review*, 33 (1), 82–98

Lu, C. (2017). *Justice and reconciliation in world politics.* Cambridge University Press.

Maass, A.-S. (2019). The Actorness of the EU's State-Building in Ukraine - Before and after Crimea. *Geopolitics*, 1–20. doi:10.1080/14650045.2018.1559149

MacAvaney, S., Yao, H. R., Yang, E., Russell, K., Goharian, N., & Frieder, O. (2019). Hate speech detection: Challenges and solutions. *PloS one*, 14(8), e0221152.

Magda, Y. (2015) *Hybrid War: To Survive and To Win,* Kharkiv, Vivat Publishing

Manancourt, V. & Lau, S. (2021, August 6) Europe was the world's great tech enforcer. Not anymore. *Politico.eu* https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-big-tech-enforcer-us-china-gdpr-privacy-competition-apple-google-facebook-amazon/

Marlin, M., & Butts, A. (2018). Constitutional Reform in Ukraine in 2016: Prospects for Regional Reintegration and Reconciliation of Dominant Eastern and Western

Ethnonationalist Factions. *European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online*, 15(01), 149-168.

Martsenyuk, T. (2012). The State of the LGBT Community and Homophobia in Ukraine. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 59(2), 51–62. doi:10.2753/ppc1075-8216590205

Matsuka, O. (2019, March 29) No matter their allegiance, Ukraine's politicians are ignoring LGBT rights, *Open Democracy* https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/no-matter-their-allegiance-ukraines-politicians-are-ignoring-lgbt-rights/

Matveeva, A. (2016). No Moscow stooges: identity polarization and guerrilla movements in Donbass. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(1), 25-50.

McCoy, J., Rahman, T., & Somer, M. (2018). Polarization and the global crisis of democracy: Common patterns, dynamics, and pernicious consequences for democratic polities. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 62(1), 16-42.

McFaul, M., Sestanovich, S., & Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Faulty powers: Who started the Ukraine crisis?. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(6), 167-178.

McMahon, R. (2014). Ukraine in crisis. *Council on Foreign Relations*, 5(8).

McThenia, A. W., & Shaffer, T. L. (1985). For reconciliation. *Yale Law Journal*, 94(7), 1660-1668.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: the liberal delusions that provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(77).

Medvedchuk, V. (2020, Novemeber 11) Medvedchuk: Zelensky and his entourage follow the path taken only by the Nazis and want to maintain their power with the help of "concentration camps" *NewsOne* https://newsoneua.tv/news/politics/medvedchuk_zelenskiy_i_ego_okruzhenie_idut_po_puti_kotorym_shli_tolko_nacisty_i_hotyat_sohranit_svoyu_vlast_s_pomoshhyu_konclagerey.html

Meierhenrich, J. (2008). Varieties of Reconciliation. *Law & Social Inquiry*, 33(1), 195–231. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.2008.00098.x

Melykh, O., & Korbut, A. (2020). Entertainment media in the context of hybrid war in the post-Soviet countries: the case of Ukraine. *Economic Annals-XXI,* 182(3-4), 25-33. doi: https://doi.org/10.21003/ea.V182-03

Molodets, P. (2011, December 14) Europe and Its Values, *Pravoslavie* https://pravoslavie.ru/50414.html

Murphy, J.G. (1988). Forgiveness and Resentment. In J.G. Murphy & J.Hampton (Ed.).
Forgiveness and Mercy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mykhailychenko, A. (2017). Content-Thematic Features of Hate Speech on Pages of
Ukrainian and Russian Editions. *European Cooperation*, 7(26), 35-48.

Nadler, A. (2002). Post resolution processes: An instrumental and socio-emotional routes to
reconciliation. In G. Salomon & B. Nevo (Ed.), *Peace education world-wide: The
concept, principles and practices around the world* (pp. 127-143). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.

Napoli, P. M. (2015). Social media and the public interest: Governance of news platforms in
the realm of individual and algorithmic gatekeepers. *Telecommunications Policy*, 39(9),
751–760. doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2014.12.003

Natorski., M. (2017). The EU and crisis in Ukraine: Policy continuity in times of disorder? in
D. Bouris and T. Schumacher, (Ed.) *The revised European neighbourhood policy.
Continuity and change in EU foreign policy,* (pp. 177–96). London: Palgrave
Macmillan UK.

NewsOne (2020, July 23) Shariy: Authorities are Behind the Massive Terrorist Attacks in
Ukraine [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJpMlDGXbEk

Nockleby, J.T. (2000), Hate Speech. In L. W. Levy, K.; L. Karst & D.J. Mahoney (Ed.)
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution (2nd ed.), (pp. 1277-1279) New York:
Macmillan

Nossov, S.K. (2015) Russophobia and Russophilia as Phenomena of Contemporary Public
Consciousness// Social Processes in Contemporary Western Siberia. *Gorno Altaysk
State University* pp. 169-176.

Nováky, N. I. M. (2015). Why so soft? The European Union in Ukraine. *Contemporary
Security Policy,* 36 (2):244–66. doi:10.1080/13523260.2015.1061767.

Novorossia (2021, August 4) "Russia will never abandon residents of Donbass" - Zakharova.
Novorossia
https://novorosinform.org/rossiya-nikogda-ne-brosit-zhitelej-donbassa--zaharova-76481
.html

Novorossia (2021a, August 4) In the Ukrainian city, parts of the monument to the "heroes" of
the anti-terrorist operation were handed over for scrap. *Novorossia*
https://novorosinform.org/v-ukrainskom-gorode-chasti-pamyatnika-geroyam-ato-sdali-
na-metallolom-76547.html

Novorossia (2021b, August 3) "The pitiful babble of a youth." The State Duma of Russia appreciated the words of Zelensky about the ownership of Crimea. *Novorossia.* https://novorosinform.org/zhalkij-lepet-yunca-v-gosdume-rossii-ocenili-slova-zelensko go-o-prinadlezhnosti-kryma--76450.html

Novorossia (2021c, July 1) Simulacra of Ukrainian textbooks. You can't figure it out on purpose. *Novorossia.* https://novorosinform.org/simulyakry-ukrainskih-uchebnikovya-narochno-ne-pridumae sh-4651.html

Novorossia (2021d, July 28) The culprits of all the troubles of Ukraine have been found: they are Orthodox. *Novorossia* https://novorosinform.org/najdeny-vinovniki-vseh-bed-ukrainy-eto-pravoslavnye-7601 0.html

Novorossia (2021e, July 1) A chance for Putin. Blogger-Russophobe scared of the dominance of the Russian language in Ukraine. *Novorossia* https://novorosinform.org/shans-dlya-putinaya-blogeryarusofob-ispugalsya-dominirova niya-russkogo-yazyka-na-ukraine-4650.html

Novorossia (2021f, June 15) Russian is everywhere: the movable Ombudsman saw joy in the language preferences of Ukrainian TV viewers. *Novorossia.* https://novorosinform.org/russkij-povsyuduya-movnyj-ombudsmen-uvidel-zradu-v-yaz ykovyh-predpochteniyah-ukrainskih-telezritelej-5733.html

Nuzov, I. (2016). The Dynamics of Collective Memory in the Ukraine Crisis: A Transitional Justice Perspective. *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 11(1), 132–153. doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijw025

Nyman, H., & Provozin, A. (2019). The Harmful Effects of Online and Offline Anti LGBTI Hate Speech. (Master Thesis, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden) Retrieved from July 17, 2021 https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1355445/FULLTEXT02.pdf

Odesskaya Alcove (2021, August 9) Picture of Urkainian and Russian Olympiada participants, Odesskaya Alcove Community: [VK Account Post]Vkontakte https://vk.com/search?c%5Bper_page%5D=40&c%5Bq%5D=%D1%83%D0%BA%D 1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%86%D1%8B%20%D0%B8%20%D1%80% D1%83%D1%81%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%B1%D1%80%D0 %B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F&c%5Bsection%5D=auto&z=photo-184918937_457 297748%2Fwall-184918937_136620

Office Journal of the EU (2014) Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part. (Agreement, Office Journal of the EU) Retrieved from July 19, 2021 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155103.pdf

Oleshkova, A.M. (2015). Hate speech as a compensatory option in the search for justice. *BBK* 60 (5).

Olujko V. M., (2005), Ukraine on the way to the state of self-governing territorial communities, *University Scientific Notes*, 1/2, p. 317 323.

Onuch, O., & Hale, H. E. (2018). Capturing ethnicity: the case of Ukraine. *Post-Soviet Affairs,* 34(2-3), 84–106. doi:10.1080/1060586x.2018.1452247

OSCE (2014) 1019th Permanent Council Meeting 16 October 2014 Russian Federation on dangerous trends in Ukraine and continuing violations of the norms of international humanitarian law (Speech) Retrieved from July 23, 2021 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/5/125949.pdf

OSCE (2018) Comparative Legal Analysis of Ukrainian Regulation of Hate Speech in the Media (Report, OSCE) Retrieved from July 25, 2021 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/e/384567.pdf

Paul, A. (2014). Ukraine on the Edge. *University of Pittsburgh,* 24.

Pavlenko R. & Viter O., (2006), Differences in value orientations in the regions of Ukraine: how to overcome the problem of "split". In U. Tiscenko (Ed.) *Regional Policy of Ukraine: Formation of Socio-Humanitarian Development Priorities, Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Research'*, Kiiv, p. 99-120.

Petersen, M. B., Sell, A., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2010). Evolutionary Psychology and Criminal Justice: A Recalibrational Theory of Punishment and Reconciliation. In Høgh-Oleson, H. (Ed.) *Human Morality & Sociality: Evolutionary & Comparative Perspectives*, (pp.72-131) Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2010

Petrenko, G.; Dovzhenko, O. ; Iliuk, O. & Burkosky, P. (2021) On the Other Side of the Screen: Analysis of Media Consumption and Disinformation in the Ukrainian Information Environment, (Analytical Report, NGO Detecter Media) Retrieved from July 29, 2021 https://rpr.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/On_the_other_side_DM_final_ENG_WEB.pdf

Piazza, J. A. (2020). Politician hate speech and domestic terrorism. *International Interactions*, 46(3), 431-453.

Pielemeier, J. (2020). Disentangling Disinformation: What Makes Regulating Disinformation So Difficult?. *Utah L. Rev.*, 917.

Pierzchała, K. (2019). Information Warfare Between Russia and Ukraine: A Cause of War for the West? *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 48(1), 103-111.

Podrobnosti (2014, October 24) Veliky Vatny Mir ili Philosophia Vatnikov. Mul'tfil'm Ireny Karpy [Great quilted world or Philosophy of quilted jackets. Cartoon by Irena Karpa] [Video].Youtube.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J0uUfFdEzv0&list=PL3Bh8iJueUK2H_izFhf84Ir5i8LvkELKj&index=6

Podrobnosti (2014a) Ukraina i Organizatsia Obespokoennykh Natsy: Multfilm [Ukraine and the Organization of Concerned Nations: cartoon] [Video]. Youtube.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d0XIL4W83SA&list=PL3Bh8iJueUK2H_izFhf84Ir5i8LvkELKj&index=12

Podrobnosti (2021) Vatnik Obraschenny: Mul'tfil'm Ireny Karpy [The Turned Vatnik: Cartoon of Ireny Karpy] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90cG9TEA3f0

Poltava (2021) Dossier of Poltava Region: Karpov Andrey Anatolyevich: Secretary of the Poltava City Council, author and host of "Vata Show. *Dossier. Poltavshina* Retrieved from July 28, 2021 https://poltava.to/dossier/284/

Pope, S. (2014). The Role of Forgiveness in Reconciliation and Restorative Justice: A Christian Perspective. J.J. Llewellyn & D. Philpott (Ed.) *Restorative Justice, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding,* (pp. 174–96). New York: Oxford University Press.

Pratiwi, F. I. (2019). Ukrainian National Identities in Influencing Ukraine Domestic Political Conflict in 2014. *The Role of Identity in Politics*, 92.

Pronoza, E., Panicheva, P., Koltsova, O., & Rosso, P. (2021). Detecting ethnicity-targeted hate speech in Russian social media texts. *Information Processing & Management*, 58(6), 102674.

Pryshchepa, G. (2017). "Hate Speech" as a Linguistic Marker of a Hybrid War. *Psycholinguistics*, 22(2), 98-112.

Radchenko, D. & Arkhipova, A. (2018). Ukrop and Vatnik: Offensive and Defensive "Hate Speech" in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict. *Ab Imperio*, 191-220

Radchenko, O., Kuczabski, A., & Michalski, T. (2014). Main factors affecting the social transformation process in Ukraine. *Journal of Geography, Politics and Society*, Year IV, 1(7), pp 5-18

Radzik, L. & Murphy, C. (June 17, 2015) Reconciliation. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2015 Edition), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2619933

Ramos, P., & Vieira, A. (2019). European Union, Russia and the MH17 case: strategic narratives' analysis (2014-2019). *Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa* e-ISSN: 1647-7251. 10 (2) pp. 53-67

Reznik, O. (2016). From the Orange Revolution to the Revolution of Dignity. *East European Politics and Societies*, 30(4), 750–765. doi:10.1177/0888325416650255

RFE/RL (2020, June 26)Homophobia: Russia, Ukraine Among Least-Accepting Countries For Gays, *RFE/RL* https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-among-least-accepting-countries-for-gays/30692269.html

RFE/RL (2021, Februrary 25) Ukraine Puts Pro-Kremlin Blogger Living In Europe On Wanted List. *RFE/RL* https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-puts-pro-kremlin-blogger-living-in-europe-on-wanted-list/31122142.html

RFE/RL (2021) With An Eye On Russia, EU Opens 'Military Mobility' Project To NATO Allies. *RFE/RL* ttps://www.rferl.org/a/russia-eu-nato-allies-military-mobility-borrell-stoltenberg/31241378.html

Riabchuk, M. (1992). 'Two Ukraines?', East European Reporter , 5 (4). ——. (2003). 'Dvi Ukrayiny' (Two Ukraines). Kyiv: Krytyka.

Riabchuk, M. (2015). "Two Ukraines" Reconsidered: The End of Ukrainian Ambivalence? *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 15(1), 138–156. doi:10.1111/sena.12120

Rikhlitskij, V. (2019, August 9) Who is Shariy? From a Ukrainian journalist to a popular blogger and pro-Russian politician, *Detector Media*. https://detector.media/infospace/article/169737/2019-08-09-who-is-shariy-from-a-ukrainian-journalist-to-a-popular-blogger-and-pro-russian-politician/

Romanenko, M. (2021, April 14) Are the Maydanuts satisfied? Maybe they will come out again to demolish this power? *Regnum*. https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3243089.html

Romenskyy, M., Spaiser, V., Ihle, T., & Lobaskin, V. (2018). Polarized Ukraine 2014: opinion and territorial split demonstrated with the bounded confidence XY model, parametrized by Twitter data. *Royal Society Open Science*, 5(8), 171935. doi:10.1098/rsos.171935

Rosenfeld, M. (2002). Hate speech in constitutional jurisprudence: a comparative analysis. *Cardozo L. Rev.*, 24, 1523.

Rosoux, V. (2008). "Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process: Scope and Limits." In The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, edited by Jacob Bercovitch,Victor Kremenyuk, and William Zartman, 543–63. Los Angeles: Sage.

Rossomakhin, A. (2016, March 16) The main Russian image was invented in England by Philologist: Andrei Rossomakhin about the emergence of the "Russian bear". *Meduza* https://meduza.io/feature/2016/03/16/russkiy-medved-byl-priduman-v-anglii

Rudchenko, A. (2011). National Myth as a Category of Hate Speech in Ukrainian Internet Media. *Scientific Notes of Institute of Journalism*, T. 2 (71)

Rumelili, B. (2018). Breaking with Europe's pasts: memory, reconciliation, and ontological (In)security. *European Security*, 27(3), 280–295. doi:10.1080/09662839.2018.1497979

Rusvesna (2021, August 4) "Look at their faces": Azarov questioned the intelligence of the Ukrainian leadership (VIDEO), *Rusvesna* https://rusvesna.su/news/1628047497

Saguy, T. (2017). Downside of Intergroup Harmony? When Reconciliation Might Backfire and What to Do. *Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 5(1), 75–81. doi:10.1177/2372732217747085

Saha, K., Chandrasekharan, E., & De Choudhury, M. (2019, June). Prevalence and psychological effects of hateful speech in online college communities. In *Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on web science* (pp. 255-264).

Sakwa, R. (2017). The Ukraine syndrome and Europe: Between norms and space. *The soviet and Post-soviet Review*, 44(1), 9-31.

Salnykova, A. (2014). *Barriers to Inter-group Deliberation in Divided Ukraine. In Democratic Deliberation in Deeply Divided Societies* (pp. 89-111). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Santacroce, G. A. (2020). Is the Ukraine crisis the West's fault? Analysis from a realist view. (Master's Dissertation, Luiss Università Guido Carli,Roma Italy) Retrieved from July 15, 2021

http://tesi.luiss.it/27193/1/084932_SANTACROCE_GAIA%20ANTONIA.pdf

Santuraki, S. U. (2019). Trends in the Regulation of Hate Speech and Fake News: A Threat to Free Speech?. *Hasanuddin Law Review*, 5(2), 140-158.

Sapunov, V.I. (2015). Manipulative Tricks of Ukrainian Mass Media During the Information Warfare 2013-2014. *Voronezh State University Herald. Series: Philology. Journalism* (1), 122-124.

Sasse, G. (2002). 'The "New" Ukraine: A State of Regions', in J. Hughes and G. Sasse (eds), *Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict* (pp. 60–100). London: Frank Cass.

Sasse, G. (2010). 'The Role of Regionalism'. *Journal of Democracy.* 21(3), 99–106.

Schaap, A. (2004). *Political reconciliation*. Routledge.

Schmidt-Felzmann, A. (2016). After the war in Ukraine: peace building and reconciliation in spite of the external aggressor. In S. Goda, O. Tytarchuk, M. Khylko (Ed.), *International Crisis Management: NATO, EU, OSCE and Civil Society, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series*, 127, (pp 151-161). Amsterdam: IOS Press

Security Service of Ukraine (2021) SBU detects spread of anti-Ukrainian propaganda, *SSU* https://ssu.gov.ua/en/novyny/sbu-vykryla-ta-prypynyla-rozpovsiudzhennia-antyukrains koi-propahandy-meshkanka-kyivshchyny-zaklykala-do-vvedennia-viisk-rf

Shariy, A. (2020, August, 5) Ze team's "dream" [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYtzwOjCEEk&list=PLTkSkLxfEiX6-PUFhHHX 7xB68foSMgyj5

Shariy, A. (2020a, August 5) Europe Wants Ukraine, [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sQORnTerZL8&list=PLTkSkLxfEiX6-PUFhHHX 7xB68foSMgyj5&index=3

Shariy, A. (n.d.) Home [Youtube Channel]. Youtube. Retrieved from July 25, 2021 https://www.youtube.com/user/SuperSharij/about

Sharlay, A. (2021, July 26) Terrorist attack in Aleksandrovka: Kiev successfully masters ISIS tactics. *Novorossia*. https://novorosinform.org/terakt-v-aleksandrovke-kiev-uspeshno-osvaivaet-taktiku-igil-75859.html

Shlyakhtin, A. (2021, September 24) Lukashenka nearly killed the mother of his son Kolya: a previously unknown story about the cruelty of the dictator. *24 Channel* https://24tv.ua/ru/lukashenko-edva-ne-ubil-mat-svoego-syna-koli-novosti-belarus_n142 1600

Shulman, S. (1998). 'Cultures in Competition', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50 (2).

Shveda, Y., & Park, J. H. (2016). Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity: The Dynamics of Euromaidan. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 7(1), 85–91. doi:10.1016/j.euras.2015.10.007

Skoibeda, U. (2013) Beasts from Social Networks. *Komsomol Truth*.

Smoor, L. (2017). Understanding the Narratives Explaining the Ukrainian Crisis: Identity
Divisions and Complex Diversity in Ukraine. Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, *European
and Regional Studies*, 11(1), 63–96. doi:10.1515/auseur-2017-0004

Sponholz, L. (2016). Islamophobic hate speech: What is the point of counter-speech? The
case of Oriana Fallaci and The Rage and the Pride. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*,
36(4), 502-522.

Stakic, I. (2011). Homophobia and hate speech in Serbian public discourse: how nationalist
myths and stereotypes influence prejudices against the LGBT minority. *The Equal
Rights Review*, 7

Stefanishyna, O. (2021, February 11). Ukraine and EU - Stitched Together. *EU Observer*.
https://euobserver.com/opinion/150888

Stopfake (2021, July 4) Manipulation: Almost half of Ukrainians consider themselves
Russian *Stopfake.org*
https://www.stopfake.org/ru/manipulyatsiya-pochti-polovina-ukraintsev-schitaet-sebya-
russkimi/

Suschy, S. J. (2020) Russian World of Ukraine: Realities and Perspectives of Post-Soviet
Period. *Free Thought.* 5(1683)

TASS (2021) Kreml Ne Schitaet Chto U Vlasti Na Ukraine Nakhodyatsya Natsisty. *TASS*
https://tass.ru/politika/11823425

Temchur, K. O. (2019). Conflict Discourse in Ukrainian Media During the Russian
Aggression in the Azov Sea. *Herald KDAK*. 54(108).

Terzyan, A, (2020, April 9). Towards a Vibrant Civil Society in Ukraine and Armenia.
Emerging Europe.
https://emerging-europe.com/voices/towards-a-vibrant-civil-society-in-ukraine-and-arm
enia/.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2021) Human Rights Situation in
Ukraine, (Report, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation)
Retreieved from July 22, 2021
https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/-/asset_publisher/bB3
NYd16mBFC/content/id/4474516

Topalski, V. L., & Ivanenko, S.M. (2020). Vikoristannya Konstruktu "Velika Vitchiznyana
Viyna" V Rosiyskij AntiUkrainskij Propagandi. *Vojenno- istorichnij visnik*, 37(3),
42-54.

Torikai, M. (2019). The Electoral Logic of Governor Rotations in Ukraine: Rulers' Authority, Party Strength, and Regional Polarization. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 1–19. doi:10.1080/1060586x.2019.1589683

Tregubov, V. (2021, January 14) Ukraine raised the alarm over weaponized social media long before Trump's twitter ban, *Atlantic Council* https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-raised-the-alarm-over-weaponized-social-media-long-before-trumps-twitter-ban/

Trenin, D. (2014). Ukraine and the new divide. *Russia in Global Affairs*, 22.

Twitter (2021) Rules and Policies: Hateful conduct policy (Help Center) Twitter https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy

Udupa, S.; Gagliardone, I.; Deem, A.; & Csuka, L. (2020, February). *Hate Speech, Information Disorder, and Conflict.* (Report). SSRC http://ssrc-cdn1.s3.amazonaws.com/crmuploads/new_publication_3/the-field-of-disinformation-democratic-processes-and-conflict-prevention-a-scan-of-the-literature.pdf

Ukrainian mood (n.d.) Home [VK Community] Vkontakte Retrieved from August 8,2021 https://vk.com/ukr_nastriy

Ukrainian Space. (n.d.) Home (VK Community), Vkontakte. Retrieved July 20, 2021 https://vk.com/uarevo

Ukrop (n.d.) Right Sector/News in Ukraine/ ATO/OOS [VK Community] Vkontakte Retrieved from July 15, 2021 https://vk.com/ukrop_ua

Unwala, A., & Ghori, S. (2015). Brandishing the cybered bear: Information war and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. *Military Cyber Affairs*, 1(1), 7.

Uyheng, J., & Carley, K. M. (2021). Characterizing network dynamics of online hate communities around the COVID-19 pandemic. *Applied Network Science*, 6(1), 1-21.

Vata show (2017, October 30) A trip from Moscow to Russia. Andrey Poltava Vata show [Video]. Youtube.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hqe1rhTbW_4

Vata Show (2020, November 16) Gorbachev, Brezhnev, Khrushyev are Ukrainians? Andrey Poltava: Vata Show [Video]. Youtube.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHALaRMrP44

Vata Show (2020a, August 28) Russian IT Guy and Bloody Bombardment: Andrey Poltava: Vata Show [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZRVf7lgwl8

Vata Show (2020b, August 10) Nabutylkino ahead! Andriy Poltava: Vata Show [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=34K077J3PkU

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2021, May 13) Draft Law on Amendments to the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses and the Criminal Code of Ukraine on Combating Discrimination. *Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine* http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?id=&pf3511=71891

Verkhovsky, O. (2007) The Language of Enmity against Society, Moscow: *Sova Center*

Villarreal, D. (2021, September 9) Ukrainian church leader who blamed COVID-19 on gay marriage tests positive for virus, *NBC News* https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/ukrainian-church-leader-who-blamed-covid-19-gay-marriage-tests-n1239528

Vollhardt, J., Coutin, M., Staub, E., Weiss, G., & Deflander, J. (2007). Deconstructing hate speech in the DRC: A psychological media sensitization campaign. *Journal of Hate Studies*, *5*(15), 15-35.

Volnov, E.; Strazdins, G. & Minakov ,S. (2021, May 9) Ordinary Rushism (7 Signs of Fascism in Russia in the 21st Century) [Video]. Youtube.]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9X7zkwlsSTk

Vorobiov, M. (2020, August 4) Pro-Russian Blogger Anatoliy Shariy Rises to National Level in Ukrainian Politics. *The Jamestown Foundation: Global Research and Analysis* https://jamestown.org/program/pro-russian-blogger-anatoliy-shariy-rises-to-national-level-in-ukrainian-politics/

Warner, W., & Hirschberg, J. (2012). Detecting hate speech on the world wide web. In *Proceedings of the second workshop on language in social media* (pp. 19-26).

Weinstein, J. (2017) Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy, 32 *CONST. COMMENT.* 527, 527 .

Whillock, R. K., & Slayden, D. (1995). Hate speech. *SAGE Publications*, Inc., 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320.

Wilson, A. (2000). *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wilson, R. A. (2003). Anthropological Studies of National Reconciliation Processes. *Anthropological Theory*, 3(3), 367–387. doi:10.1177/14634996030033007

Wonderful Russophobia (n.d.) Home [VK Community] Vkontakte Retrieved from July 15m 2021

Worthington Jr, E. L. (2006). *Forgiveness and reconciliation: Theory and application.* Routledge.

Young, J., Swammy, P., & Danks, D. (2018). Beyond AI: Responses to hate speech and disinformation. (Unpublished paper presented at Carnegie Mellon University).

Retrieved from July 29, 2021

http://jessica-young.com/research/Beyond-AI-Responses-to-Hate-Speech-and-Disinformation.pdf

Zaharchenko, T. (2015). East Ukraine Beyond Pro and Anti: Monochrome Prefixes and Their Discontents. In A. Wilson (Ed.) *What Does Ukraine Think?* (pp. 53-61) European Council on Foreign Relations

Zarembo, K. (2017) Perceptions of CSDP effectiveness in Ukraine: A host state perspective. *European Security,* 26 (2):190–206. doi:10.1080/09662839.2017.1291502

Zhabotinskaya, S.A. (2015). Language as a weapon in the war of worldviews Maidan – Antimaydan: a dictionary-thesaurus of lexical innovations Uraina December 2013 – December 2014. Online edition.

Zhurzhenko, T. (2015). Ukraine's Eastern Borderlands: The end of ambiguity. What does Ukraine think, In A. Wilson (Ed.) *What Does Ukraine Think?* (pp. 45-52) European Council on Foreign Relations

Zhurzhenko T. (2016) Hybrid reconciliation. *Eurozine*. 2016 Apr;8(04):.