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# DRIVERS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INTENTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: AN APPROACH BASED ON THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR

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## ABSTRACT

Despite the already voluminous body of literature on the international migration conundrum, scholarly debates over the motives to migrate have remained hitherto inconclusive. The present study explored the drivers of international migration intentions in the horn of Africa, taking refugees in Rwanda's Gashora Emergency Transit Mechanism as a case study. Adopting the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) framework, this study hypothesizes that migration is primarily driven by intention which, in turn, is influenced by three psychological constructs namely Attitude, Subjective Norm and Perceived Behavior Control. Multiple regression analysis was then applied to establish the levels of association between each of the aforementioned constructs with levels of intention to request asylum in Rwanda or to be resettled in a European country.

The findings indicate that migrants' intention to settle in Rwanda is very low while their intention to request asylum in an EU country remains extremely high. The construct "Attitude" was statistically significant in explaining the variation in the levels of intention to stay in Rwanda, while Subjective Norms and Perceived Behavior Control had relatively low levels of association with the intention to stay. Regarding the intention to seek resettlement in an EU country, the results reveal that Perceived Behavior Control variables explained more than 50% of variation in levels of intention whereas Attitude and Subjective Norms had no statistically significant role in explaining the levels of intention to request asylum in an EU country. Keeping all other factors constant, expected benefits in Europe such as living allowance, and overall happiness respectively explained 28% and 25% of change in attitude towards migration to Europe while recurrent droughts, political and military conflicts respectively explained 34 and 20% of overall attitude towards migration to Europe. Perceived unemployment and the state of idleness in home countries were also among the significant drivers of positive attitude towards international migration.

Since the low intention to stay in Rwanda was determined by behavioral beliefs and outcome evaluations in terms of available opportunities and possible achievements, these results suggest that raising attractiveness of countries in the South calls for policy frameworks to diversify opportunities for natives and immigrants alike. Such opportunities could be related to meaningful employment, education, and talent development. Finally, awareness campaigns are still primordial to assist potential migrants in making well calculated risks and avoid decisions based on misleading information.

**Key words:** international migration, Theory of Planned Behavior, migration intention, horn of Africa, Rwanda

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## **DEDICATION**

To my wife and son,

To my late parents,

To my siblings,

I dedicate this dissertation

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS**

ANOVA: Analysis of Variance

AU: African Union

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

BIA: Best Interests Assessment

BID: Best interest Determination

ETM: Emergency Transit Mechanism

EU: European Union

IOM: International Organization for Migration

NPV: Net Present Value

OECD: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PBC: Perceived Behavior Control

RSD: Refugee Status Determination

TPB: Theory of Planned Behavior

TRA: Theory of Reasoned Action

UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

VIF: Variance Inflation Factor

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## Chapter one: Introduction

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### 1.1 Background

Migration has been a major source of human survival, adaptation and growth across centuries and millennia (Marsella & Ring, 2003); and human mobility has always been inextricably linked to the human development process (Haas, 2009). International migration, where migrants leave their country of origin because of desperation or aspiration, has been on the rise for several decades (Carling & Collins, 2017). According to the recent International Organisation for Migration (IOM) report, international migrants make up 3.5% of the global population i.e approximately 272 million people, among which more than 40% were born in Asia. India, Mexico, and China are the three largest migrant sending countries around the world. In Africa, Egypt, Morocco and South Sudan are identified as the three largest migrant sending countries, whereas South Africa, Cote d' Ivoire and Uganda were perceived as the top African migrant destination countries (IOM, 2020).

On each new day, thousands of humans cross their traditional boundaries, and leave their birth countries in pursuit of either happiness, safety, leisure or a better life. This bulk can be compartmentalized into two broad categories: the lucky ones from developed countries, with proper travel documents and visas, entitled to all rights and privileges, including deciding on where to go, when to go, with whom to go and what to do after arrival; and the vulnerable ones, disadvantaged where they are, trying every possible chance to succeed and build a better life elsewhere (IOM, 2018). The former might also include labor migrants as a result of multilateral trade agreements or political unions, although these are often temporary. Conversely, the latter comprises those inflicted with socio-economic hardships but also those haunted by the vagaries of nature and calamities exacerbated by climate change in its various forms of manifestation (IOM, 2018). It also comprises the significant proportion of those fleeing wars, genocides, terrorism and persecution. As IOM Reported in 2018, these migrants have little to no freedom of choice and are subject to a plethora of obstacles and a myriad of sufferings; thus, calling into

question the laws of migration as put forward by Ravenstein in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Ravenstein, 1885). This existing reality also questions the preponderance of homo-economicus views long held by a non-negligible section of social scientists and outspoken migration scholars. The underpinning theory states that individuals are rational human beings and that their decision to move was a rational choice.

From early times, Africa has been considered as a continent where people are frequently on the move in response to various political, economic, religious, demographic or even security challenges. Spatial mobility was regarded fundamental to the African life; although migration patterns, directions and motivations were significantly affected and altered by the colonial experience which brought about gigantic changes in the political organization and demographic structure of African societies (Adepoju, 1997). As living conditions in rural areas deteriorate with the intensification of poverty, unemployment and underemployment, rural inhabitants are increasingly willing to risk deprivation and uncertainty in urban centers, exchanging misery without hope in rural dwellings with misery with hope in urban areas and city centers (Adepoju, 1997). As far as international migration is concerned, it has often been ignored that most Africans migrate within Africa and tend to move to nearby places. The geographic proximity allows them to return home for family visits or permanently return when circumstances change (Whitaker, 2017). Unfortunately, the growing frustrations, job insecurity, economic competition, degrading resources and poor living conditions are turning African societies against one another as was recently the case with xenophobic attacks in South Africa (Ngcamu & Mantzaris, 2019).

The fragility with which African states' boundaries are charted and the relatively smaller country sizes often tend to portray short distance movements as part of the international migration patterns. For example, citizens of Togo and Ghana cross borders on a regular basis and often commute to work to the other side of the colonially demarcated border, as is also the case for the communities living along the Nigeria and Benin border; to name but a few. Such level of complexity often blurs the distinction between national and international migration in Africa. However, the substantially growing numbers of those embarking on long journeys to other continents can by no means be ignored. In fact, the peak of south-north migration was widely

acknowledged in 2015. Back then, almost all media sources were reporting ‘migration crises’ or ‘migration waves’ as hundreds of young sub-Saharan Africans, on a daily basis, were trudging long distances through the desert and security deprived Libya to jump onto the boats in the Mediterranean Sea. Their ultimate goal was to reach the European soil (Dimkpa, 2019). The central Mediterranean migration route, traversing Libya, is presently the main route for migrants into the EU, primarily because of the non-existence of a Libyan state to enforce the law and control the migratory flows in collaboration with the EU (Baldwin-Edwards & Lutterbeck, 2018).

In addition to the perils to which migrants via the Mediterranean route are exposed, their life experiences on the Libyan territory have also been reportedly traumatizing. In 2017, the world was shocked when BBC released the video footage of inhumane treatment and slavery inflicted onto the African migrants held in Libyan detention centers, partly as a result of tightened border control at the European level and the anarchy that has reigned in Libya since the fall of Moammar Gaddafi (Kuschminder, 2020). Libya’s detention centers are conspicuous as places where refugees and migrants are tormented by horrific forms of abuse such as torture, rape and lack of sufficient food and medical care. Those in urban areas are subjected to exploitation, trafficking and kidnapping for ransom (Schlein, 2019). The memorandum of understanding between the Italian government and the Libyan authorities in Tripoli is amplifying the suffering and human misery. “During the three years since the original deal was struck, at least 40,000 people, including thousands of children, have been intercepted at sea, returned to Libya and exposed to unimaginable suffering” said Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Europe Director (Amnesty, 2020). Migrant narratives suggest kidnappers confine migrants in compounds and are required to call relatives back home to send money, often thousands of dollars, for ransom. Failure to do so results in increased torture, starvation, and rape for women.

These appalling realities compelled the international community to act and put an end to yet another series of crimes against humanity. Under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, member states were requested to galvanize support and facilitate humane and orderly transfer of refugees to willing host countries or repatriation where possible. Among those that swiftly responded were the Republic of Niger and the Republic of Rwanda.

Positioning itself at the frontline of defense and protection of rights of refugees and asylum seekers, Rwanda responded to the call by the UN body by agreeing to host nearly 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers from the Libyan detention centers and generously stepped forward to host a transit facility in Gashora (Sibomana & Hirpaye, 2020). Upon arrival, the latter are relocated into the newly constructed Emergency Transit Mechanism center, where they receive medical treatment, food, clothing, shelter and pocket money to provide for personal needs as they cheerfully wait for the will of governments in the North to permanently resettle them, as was recently the case with Sweden taking in twenty eight and Canada resettling five (Mutanganshuro, 2020b). These refugees predominantly come from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.

Despite the horrors of misery and indescribable suffering, these migrants have not given up on their dreams to settle in Europe, United States or Canada. Although the UNHCR does also envisage repatriation where possible, preliminary conversations with these groups reveal they have no intention and would by no means concede to returning home. Notwithstanding the voluminous body of literature on the migration conundrum, scholarly debates over the motives to migrate are hitherto inconclusive. Even after seeing their journeys cut short and reversed back by unexpected atrocities and human cruelty, these migrants' persistence to move north would boggle even the most enlightened minds. The present study, therefore, purposes to further delve into the drivers of migration intentions from the Horn of Africa, taking this 'special' category of migrants as a case study.

## **1.2. Problem Statement**

In 2009, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reported approximately 50 million irregular migrants worldwide. In 2017, this figure had increased to 58 million and the total number of permanent entries in OECD countries was just over 5 million, an increase of almost 25 per cent from 4 million in 2011 (IOM, 2018). Overall, the estimated number of international migrants has considerably increased over the past five decades. According to the International Organization for Migration, 244 million people were living in a country different from their country of birth with a dramatic increase since the 1990s, when it increased by almost 100 million

migrants (IOM, 2018). A corollary to this phenomenon has also been the rise in human trafficking and extremely hazardous migration routes. For instance, the number of deaths and missing migrants recorded in the Mediterranean Sea increased by 36 per cent in 2016 (IOM, 2018), while others are stranded in detention centers, killed and sexually abused on their way as amply explained in (Baldwin-Edwards & Lutterbeck, 2018).

As the flow of migrants intensified worldwide, scholars massively forayed into the matter, primarily trying to decipher the reasons behind this sharp increase in migratory movements and the factors that push outgoing migrants so desperate to risk their lives. However, despite the existence of profuse research on the causes of migration, there has been no conclusion and the debate has remained somewhat sterile as to what really appears to instigate such widespread international movements of people. The motivations of migrants appear to be far diverse and context dependent (Karemera, Oguledo, & Davis, 2010). Moreover, different authors would arrive at different conclusions depending on their overarching understanding of migration as either a threat to peace and stability or as a catalyst and ingredient for the maintenance of healthy economies in host countries while, at the same time, contributing to the improvement of living conditions in home countries. In fact, the huge proportion of studies probing the causes or drivers of migration in the 20th century, principally viewed migration as a nuisance and aimed at understanding its roots to curtail it. Over the past two decades, however, positive views of migration emerged, explaining the concomitant relative decline in the number of studies investigating the causes of migration (IOM, 2020).

Therefore, the complexity and the evolutive nature of migration contexts require constant monitoring and adaptation of studies to accurately depict contemporary realities of migration around the world. Modern societies of affluence, high levels of globalization, new technologies of communication and access to information have revolutionized ways in which migratory decisions are made, thus signposting the need to constantly analyze the contemporary motives of the decision to migrate. Migratory flows are increasing, and migrant streams seem to diversify in times of stricter border controls and tougher immigration laws but little to no attention has been paid to disentangling such paradox. The rise in populist and xenophobic political parties



across Europe, the Frontex (European external border patrol), the heightened violence and brutality against migrants, as well as the four years of Trump administration in the United States were all in the nature to deter south-north migration, albeit the opposite happened. Hence, scientific reflections on the factors and motivations that fuel massive migratory movements like the ones along the Libya Mediterranean route to Europe are as timely as relevant.

Besides, the Valetta summit on migration that convened on November 12<sup>th</sup>, 2015 concluded with the establishment of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, in a move that was meant to secure funding for African governments to foster stability and handle the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration in the Sahel and Lake Chad, Horn of Africa and North of Africa regions (European Commission, 2019). It was also requested of African governments to track and hunt down smugglers and human traffickers and to promote prosperity in their own countries, facilitating reintegration of returning migrants in their countries of origin. To achieve this mandate, government policy interventions need to be regularly and accurately informed on the real drivers of international migration.

In their recent paper, Bakewell and Sturridge argue that the compounding risks involved enhance the migrants' boldness and ability to migrate and may be the reason for which people decide to move (Bakewell & Sturridge, 2021). Their findings raise questions on the perception that increased awareness of risks would deter migrants from moving in the first place, given that increased risks related to insecurity and States' dysfunctionality create possibilities for migration which would not exist under the migrant containment regimes being brokered between Europe and Africa. Their study however, as well as most of the existing literature today (Bakewell & Sturridge, 2021; Baldwin-Edwards & Lutterbeck, 2018; Belloni, 2016; Dimkpa, 2019), has left some important questions unabated: which social psychological factors affect the migrant's intention to move?

### **1.3. Objectives**

Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior, this study seeks to investigate the determinants of international migration intentions from the Horn of Africa region, taking the sample of migrants

in Gashora Emergency Transit Mechanism as a case study. These are migrants who, in their attempt to cross the Mediterranean, were held captives and sold into slavery in detention centers in Libya but, thanks to the AU, Government of Rwanda and UNHCR, were evacuated and relocated to Rwanda. Specifically, this research intends to achieve the following:

1. Explore the adaptability of the Theory of Planned behavior in the context of intercontinental Migration;
2. To identify which and how underlying socio-psychological factors could affect migrants' intention to settle in transit countries of the South, in this case Rwanda;
3. To ascertain the motivations underpinning the migrants' decision to move from the Horn of Africa to Europe;

#### **1.4. Study Significance and Contributions**

This study investigates on the drivers of migration intentions in the Horn of Africa. Its originality lies in the following aspects: first, most scholarly works on the causes of migration in the horn of Africa focused on rather successful migrants whose migration experience was behind them (Belloni, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to involve migrants in transit, in the region where they fled. The study by (Brekke & Brochmann, 2014) involved migrants on the move but their study sample individuals were in Italy. They had already successfully traversed Libya, with a more ambitious plan to head north in Norway. Moreover, history demonstrated that, although Lampedusa is the point of entry, desired destinations are further north and western Europe. Yet, the overarching social, psychological, and behavioral motives at start have remained unexplored. Having a study population like the one in this study will, not only generate vivid and unaltered accounts of their migration causes and experiences, but also help us capture the effect of tramp related hardships on their initial dreams and how such experiences might inform future migration decisions.

In terms of policy making, further empirical understanding on the causes of migration in the horn of Africa will essentially guide political efforts that are underway to suppress illegal migration to Europe. It is our firm conviction that proper diagnosis will prescribe better alternative paths to manage migration. This study will thus cast light on how migration policies match the migration realities and contribute to addressing mismatches, if any. For instance, the findings by (Bakewell & Sturridge, 2021) cast doubts on contemporary migration policies, in particular perceptions around smugglers and challenged the effectiveness of campaigns that provide information about the risks and dangers of migration.

From the methodological point of view, previous endeavors to ascertain the determinants of migration have hit the walls of significant methodological limitations, mostly because they were founded on obsolete and theoretically uninformed push-pull and gravity models, failing to acknowledge the crucial roles played by sending country migration policies, and, non-economic factors such as sociopsychological ones (Carling & Schewelb, 2018). To overcome these limitations, this study proposes a novel approach of studying migration with the theory of planned behaviour (TPB). Long preserved for health and public health scientists, TPB has recently gained momentum in the study of migration decisions, though only a handful of studies attempted to exploit its potential to accurately predict and identify the processes and factors which influence migratory decisions (Carling & Schewelb, 2018; Klabunde, Zinn, Willekens, & Leuchter, 2017; Willekens, 2017).

Moreover, the overwhelming majority of pieces of work on the drivers of migration in the Horn of Africa are found in the West; on rare occasions have African scholars risen up to this challenge. Yet, the paucity of African scholars in the migration research has often been decried by the scientific community and the International Organization for migration (IOM, 2020), and the migration policy research is often descriptive and receiving-country biased (D'Haas, 2011). Therefore, the present study provides the unique opportunity to understand the drivers of international migration in the Horn of Africa through the lens of African scholarship. Among others, the occasion comes with the advantage of gathering genuine information from respondents and key informants in the region as they can easily relate with the principal

investigator. Prior evidence suggests migration policy discourses in Europe were often misguided and that analysts misunderstood or misrepresented the factors responsible for migration (Campbell, 2017).

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## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

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### 2.1 Theories of international migration

From the outset of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, international migration had already seized its rightful place in academic discourses; with Ravenstein rising in sharp contradiction to Dr. William Farr, who had previously observed that migration movements happened without any definite laws, theorizing about the laws of migration in 1885 (Ravenstein, 1885). Basing on the population census data throughout the United Kingdom, Ravenstein was able to propose seven laws of migration as follows: “most migrants only proceed a short distance, and toward centers of absorption; as migrants move toward absorption centers, they leave "gaps" that are filled up by migrants from more remote districts, creating migration flows that reach to "the most remote corner of the kingdom; the process of dispersion is inverse to that of absorption; each main current of migration produces a compensating counter-current; migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centers of commerce or industry; the natives of towns are less migratory than those of the rural parts of the country; females are more migratory than males” (John, 2003). It is also important to note the earlier observations by H.C. Carey (1858), who made the case that migration followed Newtonian laws in Physics (Carey, 1858). In his theory, further developed and established as the gravity model, Carey identified man as the molecule of society and stated that the greater the number of individuals collected in a given place, the greater was the attractive force exerted (Gallup, 1997). As in physics, gravitation is obtained as a ratio of mass over the inverse one of distance as follows:

$$M_{ij} = \frac{P_i P_j}{D_{ij}^2}$$

Where,

$M_{ij}$  = migration from region  $i$  to region  $j$

$P_i P_j$  = Population in region  $i$  and in region  $j$

$D_{ij}$  = Distance between region  $i$  and region  $j$

This relationship continued to underpin theoretical and empirical considerations of migrations for over a hundred years that ensued, albeit simple modifications (Gallup, 1997). One would even boldly assert that the gravity theory has known resurgence from the early 2000s, owing its success mainly to the adaptability to several other theories of migration, ease of estimation in its form, and the goodness of fit in several scenarios (Poot, Alimi, Cameron, & Maré, 2016). For instance, Karemera et al. (2010) utilized the model to understand international migration to North America. They found out that distance was a deterrence to migration flows to North America whereby increasing distances from country A to country B was a discouraging factor to migrate from country A to B mainly because logistics and financial costs increase with distance (Karemera et al., 2010). One of its important criticisms, however, has been the model's inability to capture human agency in a sense that it does not offer credible explanation to the human decision to migrate (Gallup, 1997).

Other theories were thus developed such as the neoclassical theory of migration according to which, migration decisions are driven by differences in returns to labor across multiple markets (Kurekova, 2011). The model was first developed by Lewis and Harris and Todaro to explain migration's role in the process of nations' economic development, thereby suggesting that migration was a result of actual wage differentials across markets depending on relative degrees of market tightness (Kurekova, 2011). The theory assumes that differences in supply and demand for labor and the resulting differences in wages will continue to drive migration patterns, migrants moving from labour rich countries to capital rich but labour poor countries, thus predicting a linear relationship between wage differentials and migration flows in the event of full employment (Kurekova, 2011). Also referred to as the two sector model, the Harris-Todaro model assumed that rural wage is fixed and that urban wage is fixed above the rural wage and suggests that migration will always occur as long as the urban wage is higher and the costs of migrating are minimal, considering the unemployment rate in urban centers whereas

unemployment rate in rural areas was considered nonexistent (Gallup, 1997). Extended neoclassical models contend that migration is defined by expected rather than actual earnings and the key variable is earnings weighted by the probability of employment (Kurekova, 2011).

Human capital was also considered to explain the individual migration decision making as first established by Sjaastad in 1962 (Sjaastad, 1962). Under his assumptions, Sjaastad regards migration as a human capital investment in which the individual migrants assesses the costs and returns of migrating and would decide to migrate if the returns are higher than both psychic and material costs (Gallup, 1997; Sjaastad, 1962). Harris and Todaro factored in the expected income hypothesis by adding the uncertainty of finding a job in destination cities and their impact on unemployment (Harris & Todaro, 1970). In this category also falls the Roy model which suggests that potential migrants will decide to migrate only if the NPV outcome is positive, as the model is deeply rooted in utility or income maximization (Simpson, 2017). According to the income maximization theory, migration decisions are to be influenced by income differentials and income inequality, welfare magnets, migrants' networks and friends, government taxes, transfers and safety nets, insurances and remittances.

Family decision making models (or family migration theory) were also hypothesized (Bailey & Cooke, 1998; Gallup, 1997; Stark & Lucas, 1988), implying that decisions to migrate are not taken by solitary individuals but by family settings whereby the gains of migration will be shared by the family. In rare occasions, however, will all family members be permitted to enter the desired destination country at once, thus invoking the notion of 'tied' movers or tied stayers depending on whether the interests of the migrant were to stay or move but they are unwilling to do so for broader family gains (Gallup, 1997), and most of times, staying family members pledge support to the departing one. Other important drivers of migration include the information and networks of friends and relatives that potential migrants have. It has been acknowledged that friends and families provide lodging and food while the new migrant is looking for a job as they also assist them with the psycho-sociological comfort they need to integrate in the new environment (Gallup, 1997; Kurekova, 2011). Through these networks, available resources make migration

more attractive and feasible, resulting sometimes in 'chain migrations' as reported by Boswell (Boswell, 2002).

Historical structural approaches of migration such as World systems theory and the dependency theory, stress the need for international migration and emphasize that migration is a result of the increasing interconnectedness and globalization. They point to the role of growing capitalism and concentrations of power in the North. These capitalistic powers achieve dominance in the production field and position themselves at the top of the international division of labor, penetrating the markets of other core states and being able to influence the tide in migratory flows (Chase-Dunn, 2006). As analyzed by Kurekova: "the expansion of export manufacturing and export agriculture linked strongly to foreign direct investment flows from advanced economies to semi-developed or emerging economies has led to a disruption in traditional work structures and has mobilized new population segments into regional as well as long-distance migration" (Kurekova, 2011).

As far as the theories of migration are concerned, one cannot omit the dual labor theory that was proposed by Piore in 1979. He posited that migration was not driven by supply but rather by demand in developed economies where capital and labor intensive firms are constantly seeking both skilled and unskilled labor from poor countries. Generally, less skilled laborers are willing to take up low grade and low skilled jobs with little to no chances of progress, less paid and sometimes hazardous that natives may be unwilling to take (Piore, 1979). This theory has of course, as any other theory of migration so far, been challenged for its inability to explain immigration differentials in countries with relatively similar economic structures. It was also criticized for its high emphasis on receiving countries and ignorance of the structural and political determinants from sending countries.


Finally, there exists a plethora of theories of migration, however disparate and less cumulative of one another. Although the task seems daunting, the quest for a unifying, inclusive and explanatory theory of migration has left migration scholars unsettled for many years and is likely to persist in years to come. On one hand, some believe there would never be an all-encompassing theory. On the other hand, others believe the ongoing effort should be sustained and elevated to higher levels (D'Haas, 2011). In this dissertation, we make the case that theories shall always

emerge but caution the generalized failure to recognize migration as an integral part of the history of mankind. It should be tackled as a social phenomenon which has, for centuries and millennia, been inextricably linked to the survival of mankind. Most of the theories discussed above narrowly frame migration and tend to describe it as a new sociological, economic and geographical phenomenon, yet it is as old as mankind. We therefore contend that efforts to explain and theorize migration should trace back its origins and understand migratory processes as constitutive elements in the making of modern civilizations. Certainly, there existed no modern technologies of communication to publicize it, politicians of the time had not integrated it in their agenda, but ancient texts unanimously provide unquestionable accounts of people on the move, which resulted in the formation of historical empires and modern states. Therefore, until we recognize the adamant nature of migration and the critical role it has played in shaping today's economies and societies, shall we be able to accurately conceptualize it and devise appropriate mechanisms to address it.

## **2.2 Drivers of international migration**

For so long, the principle of economic rationality has constituted one of the most widely endorsed theoretical underpinnings of migration (Carling & Collins, 2017; Rotte & Vogler, 1998). The developments around the migration architecture and the complexity it entails have gradually led migration scholars to relinquishing the primacy of economic rationality that has long held an almost sacred place in theories of migration. As a result, migration discourse has gradually shifted from 'determinants' to 'causes' and, lately, to the concept of 'drivers' to encompass other aspects other than economically rational ones such as aspirations, ambitions, desires and self-determination (Carling & Collins, 2017). Drivers can be understood as forces leading to the inception of migration and the perpetuation of movement (Hear, Bakewell, & Long, 2017).






**Figure 1: Frequency of selected terms by scholars to study migration since 1990.**

Source: (Carling & Collins, 2017).

Push and pull models of migration in some of the classical literature suggested that migrants were pushed by low incomes in their home countries and pulled by higher incomes and better prospects in well off countries and regions (Hear et al., 2017). However, such models have been criticized by academic scholars in the field of migration, mostly due to their inability to evolve and to account for changing technological, sociological and economic contexts as well as changing emotions and perspectives or changing decisions en route (D'Haas, 2011). Theoretically, attempts to conceptualize migration as a social process have bounced back and forth like a pendulum as is amply discussed in (D'Haas, 2011). Push and Pull and gravity theories, on one hand, hypothesize that income differentials, employment, social securities and social freedoms will continue to drive migration and regulate migratory flows. In the same vein, Simpson maintains that 'migrants are pulled into destinations that offer high wages, good health care and strong educational systems'(Simpson, 2017). Thus, arguing that migrants calculate and compare the net advantages of migration to the cost (Simpson, 2017). Transition theories on the other hand, suggest a non-linear relationship between development, economic growth, and migration. While it can be widely accepted that lack of democratization and political freedoms will propel migrants to move, it can also be argued that lack of personal and political freedoms will inhibit potential migrants to move (D'Haas, 2011).

Weighing in on the drivers of migration in the horn of Africa, Campbell postulates that the principle factors driving migration are concerns about the limited value of their education, peer pressure (many friends are leaving), and an awareness that diaspora nationals with better qualifications monopolize the best jobs and because 'there is nothing to do' at home (Campbell, 2017). Other scholars believe that the existence of social networks in the diaspora constitute a major factor in triggering international migration, as friends or family members in diaspora may incite those that stayed behind to migrate and may even be migration enablers (Rotte & Vogler, 1998). Indeed, increasingly larger Nigerian and Ghanaian populations in Europe can be partly explained by this fact.

Recently, there is a growing body of literature signposting the increase of migratory flows due to Climate Change and the concomitant devastation of livelihoods, especially in poor countries unable to devise mechanisms and strategies to cope and adapt to changing weather and climate patterns (Black, R., Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Warner, Hamza, Oliver-Smith, Renaud, & Julca, 2010). Natural and environmental hazards are predicted to increase in various parts of the world and more people are expected to evacuate from nature's harm (Beine & Parsons, 2012). However, failure to isolate environmental degradation from other driving factors of migration has often led to confusion and inability to demarcate between forced or voluntary migration related to environmental changes (Afifi, Govil, Sakdapolrak, & Warner, 2012). For instance, as shown in figure 2, previous studies have reported phenomenal increases in coastal flooding as reported in (Black et al., 2011), which is likely to induce further movements.



*Figure 2: Predictions of urban coastal flooding in Asia and Africa, considering the levels of economic growth and governance* Source: (Black et al., 2011)

### 2.3 Current Views, Schools of Thought on Migration and Development

The debate about migration and development has remained inconclusive for decades, from optimism in post second world war era to deep concern and pessimism in the 1970s, then to the wave of optimism in the early 2000s (Haas, 2010, 2012; Raghuram, 2008). The renewed momentum and interest in the role of migrants in development started in the year 2003 with the Global Development Finance's Report on the value of remittances for the first time, and their finding that the transfer of finances achieved through remittances by far exceeded that through foreign aid (World Bank, 2003). Since then, much of the discourse has shifted from a negative view of migration as the source of all evils for receiving countries towards a rather positive evaluation of migration. In fact, till towards the end of the 20th century, migration was often portrayed as an evil resulting in insecurity, buckling of the social fabric and unemployment while regarded as the culprit for vicious circles of poverty in countries of origin; brain drain being often

painted as the perennial effect. As a matter of fact, migration was identified as one of the problems that development interventions aimed to address in Africa (Bakewell, 2007).

According to Raghuram, several factors may have intensified the renewed interest in the relationship between migration and development from the onset of the twenty first century: the limited success of much of the development practice thus far, with changing development paradigms from Rostow's emphasis on economic growth (Rostow, 1960), to the United Nations' sustainable livelihoods approach in 1987 (United Nations, 1987) and later to Moser's basic needs (Moser, 1993); increasing concerns over migration in a securitizing world with fears that underdevelopment in regions of the South would spill over to the developed North in tragic forms of violence and insecurity; as well as the rise of anti-immigration lobbies and political parties in the developed countries that heightened the public and political anxieties about migration (Raghuram, 2008). Scholars take a separate stance depending on whether they view migration as the outcome of underdevelopment, poverty and inequality or whether they perceive it as a result of development itself, in which case it may seem inevitable (Raghuram, 2008). This dichotomous interpretation was also reported by Castles and Wise in their book entitled "Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South" (Castles & Wise, 2007).

While exploring the first stance, i.e whether development suppresses migratory flows, Michael A. Clemens' conclusions are unequivocal: "over the course of a "mobility transition", emigration generally rises with economic development until countries reach upper-middle income, and only thereafter falls; the latest data and a half-century of research suggest that as typical poor countries grow, emigration pressure actually rises. Migration pressure only typically falls when they grow past upper-middle-income status. In poor countries, more development means more migration, not less. Policies to foster development may thus be most effective when paired with policies to accommodate mobility" (Clemens, 2014); thus, contradicting earlier claims that migration supports economic growth through remittances, technology and skills transfer, development of transnational networks, which in turn, suppresses the pressure for migration (Bakewell, 2007). Such conclusions are congruent with the findings of Bigsten who, while researching on the

circular migration of smallholders in Kenya, asserted that rural development, desirable though it is on other grounds, is unlikely to have the effect of stemming the flow of migration (Bigsten, 2016). As development proceeds, human capital accumulates, connections to international networks increase, fertility shifts, aspirations rise, and credit constraints are eased. All these changes tend to raise emigration. The most important of these factors appear to be rising education levels and international connections, which both inspire and facilitate emigration (Clemens & Postel, 2017).

In his theoretical perspective, Hein de Haas argues that the classical opposition between pessimistic and optimistic views about migration's impacts should be nuanced by the empirical evidence of the highly heterogeneous nature of migration-development interactions (Haas, 2010). Challenging the literature that argues that there is a necessary trade-off between a development and a security-orientated migration policy, Lavenex and Kunz make the case that this dichotomous juxtaposition hides the many ways in which different orientations can be combined, depending on the institutional context within which they are framed (Lavenex & Kunz, 2008). Viewing migration as a *fait accompli*, the United Nations radically shifted the focus from questioning its relevance for development, rather towards leveraging its potential developmental impacts.

The inclusion of migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development presents a momentous opportunity to assess the impact of migration on a range of development issues and to understand better how development can impact on migration and migrants. The central reference to migration in the 2030 Agenda is target 10.7 under the goal "Reduce inequality in and among countries". It is a call to "facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies" (IOM, 2018). Pursuant to the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants, the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration by the United Nations General Assembly in 2018 presents a significant opportunity to leverage the positive relationship between migration and development (IOM, 2018). As it has been mentioned

earlier, this sort of consensus on the necessity to integrate migration into development policies is, in part, due to the mounting evidence from scholars that it is part of the sustainable livelihoods approach by the growing middle class in poor countries.

A holistic approach should incorporate the dimension of migration as a strategy for families' sustainable livelihoods and economic prosperity. Financially enabled families in low-income countries of Africa are increasingly seeking employment in the global North for higher wages and sending students in universities overseas. As Oliver Bakewell puts it, migration has always been a strategy used by people to try to improve their quality of life, and a development industry that fails to recognize this will severely limit its impact on poverty reduction (Bakewell, 2007). For instance, exploring the effect of migrant workers on employment in Denmark, Foged and Peri found that the arrival of migrants from Somalia, Afghanistan, Iran and Lebanon had a positive effect on employment in a sense that low skilled native Danish abandoned heavy manual works for better employment with higher salaries and equally saw their employability levels increasing (Foged & Peri, 2015).

Examining the relationship between migration and development in the Sahel, Fall maintains that the region cannot remain on the sidelines of the developments that are taking place globally in terms of judicious exploitation of the potential of human mobility in the perspective of sustainable development (Fall, 2016). This author suggests that policy makers and stakeholders should strive to detect and understand the skills of migrants in order to integrate and harness them into governance and development planning; adding that migrant associations based in Europe or in the countries of the North are today privileged or even essential actors of international cooperation and have become essential interfaces for development partners, thanks to their numerous achievements (Fall, 2016).

Particularly in Africa, given the promises of a bright future at the time of independence through the deteriorating economic and political conditions of the late 1970s and 1980s to the perception of a dismal future in the 1990s, many Africans now see migration as a last hope for improving their living standards (Adepoju, 2008). The 2006 Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and

Development, recognizes that migration is both a common challenge and opportunity for Africa and the EU and that appropriate responses can best be found together (Adepoju, 2008).


#### **2.4. Conceptual framework**

To assess the drivers of the intention to migrate from the horn of Africa, this study adopted the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), which is a successor to the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) put forward by Fishbein (Fishbein, 1979; Knabe, 2012). One of the significant shortcomings of the TRA is the inability to capture the ability of the subjects to implement the behaviors and the level of control they would have on circumstances that would hamper the concretization of their intentions into behaviors (Knabe, 2012). The Theory of Planned Behavior thus came as an corrigendum to enable the TRA to deal with behaviors over which individuals have incomplete volitional control (Ajzen, 1991). In this study, both the migration from one's country to another with the goal of reaching Europe and settling in Rwanda have been considered as the behavior types under study. It assumes that both actions depend on conscious effort and stem from the rational thinking decision to act in a certain way. According to this theory, there exists three conceptually independent determinants of intention namely (1) Attitude towards a certain behavior, (2) Subjective Norms and (3) Perceived Behavior Control.

In this dissertation, they have been referred to as TPB Constructs. The first relates to the degree to which a person has a favorable and/or unfavorable evaluation of the behavior or its outcomes, while the second measures the perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform a behavior. For instance, parents and family members would expect a 30-year-old plus to marry. Colleagues and friends might also have positive opinions about it or lash out some injunctions to do so. In this way, the individual's intention to marry at the age of 30 years and plus might increase. The third construct refers to the level of self-efficacy of the agents. It pertains to resources, opportunities and support available for individual agents to perform such desired behavior (Ajzen, 2005). Under the assumptions of the model, the salient beliefs precede attitudes, behavioral beliefs derive Subjective Norms while control beliefs make up the PBC.

As Knabe puts it “It is important to note that each of the variables are hypothetical or latent, and thus cannot be directly measured. Instead, the measurements are inferred from observable responses on a questionnaire” (Knabe, 2012).

The following figure (figure 2) illustrates the theoretical framework employed in this study:



**Figure 3: Theoretical and conceptual framework as adapted from Icek Izzen (Ajzen, 2005).**



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## CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

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### 3.1 Study Area and study population

The present research is based on primary data collected from respondents residing in Gashora Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM), Rwanda. The center was built by the Government of Rwanda, in partnership with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and received funding from the European Union. Under the agreement, as brokered by the African Union, Rwanda pledged to take in about 30,000 migrants on a gradual basis; five hundred of which were to be relocated at the Gashora ETM (UNHCR, 2019). According to the provisions of the standing memorandum, refugees and migrants admitted in the center are either accorded residence in a third country (resettled), returned to the country of origin or allowed to stay in Rwanda in accordance with their will (Mwai, 2019; UNHCR, 2019).


The center is located at Gashora in Bugesera district, which is situated within an hour of drive from Kigali city (approximately 60km) and is built to ensure the safety and wellbeing of asylum seekers and refugees it accommodates with modern facilities and improved amenities. Although UNHCR proposes three possible durable solutions, only one solution is deemed acceptable by refugees and asylum seekers; and that is resettlement in a European country as they vow<sup>1</sup>. On December 30<sup>th</sup>, 2020, the fifth batch of 130 refugees and migrants was successfully put aboard an evacuation flight from Libya to Rwanda, where they will be housed, nourished, clothed, medically treated, given pocket money and put to safety (Mutanganshuro, 2020a). Since 2019, 515 refugees and asylum seekers have been evacuated from Libya to ETM Rwanda. Upon arrival, they are registered and provided with proof of registration. They are further informed on ways to access protection and humanitarian assistance. Registration activities are followed by individual case processing for solutions. The procedure includes Refugee Status Determination

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<sup>1</sup>“Life inside Gashora Transit Center hosting refugees and asylum seekers from Libya” (2019), [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_5Z-pFXUWBU](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5Z-pFXUWBU), last consulted on 02.02.2021

(RSD), Best Interests Assessments (BIA) and Best Interests Determinations (BID) for children with specific needs, including unaccompanied and separated children and resettlements interviews (UNHCR, 2021).

As of April 23, a total of 259 refugees and asylum seekers were hosted in the center, including 242 refugees and 17 asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2021). Approximately 88% of them are adults (18-59 years old), and 234 live in the center as households. Figure 3 shows the repartition of refugees and asylum seekers with regards to their countries of origin. They are mainly from Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia. All individuals at the center are given shelter. They are dispatched along the 30 blocks designated for families, single women and girls, males, and boys for all ages. Community leadership structure exists whereby each block has a representative (UNHCR, 2021). Refugees are permitted to leave the camp, do business, shop, practice all kinds of sports and socialize with host communities in the commercial center around the camp.



**Figure 4: Distribution of refugees and asylum seekers by country of origin, source: UNHCR Rwanda, 2021**

### 3.2 Data collection

In this study, quantitative data were collected from refugees residing in Gashora camp via questionnaires, designed by the researcher, following Icek Ajzen's TPB questionnaire construction example (Ajzen, 2013). The questionnaires were administered by means of

convenience and snowball sampling. In this case, standard sampling techniques such as probabilistic sampling were deemed impossible because the necessary permissions to access the entire study population were denied by the responsible authorities. As part of the non-probabilistic sampling methods, Snowball sampling is often used when random sampling is not theoretically, practically and feasibly sensible (Etikan, Alkassim, & Abubakar, 2015). In this exercise, snowballing refers to instances where respondents were brought in by initial respondents based on acquaintances. Convenience refers to instances where respondents were identified and approached by the principal investigator by means of random walk around the environs of the camp, especially within the nearest commercial center and/or along the shores of lake Rumira where refugees and asylum seekers are accustomed to being basking at the sun, swimming and interacting with locals in late hours of the afternoon.

Respondents were first briefed on the purpose of the survey, and it was made clear beforehand that participation was voluntary. As most respondents did not speak English, an interpreter was hired to translate questions from English to Arabic. Two reasons formed the basis on which Arabic was selected as the language of interpretation: first, a largely significant number of refugees and asylum seekers come from Sudan (see figure 3) where Arabic is the usual language of communication; secondly, all refugees had been living in Libya for at least 2 years prior to their arrival in Rwanda, which gave them the occasion to learn Arabic as one of the survival mechanisms in Libya. In total, 49 respondents agreed to answer the questionnaire but, in the end, 43 respondents were considered for the analysis as the remaining 6 respondents were unable to answer all the questions asked in the questionnaire.

Initially, we identified the salient beliefs by administering 10 questionnaires that comprised open ended questions such as “Why did you choose to move away from your country of origin? How did the idea come into your mind?”, or “What did friends in your country think about migrating to Europe?”. This step was important to ensure the questions made sense to the respondents and that several attributes measured were informed by the realities of respondents. This offered a crucial opportunity to revisit the questionnaire and to adjust where necessary. For example, initially, we had listed Ethiopia and South Sudan among the primary migrant-origin countries

but discovered afterwards that respondents were predominantly coming from Sudan and Eritrea, while there was only 1 respondent from Ethiopia.

### **3.2.1 Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the respondents**

To construct respondents' profile and control for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics data were collected. Respondents were asked to select their country of origin, age category, employment status before leaving their country of origin, languages they speak, marital status, place of residence in origin country, highest level of formal education achieved, and amenities/utilities enjoyed prior to commencing their migratory journey. Employment status was coded as a dummy variable, 0 denoting unemployment and 1 denoting employment before leaving one's country of origin. For age, participants were asked to circle the right age interval that corresponded to their age, ranging from less than 18 through 60 years and above, whereas, for education, they were asked to select between categories none, primary, secondary, bachelor's degree, master's, and PhD. Social demographic variables were included to get an insight on the characteristics of the respondents and to inform the discussion on what could be driving the intention to migrate from one's own country. In previous studies, it has been found, for instance, that demographic characteristics such as age significantly explained the intention to adopt new technologies (Knabe, 2012).

### **3.2.2 Measuring the refugees' intention to migrate to Europe, stay in Rwanda or return to their countries of origin**

Following Icek Ajzen (Ajzen, 1985, 2005), intention to move or to stay in Rwanda was measured through TPB constructs. Two variables assessed the attitude towards Rwanda, thus forming the behavioral beliefs with one outcome variable included to capture the impact of outcome evaluations on migration decisions. In this regard, respondents were asked to rate their opinion on a 7-point Likert scale, on whether they would accept asylum in Rwanda.

To evaluate the influence of attitudes and beliefs on the intention to either settle in Rwanda or seek resettlement in a third country, respondents were asked to rate their opinion on whether Rwanda was a beautiful country to live in or whether they believe they could achieve a lot more

in Rwanda than in their country of origin. The Direct attitude was measured as the mean score of the three statements.

To assess the subjective norms, respondents were asked to rate the opinions of their friends, family members or people who are dear to them, about settling in Rwanda. Participants were also asked to explain to what extent they would be willing to comply with the suggestions of their parents and friends when it comes to settling in Rwanda. Direct measurements of subjective norms were established by averaging participants' scores in all the two variables measuring the influence of society, friends, and family with regards to migration intentions.

Similarly, the intention of migrating to Europe, attitudes, beliefs, social norms and perceived behavior control were assessed by means of 7-point Likert scale questions. Responses were recoded in such a way that the selection of "1" represented the highest degree of disagreement (extremely disagree) while "7" represented the highest degree of agreement (extremely agree) with the statements. Several studies used the 7-points ratings to assess the TPB constructs (Borges, Lansink, Ribeiro, & Lutke, 2014). In total, 9 statements intended to measure individual perceptions about migration whereas 8 statements measured participants beliefs about the likelihood of positive outcomes of migration, which, in sum, morphed into the direct measures of attitude. In total, there were 10 subjective norm statements. The average scores of respondents on each statement were retained to establish the direct measure of Subjective norm. Perceived Behavior Control (PBC) was assessed in two iterations. The first iteration looked at the enabling factors prior to embarking on the migration journey, i.e, how participants evaluated their capacity to migrate from their countries of origin to other countries whereas the second iteration assessed refugees' self-efficacy with regards to moving out of Rwanda and settling in third party countries. In total, 5 statements measured the behavior controls at start while 5 statements were used to assess the present controls over the migratory decision. Table 1 illustrates Statements and scales used to measure intention (INT), attitude (ATT), subjective norm (SN) and perceived behavioral control (PBC). However, given the complexity of migration, some factors could not be controlled for by adopting the proposed conceptual framework of the TPB alone. For example, it was also important to analyze how migrants perceive the security threats and survival risks ahead prior to embarking on their journeys. To do so, we expanded the model by incorporating an extra

variable, hereby denoted as P-Know, to assess the level of knowledge and awareness that migrants possessed before setting off. We also included one variable to measure the influence of climate hazards, political instabilities and lack of democratic freedoms in enhancing migration by integrating variables Att\_11, Att\_12, Att\_13 and Att\_16 as shown in table 1. However, since some of these variables undermined the internal consistency between observations, they were treated separately in the regression equation. As Campbell notes, it is important to look at the complex factors which influence migration including the politics of governance, political economy, geography and what happens in transit (Campbell, 2017).

**Table 1: Statements and scales used to measure intention (INT), attitude (ATT), subjective norm (SN) and perceived behavioral control**

Variable	Statements	Scale (1-7)
Att1	For me, migrating to Europe is necessary	Extremely necessary Extremely unnecessary
Att2	The United Nations High Commission for refugees also considers voluntary repatriation where migration to Europe is impossible. Therefore, returning to my country of origin is for me	Totally acceptable Totally unacceptable
Att3	If I were successful in my attempt to Europe, I would definitely achieve more (in terms of income and wealth) than staying in my country of origin	Extremely true Extremely false
Att_R1	If I were successfully settled in Rwanda, I would definitely achieve more (in terms of income and wealth) than staying in my country of origin	Strongly agree Strongly disagree
Att_R2	Rwanda is a beautiful and peaceful country to live in	Strongly agree Strongly disagree
Att_R3	Rwanda offers much better opportunities than my country of origin	Strongly agree Strongly disagree
Int_R1	If I were given asylum in Rwanda, I would gladly accept it	Strongly agree Strongly disagree
Int_R2	I intend to stay here in Rwanda	Strongly agree Strongly disagree
Int_R3	I will request asylum to the Government of Rwanda	Strongly agree Strongly disagree
Att_4	For me, staying in my country of origin was riskier than starting the journey to Europe through Libya	Extremely true Extremely false
Att_5	Despite the suffering I have had to undergo in Libya, I consider that it was worth it	Extremely true Extremely false
Att_6	If I happen to reach Europe, my chances of getting high paid employment are	Extremely high Extremely low
Att_7	If I reach Europe, I am certain that I would receive decent housing from the government of the EU host country	Extremely true Extremely false
Att_8	If I reach Europe, I am certain that the government of the EU host country would provide me with a regular living allowance	Extremely true Extremely false
Att_9	If I reach Europe, I am confident that the government of the EU host country would provide me with a better health insurance	Extremely true Extremely false
Att_10	If I reach Europe, I am confident that the government of the EU host country will make sure that my rights are observed, and I will be treated with dignity and respect	Extremely agree Extremely disagree

Att_11	In areas experiencing recurrent droughts, I personally believe that people should migrate to other places for greener pastures (i.e better sources of livelihoods)	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
Att_12	I was exasperated by periodic political and military conflicts in my country	Extremely correct Extremely incorrect
Att_13	I think that compulsory indefinite military service can push people out of their countries	Extremely true Extremely false
Att_15	I decided to go to Europe because there were no jobs, and nothing else to do at home	Extremely true Extremely false
Att_16	It is better for me to live in a country where free and fair elections are regularly held than in dictatorial or rogue regimes	Extremely true Extremely false
Att_17	Reaching Europe would overall make me happier than if I stayed in my country	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
P_Know	Before starting the journey to Europe through Libya, I was well aware of the risks and dangers that migrants faced, including possible death, detention and slavery	Extremely true Extremely false
SubN_1	When I took the decision to migrate to Europe, my family members supported the idea	Extremely true Extremely false
SubN_2	When I decided to migrate to Europe, it was actually my parents and/or relatives that pushed me to do so	Extremely true Extremely false
SubN_3	When I took the decision to migrate, most of my friends in the neighborhood had already moved to Europe	Extremely true Extremely false
SubN_4	When I decided to move, my colleagues at work and/or former colleagues, peers, classmates had positive opinions about the benefits of settling in Europe	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
SubN_5	My friends think that I will be rich once I reach Europe	Extremely true Extremely false
SubN_6	In my country of origin, it is generally believed that better and well-paying jobs are held by diaspora nationals that return home with better qualifications	Extremely true Extremely false
SubN_7	After all I have been through in Libya, my family members now think that I should return home	Extremely true Extremely false
SubN_R1	After going through so much in Libya, my family members think that I should stay here in Rwanda	Extremely true Extremely false
SubN_8	After going through so much in Libya, my family members think that I should keep trying every possible chance to go to Europe	Extremely correct Extremely incorrect
SubN_9	After all I have been through in Libya, my friends think that I should continue going to Europe	Extremely correct Extremely incorrect
SubN_R2	After going through so much in Libya, my friends think that I should give up and stay here in Rwanda	Extremely correct Extremely incorrect
SubN_10	After going through so much in Libya, my friends think that I should give up and return home	Extremely correct Extremely incorrect



SubN_R3	If my parents or other people whose opinions I value asked me to stay here in Rwanda, I would	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
SubN_11	If my parents or other people whose opinions matter to me asked me to return to my country, I would return	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
PBC_1	Obtaining a travel passport in my country was	Extremely difficult Extremely easy
PBC_2	For me, being able to move out of my country has been	Extremely difficult Extremely easy
PBC_3	When I left my country, it was completely up to me whether or not to leave	Extremely correct Extremely incorrect
PBC_4	When I chose to migrate, I was confident that I could move out of my country no matter what	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
PBC_5	Prior to starting the journey, I had support from smugglers to cross borders from my country to Libya	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
PBC_6	When I left my country, I had enough money to pay for irregular border crossing	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
CBC_1	Up to this stage, I believe that going to Europe is	Absolutely possible Absolutely impossible
Int_E_1	I will spare no effort to go to Europe	Absolutely agree Absolutely disagree
Int_E_2	I look forward to settling in Europe	Absolutely agree Absolutely disagree
Int_E_3	I intend to seek resettlement in a third-party country	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
CBC_2	For me, I won't have problems once I arrive in Europe because I have friends and/or relatives there	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
CBC_3	At present, UNHCR will assist me with the necessary paperwork to go to Europe	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
CBC_4	Whether I choose to stay in Rwanda or to go to Europe is completely up to me	Extremely agree Extremely disagree
CBC_5	When I left my country, I had enough money to pay for irregular border crossing	Extremely agree Extremely disagree

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Att: variables referring to attitudes; Att\_R: variables reflecting attitudes towards settling in Rwanda; Int\_R: variables referring to the intention to settle in Rwanda; P-Know: variable evaluating the prior knowledge before migration; SubN: variable referring to the subjective norms; SubN\_R: Variables referring to subjective norms with regards to staying in Rwanda; Int\_E: variables making up the construct intention to go to Europe; PBC: variables referring to past perceived behavior control; CBC: variables referring to current behavior control

### 3.3.3 Statistical analysis

Data analysis was performed using SPSS. The reliability of the scales used to measure the TPB constructs was analyzed using the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient (Bagheria, Bondori, Allahyari, & Damalas, 2019). As in most literature, a Cronbach coefficient greater than 0.6 highlights that there is an internal consistency between statements measuring the construct, thus enabling summation, and averaging of statements' scores to obtain indirect attitude, indirect subjective norm and indirect perceived behavior control (Senger, Augusto, Borges, Armando, & Machado, 2017; Vermeir & Verbeke, 2007). In the same vein, scores of statements used for intention, attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavior control could be summed and the mean score could effectively represent direct measures of intention, attitude, behavior control and subjective norm. On the contrary, a Cronbach's  $\alpha$  that is less than 0.6 could be indicative of a low degree of internal consistency between statements and rules out the possibility for sums and averages unless backed up by strong theoretical underpinnings (Senger et al., 2017).

Multiple linear regression models were utilized to infer relationships between refugees' intention to stay in Rwanda and assess the likely determinants of the penchant toward third country resettlement. This study adopted an equation estimation procedure as follows:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ATT_i + \beta_2 SN_i + \beta_3 PBC_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Y denotes the independent variable, i.e, the intention to migrate to a third country for resettlement or the intention to stay in Rwanda for individual i; The dependent variables ATT, SN and PBC denote attitude, subjective norm, and Perceived Behavior control, respectively, with  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_2$  and  $\beta_3$  as the corresponding coefficients of interest.

The linearity assumption has been tested and all variables and the residuals of both models were carefully checked for normality, homoscedasticity, and collinearity. The Kormogorv-Smirnov test & Shapiro-Wilk's test were used to estimate the normal distribution between residuals, while the Durbin Watson test helped to rule out autocorrelation between residuals. However, since our

sample size was relatively small, we considered the Shapiro-Wilk's test. The cook's distance was also checked to estimate the number of outliers in the dataset.

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## CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

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### 4.1 Migrants sociodemographic characteristics

Analysis of sociodemographic characteristics was crucial to this study to depict profiles of individuals that resolve to migrating internationally from the horn of Africa. As it can be observed from table 2 below, almost 80% of respondents in this study were aged between 18 and 35, with an almost 50% aged from 18 to 25 years. This confirms earlier claims that younger people have a penchant for international migration as they have energy and the highest level of ambition required to embark of such adventurous journeys. They are mostly risk tolerant and often have little to lose in their decision to do so, as opposed to older segments of the society that may lack the necessary physical strength. The dynamics of age reported in this study are congruent with the previous findings by Giray and Panu (2020), who, while invoking the self-selection of migrants to investigate on the characteristics of migrants and their ideal destination countries, found that the mean age for migrants was approximately 26.41 (Giray & Panu, 2020).

***Table 2: Sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents***


<b>Respondents' age group</b>		
	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Less than 18 years	7	16.3
From 18 to 25 years	21	48.8
From 25 years to 35 years	13	30.2
From 35 to 45 years	2	4.7
<b>Place of residence in origin country</b>		
Capital city	20	46.5
Another big city	10	23.3
Small city	5	11.6

Rural area	8	18.6
<b>Marital status</b>		
Single	13	30.2
Married	29	67.4
widow	1	2.3
<b>Employment status before leaving country of origin</b>		
Employed	8	18.6
Unemployed	35	81.4
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	39	79.1
Female	9	20.9

As Obi C. et al (2019) put it: “in extreme food insecurity crises, young people may seek all possible ways to migrate to high income countries to help their households” (Obi, Bartolini, & D’Haese, 2019).

Among the characteristics that have been studied in this study, is the place of residence in migrants’ origin countries. With this, it was hypothesized that potential migrants in the capital city and larger cities might have had possibilities and access to information about migration through social and media networks while residents of rural areas might be less informed and less motivated to migrate. Table 3 indicates that 46.5% of our respondents were residing in the capital cities of their countries of origin, while 23.3% resided in comparatively large cities other than the capital. Thus, it can be estimated that 70% of those trudging the Mediterranean route from the Horn of Africa largely come from bigger cities like Asmara, Khartoum, and Mogadishu. However, this research has cast light to a non-negligible proportion of migrants coming from rural areas in their home countries, which goes up to almost 20%, suggesting that the urge for international migration is increasing even in rural areas. Nevertheless, caution should be applied prior to embracing this interpretation. What could be interesting here, is to trace back the migration experiences of the respondents to ascertain whether, even those that reported living in the capital or big cities in their home countries had not initially migrated from rural areas. In the latter scenario, international migration would thus be inscribed in a set of sequences whereby migrants take intermittent steps prior to leaving their own countries. It is important to note, however, that, over the past decade, international migration from rural areas has gained momentum in the migration and development literature (Obi, Bartolini, Brunori, & D’Haese, 2020).

Seeking to have a glance at whether educational attainment might have a role in shaping migratory decisions, the study analyzed the variations in levels of formal education achieved by migrants. From figure 4, it can be noted that approximately 50% of the respondents had completed secondary school while 34.9% had only accomplished primary, 9.3% had no formal education at all and only 4% had reached university levels.



**Figure 5: Distribution of respondents according to the level of education**

Education is an important aspect to look at when reflecting on the drivers of migration as previous studies established unequivocal links between educational attainment and migratory decisions. For instance, less educated, low skilled migrants were found to be driven by short term income/ wage fluctuations while highly educated migrants were more influenced by trends in income levels and unemployment (Simpson, 2017).

Analysis of employment status reveals that an overwhelming majority of respondents had no jobs in their home countries. 67.4% were single while 30.2% percent were married. Even so, it is important to highlight an even larger share of single migrants at start as many of the respondents founded families along the migratory journey, including those that got married while in Rwanda as explained by respondents during oral discussions. This study confirms earlier claims that married people were less likely to migrate on their own and that, even if they did, they were more likely to return home (Simpson, 2017). As it can be observed from the table above (table 2), the unquestionable influence of unemployment in shaping migration decision can be inferred. There

has been strong scholarly evidence to suggest unemployment was one the leading push factors of migration (Rotte & Vogler, 1998; Simpson, 2017).

#### **4.2 Model diagnostics: Multicollinearity and Internal Consistency of the Model constructs**

Analysis of reliability results revealed that statements to measure the migrants' attitude towards Rwanda, and the statements for the construct of attitudes and behavioral beliefs towards migration to Europe were internally consistent as shown in Table 3 beneath. Statements for measuring the Subjective Norm construct were also measured for reliability and they proved to be internally consistent. All the reported coefficients (Table 3) are above the recommended value of alpha, which confers the possibility to proceed with the analysis of constructs. However, the statements for measuring the Perceived Behavior Control were found not internally consistent as their Cronbach alpha coefficient fell way below the recommended threshold of 0.6. Excluding statements to improve the coefficient was not helpful either. Nevertheless, some studies argue that analysis of the construct should still be performed provided there exists a theoretical link between statements employed and the construct (Senger et al., 2017). To perform Ordinary Least Squares regression, linearity assumptions were validated, and the residuals autocorrelation was ruled out with a Durban Watson value of 2.072, which is within the normal range (Abdulhafedh, 2017; Turner, 2019). Multicollinearity was excluded by the checking tolerance (T), Condition Index (CI) and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). In normal circumstances, T should be greater than 0.5, VIF less than 10 while CI should be less than 30 (Tay, 2017).

***Table 3. Reliability analysis for constructs Attitudes, Subjective Norms and Perceived Behavior control***

<b>Construct</b>	<b>Cronbach's alpha coefficient</b>
Statements for attitude towards settling in Rwanda	0.941
Statements for subjective norms towards settling in Rwanda	0.724
Statements for attitude towards resettlement in a third country	0.611
Statements for measuring the subjective norm	0.628
Statements for measuring the perceived behavior control	0.270

### 4.3 Migrants' intention to stay in Rwanda

Descriptive statistics in table 4 show that, overall, migrants' intention to stay in Rwanda is low, indicating a strong opposition to the idea of settling in Rwanda. According to the scale used in our dataset, the mean score of 2.5 lies between "quite disagree" and "slightly disagree". The same applies to their perception of what Rwanda could offer them in terms of opportunities and achievements in comparison with their countries of origin. Their intention not to demand asylum in Rwanda was mainly driven by the direct attitude. The behavioral beliefs employed to measure this construct were associated with approximately 80% of change in intention to stay, keeping all other factors constant. These were more related to what migrants thought they could achieve if they stayed in Rwanda, and the quality of life that they might have. While a significant number of them agreed that Rwanda was a beautiful country to live in, scores were generally very low when asked to rate their expected achievements in Rwanda as opposed to their countries of origin. They also scored very low when asked about the opportunities that Rwanda could offer in comparison with their countries of origin.

**Table 4 Descriptive statistics regarding migrants' attitude towards Rwanda (*att\_R*) and their intention to stay (*Int\_R*)**

	(n=43)	Mean	Std. Deviation
If I were settled in Rwanda, I would definitely achieve more than in my country of origin		2.8372	1.83783
Rwanda is a beautiful country to live in		2.9767	1.43905
Rwanda has better opportunities than my country of origin		2.7674	1.41147
I intend to stay here in Rwanda		2.5814	1.41812
If I were given asylum in Rwanda, I would gladly accept it		2.5116	1.53331
I will request asylum to the Government of Rwanda		2.5116	1.40360

Linear regression results revealed that the construct "Attitude" was statistically significant in explaining the highest level of variation in the level of intention to stay in Rwanda, while Subjective Norms and Perceived behavior control played lesser roles (Table 5). These results are congruent with findings of previous studies applying TPB in other behavioral contexts. For example, (Onek, 2020) found that attitude played a significant role in determining farmers'

intention to adopt iodine fertilization. In the same way, Fisher (2016) reviewed literature on the efficacy of the TPB to predict intentions to choose travel destinations and concluded that attitude towards taking a vacation at a destination was found to be an important factor in predicting intentions to take a holiday at that destination (Fisher, 2016). Also, Ajzen (1991) predicts that attitude towards performing a certain behavior was able to partially explain variations in the intention towards implementing the behavior (Ajzen, 1991).

**Table 5: Regression Analysis results on the intention to stay**

Variables	Unstandardized coefficients (std error)	Standardized coefficients ( $\beta$ )
Direct attitude	0.808 (0.079) ***	0.817***
Direct subjective norms	0.179 (0.12) *	0.118*
Perceived Behavior Control	0.372 (0.084) ***	0.343***
R Square	0.77	

\*denotes 10% significance level; \*\*denotes 5% significance level, while \*\*\*denotes 1% significance level

*The intention to stay in Rwanda is the regressand whilst Attitude, Subjective Norms and Perceived Behavior control are regressors*

It can be noted that the Attitude significantly explains more than 80% of the variation in migrants' intention to stay in Rwanda. Subjective norms did very little to influence the refugees' intention to stay in Rwanda, thus implying that opinions and expectations of friends and/or relatives were not very important in making the choice at this stage. Additionally, the behavior control, in this case, whether migrants had control on their decision to move or stay, was positively explaining 37% percent in the variation of the intention to stay.

#### **4.4 Migrants' intention to seek resettlement in third party countries**

Results suggest that all study participants had a very high intention to seek resettlement in Europe and/or Canada, as the minimum overall mean intention score rose to 6.5 on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating a low intention and 7 indicating the highest intention to migrate to third party countries in Europe or Canada for asylum. Their evaluations of self-efficacy and the influence of social norms were relatively low as shown in Table 6:



**Table 6. Mean and standard deviation for each of the TPB construct**

	(n=43)	Mean	Std. Deviation
Intention to request asylum in an EU country		6.5039	0.45642
Subjective norms		4.5767	0.70096
Perceived Behavior Control		3.9553	0.45454

In most cases, participants had limited or no control on whatever could have eased their migratory process. For instance, almost every participant noted that passport was not easy to obtain in their countries and, in some cases, being able to cross the borders of their countries was not guaranteed as is the case in Eritrea with the so coined “shoot to kill” practice at the border (Reisen, Saba, & Smits, 2019). Also, most of them were unemployed prior to embarking on the journey, which explains the fact that they did not have enough money to pay for irregular border crossing costs. The scores increased, however, when they were asked about the present behavior controls. At this stage, neither money nor passport are required to go to Europe, after being tagged as Person of Concern by the UNHCR. They view resettlement to a European country increasingly plausible and had total support from the aforementioned UN body.

Unlike the intention to stay in Rwanda, the intention to request asylum in an EU country was more galvanized by participants’ evaluations of self-efficacy and the assurance in the possibilities to do so. However, it is important to note the overall high scores on almost every statement used to measure the migrants’ attitude towards resettlement in an EU country, apart from the statement assessing their awareness on risks involved prior to making the decision to migrate via unauthorized migration routes as shown in Table 7.

**Table 7: Mean scores for statements used to measure the direct and indirect attitude towards resettlement in an EU country**

<b>Statements</b>	<b>(n=43)</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>
Migrating to Europe is necessary		6.6977	.63751
If I were successful in my attempt to Europe, I would achieve more than in my country of origin		6.6744	.60635
If I were successful in my attempt to Europe, I would achieve more than in Rwanda		6.6512	.71991
Returning to my country of origin is for me acceptable/nonacceptable		1.9070	1.19152
Staying in my country of origin was riskier than starting the journey to Europe through Libya <sup>xx</sup>		2.4186	1.94242
Despite the suffering I have had to undergo through Libya, I consider that it was worth it <sup>xx</sup>		4.2791	2.62157
My chances of getting employment in Europe are extremely low/high		6.6977	.55784
If I reach Europe, I am certain that the government of the EU host country would provide me with a decent housing		6.5814	.82325
If I reach Europe, I am certain that the government of the EU host country would provide me with a regular living allowance		5.7209	1.99196
If I reach Europe, I am certain that the government of the EU host country would provide me with a better health insurance		5.7442	1.96509
If I reach Europe, I am confident that the government of the EU host country will make sure that my rights are observed, and I will be treated with dignity and respect		6.5349	1.20216
In areas experiencing recurrent droughts, I believe people should migrate for greener pastures		5.4186	1.91774
I was exasperated by political and military conflicts		4.6512	2.23483
I think that compulsory indefinite military service can push people out of their country		5.8140	1.40163
I decided to go to Europe because there were no jobs and nothing else to do in my country		5.6047	2.04869
It is better for me to live in a country where free and fair elections are held		5.1860	1.54698
Reaching Europe would overall make me happier		6.4186	1.07421

*xx: Variables not included in the regression model as their presence limited construct reliability*

It can be noted that participants scored relatively high on each statement except when asked to compare the risk of staying in their country with the perils they got exposed to in Libya or when they were asked to evaluate their perceptions towards returning to their home countries. Obviously, almost all participants in this study viewed migrating to Europe as an extremely necessary step. Equally, very high scores were obtained for statements evaluating migrants' perceptions and beliefs about potential achievements in the EU and the possible welfare benefits that the governments of European countries provide once asylum is recognized. It is also important to underscore the fact that migrants hope for overall happiness in life once they reach Europe, hence, the relevance of studies examining migrants' life satisfaction in Europe as in (Slosse, 2019).

In Table 8, it can be observed that control beliefs explained as much as 50% of the variation in levels of intention to seek resettlement in Europe as opposed to the intention to stay in Rwanda where it was determined that behavioral beliefs and outcome evaluations had great influence on the levels of intention to stay in Rwanda. These findings reveal that social networks and friends did not significantly explain the change in intention characteristics, while behavioral beliefs forming the construct attitude explained 19% of variation in migration intention at 10% significance level. The underlying mechanism here may be related to the fact that, at the time of our investigation, the intention to go to Europe was not new for the concerned subjects. They had had the intention and implemented the behavior when they first set off for migration. Subjective norms could have arguably been influential in the first place. Presently, more importance is attributed to the actual capacity to keep moving. The existence of a coordinated mechanism through which UNHCR assists all the migrants (in Rwanda referred to as refugees) in their procedures to apply for resettlement in third country confers upon them a high level of confidence and certainty that they could arrive in Europe.

**Table 8: Regression estimates on the relationships between TPB constructs and the intention to resettle in an EU country**

<b>Construct</b>	<b>Unstandardized coefficients</b>	<b>Standardized coefficients (<math>\beta</math>)</b>
Attitude	0.19 (0.131) *	0.211*
Behavioral norms	-0.026 (0.098)	-0.039
Control beliefs	0.505 (0.141) ***	0.507***
R square	0.33	

\*denotes significance at 10% level, \*\*denotes 5% and \*\*\* denotes significance at 1% level

An attempt was made to evaluate the relationship between whether or not migrants were informed about risks and dangers they would face along the journey with the overall intention to migrate to Europe. However, the model did not satisfy the linearity assumption and the ANOVA was not statistically significant ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). The same scenario happened when we attempted to assess the contribution of democratic freedoms and conflict prevalence in shaping migration intentions. Therefore, our results can only be descriptive here. We find that 55.8%, 11.6% and 18.6% of respondents had no knowledge about the risks involving slavery and detention in Libya prior to setting off, as they responded to the statement by “extremely disagree”, “quite disagree” and “slightly disagree”, respectively. This indicates that efforts to reduce irregular migration could also focus on exposing the perils which migrants are exposed to. Similarly, 4.7% and 51.2% of participating individuals respectively selected “quite agree” and “extremely agree” on the question of whether people should move to other countries when faced with recurrent droughts and other natural calamities. In this study, it has also been found that most of the migrants did not have enough money to pay for smugglers and assistance on the way. Respondents from Sudan revealed to us that they could do some manual labor activity along the way to gain some money towards the next step. This reveals the highest level of determination and hope in the possibilities to migrate from their countries. For almost all the participants from Eritrea and Sudan, obtaining a passport was very difficult and expensive, which could also be regarded as an incentive for irregular migration, albeit, as they reported, issuance of passports could contribute very little if the current highly restrictive visa regimes are perpetuated.

The complexity associated with getting visas and travel documents serves as a compounding factor for irregular migration, in as much as, in the eyes of migrants, migration is a prerequisite

and a 'sine qua non' for survival. Hasia Diner, one of the renowned contemporary historians, as a result of her investigations in the foodways and ethnic cultures of European migrants in the United States, once wrote: *"Where there is bread, there is my country"* (Diner, 2003). She amply explains that hard labor without food in Italy, Ireland or Eastern Europe propelled a cascade of migrants from a dozen of European countries to the United States where they could work on farms, factories and mills in exchange of abundant and high quality foods (Diner, 2003). Similarly, Obi C et al. (2019) also maintain that food crises exacerbated by erratic climatic changes, violence and other uncertainties are important drivers of international migration (Obi et al., 2019). In this regard, the story of a 17-year-old Sudanese migrant is worth reporting. When asked to rate his living conditions in Rwanda against his living conditions in Sudan, he says: *"In Sudan, it's a desert. Everything is dry, no water and no trees. People are suffering. I was living with my mother. We had no food to eat. But here in Rwanda, you can see for yourself. It is very green, plenty water and a pleasant weather"*.

On the possibility to accept voluntary repatriation, results in table 8 below, demonstrate that as high as 95.3% of our respondents considered this alternative unacceptable. For 79.1% of the respondents, repatriation to their countries of origin was either extremely or quite unacceptable, which indicates a strong opposition to this option. Given that several factors that instigated migration remain prevalent in the countries of origin, these results are not surprising. For instance, in Ethiopia, the federal government recently waged a war against the TPLF army in the region of Tigray. This resulted in massive refugee influx to security-wise inherently fragile neighboring states like Sudan and Eritrea. In Eritrea, military service remains compulsory and anyone aged 18 years of age and above is conscripted to indefinite military service despite the peace deal with Ethiopia (Reisen et al., 2019).

**Table 9: Descriptive results on the possibility to return to countries of origin**

	<b>Frequency (n=43)</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Totally unacceptable	19	44.1
Quite unacceptable	15	34.2
Slightly unacceptable	7	16.2
Slightly acceptable	1	2.3
quite acceptable	1	2.3
Totally acceptable	0	0

The study also investigated the role played by each of the statements to measure attitude with the overall attitude towards moving to an EU country as illustrated in Table 10. Results indicate that, keeping all other factors constant, expected benefits in Europe such as living allowance, and overall happiness respectively explained 7% and 12% of change in attitude towards migration to Europe while recurrent droughts, political and military conflicts respectively explained 9% and 4% of overall attitude towards migration to Europe. Most importantly, it can be inferred that migrants embarked on the migratory journey as a necessity for life, in well thought of circumstances. The necessity to migrate for a better living was able to explain as high as 27% in the positive changes towards attitudes with regards to international migration. Similarly, we find that the perceived employment and the state of idleness in home countries was also among the significant drivers of positive attitude towards international migration. Our results corroborate earlier claims that climate change, political instability, unemployment and different standards of living could have been driving migratory movements in the past and are likely to do so in the coming future (Beine & Parsons, 2012; Rotte & Vogler, 1998). These findings also highlight the importance of self-worth and aspirations in migration, as previous researchers observed (Carling & Collins, 2017).

**Table 10. Regression estimates for the relationship between behavioral beliefs and direct attitude, as well as the Cronbach's  $\alpha$  for the eight behavioral beliefs**

<b>Behavioral beliefs</b>	<b>Unstandardized coefficients (std error)</b>	<b>Standardized Coefficients (<math>\beta</math>)</b>
Migrating to Europe is necessary	0.271 (0.189)*	0.33*
If I reach Europe, I am certain that the government of the EU host country would provide me with a decent housing	0.092 (0.056)*	0.14*
If I reach Europe, I am certain that the government of the EU host country would provide me with a regular living allowance	0.076 (0.033)**	0.28**
In areas experiencing recurrent droughts, I believe people should migrate for greener pastures	0.093 (0.025)**	0.34**
I was exasperated by political and military conflicts	0.049 (0.342)**	0.20**
I decided to go to Europe because there were no jobs and nothing else to do in my country	0.064 (0.023)**	0.24**
Reaching Europe would overall make me happier	0.126 (0.04)**	0.25**
Cronbach' $\alpha$	0.606	

Only significant variables are reported. \* denotes 10% significance level, \*\* denotes 5% significance level, \*\*\*denotes 1%

The study participants indicated that migration to Europe was necessary to gain decent housing, achieve financial freedoms through social welfare benefits in forms of living allowance or decent employment. The crucial importance participants accorded to the happiness they expected in Europe is also worth of attention. Hence, it can be argued that efforts to tackle irregular international migration should require multifaceted schemes susceptible to raise happiness levels in countries of origin. Indeed, the Global Happiness Index report ranks most of the Sub-Saharan African countries well at the bottom, considering the 9 domains used in the calculation of the GNHI such as psychological wellbeing, time use, community vitality, cultural diversity, ecological resilience, living standard, health, education and good governance (Ura, Alkire, Zangmo, & Wangdi, 2012). It is far beyond unemployment or wage differentials.

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## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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### 5.1 Conclusions

The present study sought to expand the international migration literature by using the Theory of Planned Behavior framework to understand the drivers of migration intentions in the horn of Africa by taking evacuees from Libya, currently relocated in Rwanda as a case study. Three constructs namely, attitude, subjective norms, and Perceived Behavior Control (PBC) were used and examined for their differentiated roles in determining migration intentions. Reliability was established for statements measuring both Attitude and Subjective Norms, whereas statements for PBC did not stand up to the test of internal consistency. The intention to stay in Rwanda was much more conditioned by direct and indirect attitudes while subjective norms and PBC played a seemingly lesser role. We also find that migrants were still committed to migrating to third party countries of Europe, with higher intention scores. Since the study subjects were already in transit towards Europe, higher intention scores could suggest the ability of TPB to accurately predict human migration intentions. As noted by Icek (1991), the inclusion of past behavior in the prediction equation is shown to provide a means of testing the theory's sufficiency. To the best of the author's knowledge, this study is one of the first studies to apply the TPB model to understand human migration intentions.

We also explored the migrants' intention to adopt either of the three options proposed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees namely, voluntary repatriation where possible, asylum in the Republic of Rwanda or resettlement in third party countries in Europe. The overwhelming majority of respondents strongly opposed both the voluntary repatriation and asylum in Rwanda. Their dominant aspiration was to settle in Europe. None of the respondents rejected the possibility to be resettled in Europe. These results indicate that, despite the setbacks and suffering they underwent in Libya, the original intention remains adamant. This extremely



high level of intention, as explained by linear regression results, was predominantly determined by what migrants perceived as enabling factors captured in the construct of PBC. They believed that landing onto the European soil was a dream closer to reality, mostly due to the assistance provided by the UNHCR, which processes asylum requests on their behalf. Most of the respondents had already seen their friends taken to either Norway, France or Sweden and they believed their turn was getting nearer. Also, respondents believed they were able to adapt in Europe as they had friends and/or relatives already settled there.

Moreover, it has been found that several factors contributed to building a positive attitude towards resettlement in an EU country, such as the lack of jobs and the state of idleness in their own countries, and the prevalence of political instability and military conflicts. Two other factors influencing attitude towards international migration captured our special attention: the concern about recurrent droughts and the expected levels of overall happiness. Participants considered that recurrent droughts and other natural hazards should form the basis upon which migratory decisions could be made, thus certifying views that climate change is likely to intensify human migratory movements in the coming years (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010; Kniveton, Schmidt-Verkerk, Smith, & Black, 2008). Also, the particular importance attached to the level of happiness in Europe is suggestive of the generalized feeling of unhappiness and unwellness that potential migrants experience in their home countries. Similarly, migrants undertook the migration journey out of necessity as shown in Table 10. The imperative to move was explaining 27% of variation in positive attitude towards intercontinental migration.

## **5.2 Limitations of the study**

The primary limitation to this study concerns the relatively small sample size and the sample selection procedure that might have introduced some self-selection bias. However, analysis of the socioeconomic characteristics of respondents revealed that they were reasonably distributed in terms of age, gender and country of origin as compared to the statistics of the whole population as discussed in chapter 3. Besides, as is the case for most TPB studies, the relative importance of background socioeconomic factors in driving intentions has not been assessed (Borges et al., 2014; Senger et al., 2017). Yet, background factors such as education might also play a role in shaping

attitudes and perceived behavior control. In this study, the model would make little sense since the group considered was relatively homogenous with predominantly the same age category and educational achievements.

Also, as Sussman & Gifford (2019) posit, TPB model needs to be adjusted to account for possible endogeneity between the predictors and the predicted variables. For instance, we evaluate the impact Attitudes, Subjective Norms and PBC could bear on the intention to migrate to Europe or to settle in Rwanda, but we fall short of examining the possible reverse relationship. We therefore reiterate the call for future TPB studies to consider this eventuality in their predictions (Sussman & Gifford, 2019). Furthermore, it could be helpful, in the future, to improve the predictions by incorporating more powerful statistical models such as Structural Equation Modelling to assess the relative importance of both measured and latent variables in the model (Senger et al., 2017).

Most of the TPB studies in social sciences relied on a relatively small number of variables (statements used to derive constructs) to increase internal reliability although they seemed redundant and arguably unable to provide meaningful information on the determinants of intention. Yet, the complexity of migration and its drivers requires that genuine scientific analyses incorporate as many factors as possible, although they tend to limit internal consistency and reliability of constructs. For this reason, perhaps, our perceived behavior control variables were found not internally consistent. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for TPB studies in social sciences to wrestle with reliability challenges for the PBC. For instance, (Senger et al., 2017) failed to have an internally consistent PBC construct, despite only having 5 statements to measure the construct. Future studies could be helpful to propose a framework to include all theoretically meaningful variables without compromising the reliability aspect, while dealing with complex sociological phenomena such as migration.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

This study has revealed that migrants had little to no intention to settle in Rwanda, despite the government of Rwanda's readiness to offer them asylum, should they request it. Their intention not to stay was primarily determined by direct attitudes, which were also influenced by the evaluations of outcomes such as opportunities and achievements which they could not obtain in their home countries. Therefore, raising attractiveness of countries in the South calls for policy frameworks to diversify opportunities for natives and immigrants alike. Such opportunities could be related to meaningful employment, education, and talent development. In Rwanda, for instance, the unemployment rate went as high as 22.3% in November last year (Mukundabantu, 2021). Offering hope to young people from the continent requires to address systemic unemployment, among others.

Higher levels of intention to migrate towards Europe were also found associated with certain normative beliefs, mostly related to expectations in Europe. Most of them are expecting decent housing, employment, health insurance and living allowances that EU host governments provide, should asylum claims be recognized. However, such beliefs do not always stand up to scrutiny. The lack of a common EU immigration policy makes it that each government of the EU handles the matter as it pleases their political and economic interests. What is often ignored is that asylum requests might take too long to process and, in some cases, may yield to rejection (Slosse, 2019). Additionally, this study has shown that most respondents were not aware they would be harassed, killed, detained, sold, or enslaved in Libya before they set off for Europe. Awareness campaigns are thus primordial to make sure migrants make well calculated risks and avoid decisions based on misleading information.

Furthermore, among the factors driving attitudes towards intercontinental migration from the Horn are the perceived political instability and military conflicts. No effort should thus be spared, and no chance should be wasted to restore peace and to silence the guns in the Horn as well as in other parts of the continent. Although the African Union had ambitioned to silence the guns on the continent by the year 2020 (Musau, 2019), concrete results are yet to be seen. To restore peace and stability, the continental body recognizes the need to address the root causes of conflicts and

wars, including illiteracy, unemployment, and social exclusion. There is a compelling need to invest in economic development to instill hope in an approximately 600 million African youth that are unemployed (Musau, 2019). Here, real actions to support Africa's growth and development are paramount. It invokes a paradigm shift from the traditional loan and aid policy that consisted of trickling down less consequential sums in exchange of policies and reforms that were not always beneficial to developing economies.

Hence, we salute the debt moratorium to oxygenate African economies even as they combat the debilitating effects of the COVID 19 pandemic. Even further, it is critical that new voices such as that of H.E Emmanuel Macron, advocating for a Marshall plan for Africa are heard and followed. In his recent trips to Rwanda and South Africa, he alerted on and questions the failures of the current politics of development. He maintains that if the African youth lacks economic opportunities, if it is not properly educated and, in absence of well-functioning health systems, it will emigrate (Theveniaud, 2021). Massive investments on the continent, in the likes of Marshall Plan for Europe in the aftermath of the second world war, could increase economic opportunities, boost employment, promote Africa's growth and industrialization, and unleash Africa's full potential. By doing so, wealthy destination countries would also be ethically protecting themselves from insecurity, terrorism and humanitarian emergencies that often stem from obscurantism factored with misery.

Moreover, respondents to the survey indicated that they cherished democratic values and were hopeful that they would be treated with dignity and that their rights would be respected and protected in EU destination countries. There too, efforts aimed at reducing irregular migratory flows should contribute to the enforcement of civil rights and personal protection and uphold democratic principles whereby equal chance of participation is guaranteed for all. In this regard, Africa's development partners should revise their strategy and reconsider funding priorities. Democracy, in its genuine sense we believe, will be achieved through inclusive, sustained and quality education. As long as the masses of the African peoples remain uneducated or illiterate,

dictatorial regimes would remain unchallenged even through the ballot boxes due to rampant political, ideological and ethnic manipulations in form of chauvinism, corruption and tribalism.

Additionally, the increasingly important role played by climate hazards in informing migratory decisions should be tackled by, among others, mitigating the impacts of disasters and reducing populations vulnerability and ensuring sustainable livelihoods for vulnerable communities. This can be done by, for instance, honoring commitments to the Paris climate agreement accord to curb global emissions and reduce global warming to 1.5 degrees above preindustrial levels but also facilitating technology and skill transfer. Under the agreement, industrialized economies were also to avail a 100-billion-dollar fund annually to support developing economies in lessening the impacts of climate change, shifting towards net-carbon growth and enhancing communities' resilience.

Finally, this study has shown that migrants aspire to be happier in Europe than they are in transit or origin countries. Addressing international migration should consider, beyond economic and security considerations, other sociopsychological factors that may contribute to an individual' wellness and happiness in their countries of origin. The Bhutanese Happiness Index ranks countries of the Horn of Africa at the very bottom when classifying populations based on happiness. It is therefore recommended that analysts, policy makers, private and public actors strive for the improvement of happiness in all its dimensions.

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## Appendix

*Table 11: Mean scores, frequencies, and percentages for all the statements used to estimate direct attitude, Perceived behavior Control and behavioral norms*

Intention to Europe			Behavioral Beliefs			Subjective Norms			Perceived behavior control		
Mean score	frequency	%	Mean score	frequency	%	Mean score	frequency	%	Mean score	frequency	%
5.33	1	2.3	4.12	1	2.3	2.50	1	2.3	3.15	1	2.3
5.67	4	9.3	4.47	1	2.3	3.40	2	4.7	3.31	3	7.0
6.00	3	7.0	4.59	1	2.3	3.70	1	2.3	3.38	1	2.3
6.33	12	27.9	4.76	2	4.7	3.80	1	2.3	3.46	2	4.7
6.67	10	23.3	4.94	2	4.7	3.90	1	2.3	3.54	4	9.3
7.00	13	30.2	5.00	2	4.7	4.00	3	7.0	3.62	2	4.7
			5.12	2	4.7	4.10	4	9.3	3.69	2	4.7
			5.18	1	2.3	4.20	2	4.7	3.77	4	9.3
			5.24	2	4.7	4.30	2	4.7	3.85	1	2.3
			5.29	1	2.3	4.40	1	2.3	3.92	5	11.6
			5.35	3	7.0	4.50	1	2.3	4.08	2	4.7
			5.41	2	4.7	4.60	2	4.7	4.15	2	4.7
			5.47	3	7.0	4.70	4	9.3	4.23	3	7.0
			5.59	3	7.0	4.80	5	11.6	4.31	2	4.7
			5.65	3	7.0	5.00	2	4.7	4.46	2	4.7
			5.76	3	7.0	5.20	3	7.0	4.54	1	2.3
			5.88	1	2.3	5.30	1	2.3	4.62	3	7.0
			5.94	2	4.7	5.40	2	4.7	4.69	1	2.3
			6.00	4	9.3	5.50	3	7.0	4.77	1	2.3
			6.06	1	2.3	5.60	1	2.3	4.85	1	2.3
			6.29	1	2.3	6.00	1	2.3			
			6.41	1	2.3						
			6.65	1	2.3						



Picture from field data collection,  
Gashora, Rwanda  
March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2021